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AI AiSTBACT or TIl 'l'HISIS OF l'.(JBda L. McDoDalci for the laster of 
Arts in Psychol.". presented Jul1 25. ~9?)•. 
T1tle I 	 A '1'heoX7 of the Cre&t1v1t7-InteUigence Inte:z:actlon. An 
Bnvirouental Suppressor Variable 
APPJiOVID BY DMBDS OF TO TDSIS OOOI'l'J.'D 
In the couonly held view. creativ1ty an4 lntelll~. interact 
in a imtually eDlancing _,.. Their 1ntemctlon, h.....~t ls assuae4 
to be slight and. reJat1ve17 untaportant. and to titId 1til ceiUng at a 
oertain IGl level. Beyond th1a IQ ce1l1Dg, no in\;hraction ·1. belle"d 
to OOCl1r, aBel the tw. variables are a8suae4 to be indepeaient. It is 
suggested that this vi•• and those theorists who hold. 1t cle 11ttl. to 
e~la.1n tne rea.aOJJS for the cell1Dg eU.at. 
An attempt is ma4e to clevise a theoretical S7S~. whioh accounts 
for and explains the ce1llDg effect. as well as providing new groWld. 
tor the synthesis of existing experiaental data tr. a wlele range of 
related fields. The theoretical 818"-. 18 'taaed. upon the hypothesis 
that an envlronaelltal variable acts te suppress increased. p~tent1al 
foX' ereatlvit7 aceolll*nylng 11lCre&aes 1& 1ntell1pnce level, and. that 
this va.r1able 1s able 1n effect to oanoel the h1glt.er potent1al for 
creativ1ty which .y exist aaong those above the celling level of 
1IltelUpace. 
The r8s-.rcb is re'rie'" 1n search of aD7 suPJO~ tor or cr~­
tical refUtation of the hJpotheai8 &Del 1ta corollari••, and suges­
tlo. are .... aa to the posa1'ble ~to:r:a of the suppressor-variable 
aUect. It ls eODCl.ud.ed that the 8U.,....SOr-va.r1a'b1e hJpethesls 1s a 
vah1able one-one .bleb, alo~. witA 1'ts .ppleaeatart hypotheses. pro­
vides a useftll .eana of br1ngisag together widely d1versified boties 
of research data, aDd acoOUD.te for the ce1llDg effect without violating 
J.ogical and intti.t1ve concept1tms of intelUpnoe aDd. ezeatlvit1'. 
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If any oulture is to profit fully from its members, or any indi­

vidual to derive raaxitnum benefit from his own potential, then the 

. nature of intellectual and creat1ve abilities must be fully explored. 
It 1s clear that we can only enhance and develop these mysteries if 
they cease to be mysteries and become definable phenOltlena, however com"'" 
plex the definition. 
The importa.nce of' intelligence has no',. been overlooked by our 

culture-as is troll attested to be our burgaonJ.ILZ 1n-t.erest in and E:ven 

obsession with -The IQ" in our schools. businesses, and private lives. 

hOll even a casua.l e>amina:',ion of the intelligence 11tara.tura, 1t can 

be swouised ~lat we are zather more interested in our l&ck of intelli­

gence than in our possession of it. Neverthelesso we have oerta~y 

not neglected placing emplas1s on the importance of \mdersta..nd1ng (and 
acoeierating) intellectual abilities. 
Our preoccurat1.on "".,.th oreativity is re1a.t1,"ely young. J. Po 
Guilford. (19.50) made the comment that only 186 titles had been pulilished 
in PsyohoJ.ogiool Abstraots in the twenty-three years from 1927 to 1950 
which could 00 indexed as relevant to the subject of crea.t1vi't,y. Ti'.k"1.t 
sltuat,ion has drastic~lly changed in the twenty-three years !..~ 19.50e 
,A great amount of researoh and speculation has been done a.bout creativ­
ity since t.hen, and it. ha.a become an important ooncern. St11l, a.s pre.... 
occupations go, creativity hoLIta a dG:f~:tn1te second place ne:A."t to intelll­
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gellce, and many feel that the conceptual revolution which brought jJiS 
significance to light has not been revolutionary enough~ 
The revolution has not gone far enough because it difficuit.-­
more difficult than we find it to be for intelligence--to specify the 
importance of creativity. Creative prqcesses are simply less clearly 
related to successful functioning withL~ our culture. ({hat do they 
mean, in terms of potential benefit for the individual, or for the cu.I ...... 
ture? 
For' thE) individual, Torrance (1962) has suggested that creativ­
ity brings ment1C31 he.slth, full functiontng, and. better ab:'Llity tio cope 
with stress, difficulty, and problem solving. BaITon (1968) expressed 
the same sort of conviction: that creativity is somehcrN related to 
health and vi'tiality, to ttcourage, resourcefulness (an4J .flexibili.ty_ .• 
(p. v:i.). n In short, it seemed "lio Barron that creativity was a culmina­
tion of things good for individuals t.o be. 
There is a rather strong Gt.hical tone to some of these pre­
concept,:Lons, as I have suggested." But I would 'Llrge here that 
we must avoid any ilTqJlicHtion that the healthy person psycho­
logically must necessarily be a good person morally. For the 
most part it is probably a healthy th:L1'1g to be rather well be­
haved, and as a rule VIe are in better health when we are cool 
and collected.... But thei'e are tilll€!S when it is a mark of 
greater healt.h to be unruly and a stgn of greater inner re­
sources t·o be able to unset one's OVlIl balance and to seek a 
nevi order of selfhood (PP. 3-4). 
Although it. is certainly not the intention this paper to taka 
a position 'as hu.1!k1nistic in tono as does this passage, )ve do not argll.€J 
with Barron's assertion th:lt creati',ity j.B good for inmviduals.. Of 
course, there are many differe:mt convictions as strongly held as this 
one about what. it is good for people to be. None of them; including 
Barronfs, can be anything but beside the point if they suggest ber~vior 
patterns 1-lhich are "good" for individuals, .but bad for the survival of 
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their cu1tur~. That is an absolute which nrust be bas:l.c even to iilldivid~ 
ual goo.d, 'as icultural survival is basic to indivIdual surn'val., And 
creativity is not of overwhelmingly apparent value to a cultural organ­
ism. As B. ~. Skinner (1972b) qomments, 
,
, 
Many aqcidental cultures have been marked by uniformi'!:,y al'~~:t 
regiment,tion. The e..'ti.genci~s of administration in govlttT.U1Bn­
tal, re],.~gi.ous, and economicl systems breed uniformity, .beC:~iJse 
it Simplifies the problem of control. Traditional educationFl 
establishments specify "w'lhat the student 1.s to learn at 7lhat 
age and administer tests to mak~ sure that th9 specifications 
are met. The codes of government and r,eligicns are uS}lally 
quite explicit and al1a~ little room for dive~sity or change 
(p. 	162). 
Although most cultural institutions have al1'iay~,; Oe.en, and still 
seem to 1::e, unaware of the advantages of encouraging Cl"e3 tive beh8vior 
I 
in their member~, the advantages do exist, and it is t::Lme t,hey were rec­
ogni?ed, along with the very real dangers of conformi ty. Sk:in.'1.tn.~ con·.. 
tinues: 
If man were very much alike, they would be less likely.to 

hit upon or design new practices, and a culture 'Vlhich made 

people as much alike as possible might slip into a standard 

pattern from which there 'W ould be no escape (p. 162). 

The principle means of survival in an evolutionary system. r.~ve 
alw~ys been adaptability and flexibility. Species have been able to 
survive because they were able to adapt to .changing environmental cir-, 
cumstances. Man has survived and flourished chiefly because of his 
great flexibility and his freedom from fixed, reflexiv~ behaviors. 
This is an absolute, a fact of and an explan<.ltion for his continued 
existence on this planet. It is good, in one of the 'few senses of the 
word ttgoodll which can be universally agrood upon: its applicability to 
solutions for the problem of survival. 
There is no reason to believe that the value of flexib:ility is not' 
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as real at a cultural level as it is at the biological level. For ever,y 
culture there is a changing environment, and ours is no exception. Haw 
are we to adapt to physical and social changes if we, as a group and as 
individuals, have destroyed our capacity for flexibility? As Torrance 
(1962) points out, the "future of our civilization-:our very survival-­
depends upon the quality of the creative imagination of OU1" next gener­
ation (po 6).!t 
In the -face of this biological absolute of adaptability, our own 
culture seems to be intent upon elim.in~ting the differences among its 
members, and the flexibility withln them(l Friedenberg (1959) argues 
that Americans began to use their school systems as a kind of homogeni­
zation process V8r,y early, because of a need to unify their melting-pot 
culture--and they have never recovered from the tendency, now that the 
need for it is past. Thus, creativity, originality, and individual dif­
ferences are seen as inequalities in need of stirring up, not as assets 
and potential for cultural grO'tvth, flexibility and survival. 
From a cultural st.andpoint, then, there is no need or possibility 
of avoiding an evaluative quality in our interest in craa'liive behavior.­
We can often assume that when a behavlor can be placed a long a creativ­
ity continuum, it can be evaluated. And thaif "creativetr equals "good. 1t 
Of cour~e, there are li.m.:i.ts as to how much individual eccentricity is 
valuable for a culture, but these lit'llits can be allo"r'1ed for if we incor­
porate into our criteria for creati.vity some qualification of applica­
bility or appropriateness. 
A more serious danger, to which we must constantly be alert, is 
the assumption that \t:;hat is a good degree of individual variation and 
creativity for a culture is the degree natn:rally recognized and retn­
forced by that culture. Unfortunately, the evolutionary and accidental 
nature of the development of cultures usually precludes foresighto Any 
culture may respond to its present environment ~ shaping its members in 
a way which will eventually mean its own destruction. This seems espe­
cially possible in a r~pidly changing Culture, where the future demands 
maximum flexibility, but the present shaping processes and structures 
are the result of a more stable time. We cannot trust to the wisdom 
of the cultural status quo. It may be our job to instigate a process 
of change--to begin encouraging creativity in the members' of our culture 
so that it can survive, in spite of its own a~~erence to the shaping of 
noncr.eative behaviors. l 
I. PRESENT VIEWS OF THE CREATIVITY-INTELLIGENCE INTERACTION 
The need for creativity among the members of our culture, and the 
add.i.tional need for an increased emphasis upon creativity and apprecis­
tion for it, are well reco"gnized here. They are indispensible and vital. 
But it should not require argument to assert that intelligence is also 
necessary for the full realization of cultural and individual potential. 
The assertion seems superfluous. Yet, there seems to be little willing­
ness among intelligence researchers to stipulate the importance of crea­
~ivity, and vice versa. Their natural dichotomy of interests has become 
a polarity of vi~vpoints, and then a battlefront of values. Torrance 
(1962) went so far as to suggest that in its traditional conception, 
IWa qre here asslli"Iling that creativity and other behaviors can be 
reinforced or shaped by the cultural environment--an assumption which 
will later be demonstrated. 
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intelligence is a kind of conformity which is actually antithetical to 
creativity (although he did admit that both kinds of thought are neces­
sar.y for survival). 
Does it come to that? Are they, in fact, that different? As 
Barron (1969) has suggested" it would really be much more in line with 
our expectations if intelligence and creat,ivity turned out to be very 
closely related--and if those we suspected of great intellectual gifts 
were also creative, wit~out exception. This does not prove to be the 
case. Even Barron concludes that, although creativity and intelligence 
have a low, positive correlation with each other over most of their 
range, there is a ceiling effect in their interaction. 
Another way of putting this is to say that for certain in­
trinsically creative activities a spe~ifiable minimum IQ is 
probably necessary in order to engage in the activity at all, 
but that beyond the minimum, which often is surprisingly low, 
creativity has little correlation with scores on IQ test 
(p. 42). 
It is verY widely accepted that the data from studies of the cre­
ativity-intelligence interaction are best described as a ceiling effect 
--although some theorists emphasize the independence of the two variables 
to a greater degree. But the fact of the ceiling effe~t'is a diffi~ult 
one to accept. For, if intelligence contributes to creativity at lower 
levels, why does it act completely independently at higher levels? It 
is not adequate to say that any amount of intelligence is simply enough 
intelligence for creativity. Whatever it is that intielligence provides 
which is necessary for creative processes, it could automatically be 
argue4 (at least) that this variable does not a'l'Tiva in chun.l{s of 
"enough" or tlnot enoughtt--that if some of it, enhances creativity, more 
of it might continue to etlhance creativity. Whal'e there is a reason 
7 
for an inter-relationship, it is essential that the reasons the rela­
tionship ceases to function be specified• 
. In spite of its difficulties, let us examine evidence of the exist­
ence of the ceiling effect. Most of the evidence we have to present 
provides strong support only for its first assumption: that the over­
all relationship be~~een intelligence and creativity is a weak and pos­
itive one. For example, the highest correlation with IQ among the 
Getzels and Jackson (1962) battery of creativity tests is .38 (uword 
association") • Torrance (1959).9 in a review and summa~J of much of the 
creativity-intelligence correlational literature, reported that the 
median correlation be~~een the two variables was 020, with the median 
among verbal t eats of creativity with intelligence at .21 nonverbal 
creativity correlated at merely .06 with intelligence). In his own 
analysis of existing data, Barron (1969) estimated that the average 
correlation was .25 between IQ and i.rnaginativeness or originality. In 
our own revi~~ of obtained intelligence-creativity correlations, few ex­
ceptions to the expected ranges of ~20-.30 have been f01xnd (for typi­
cal examples, see: Saugstad, 1952; Schlicht, Anderson, Helin, Hippe, 
Listiak, Moser, and Walker, 1966; and Getze1s & Jackson, 1962). 
But there are exceptions to this .20-.30 range which seem to 
prove the second assumption of the ceiling-effect description: that 
after a certain IQ level, creativity is not enhanced by increases in 
IQ. For example, an Institute of Personality Assessment and Research 
(IPAR) study, using a group of creative architects as subjects, obtained 
a correlation of -.08 betv/een creativity measures and the Concept Mas­
tery Test (Barron, 1969). Two other groups of architects were chosen 
for ~~nparison with the creative group--one randomly, and one matched 
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for age, background and experience with the creative group. The crea­
tivity level of the creative group was higher, even though the mean IQ's 
of all of the groups were within one point of 130 (Wechsler Adult In­
telligence Scale, or WAIS). These results seem to indicate a ceiling 
for increases in creativity ~ith increases in intelligence at about IQ 
130. The creative architects were of the same average intelligence as 
the other groups, and among themselves shcwlad no net correlation be­
tween IQ and creativity. 
However, the generality of these results is limited, not only be­
cause of the narrow range of creativity found in the group of what 
Barron descr:i.bes as very udistinguished" aremtects, but also because 
of the artistic nature of their profess:i.on, which ~ould automatically 
limit the lower ranges of their creativity at a relatively high level. 
It should also be pointed out that correlating ratings of professional 
creativity with intelligence may as a general rule involve significantly 
stronger threshold effects, because of the basic intellectual qualifica­
tions required for different professions. This may not be the case with 
ttereativityU as opposed to "creative architecturen as the focus of atten­
tion. The professional creativity rating has been Barron's purview, and 
he therefore emphasizes the variability of ce~ling levels. This varia­
bility in where the ceiling effect is to be expected in any particular 
group of subjects does not obscure the fact that cail:i.ng effects are carw~ 
tainly evident in the work of Barron, and of IPl1..R. 
other investigators, who do not have this particular emphasis, 
place the ceiling at a more or less constant ievel of intelligence (for 
example, Terman and Oden, 1947). 
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But ths overwhelming body of research indicates that the ceil­
ing effect does occur. Correlational studies of intelLi.gence and 
creativity yield results in the neighborhood of r = .2-.3 when a 
wide range of intelligence levels is used. Thlt when the intelli­
gence range is narrmv and the overall level is high, zero or neg~ 
ative correlations are the rule (MacKirmon, 1959; Holland, 1961; 
Taylor, Smith, Ghiselin, and Ellison, 1961--a11 reviewed in 
Taylor and Holland, 1964; see also P~pp1e and 1~y, 1962). 
The idea that intelligence and creativity are L~dependent of each 
other above a certain level is supported to a certain extent by the lit­
erature dealing with creativity, intelligence, and achievement. Getzr~ls 
and Jackson (1962) found that an extremely high-IQ group had achievement 
levels in various subjects no higher than those of a less intelligent 
(but still bright) group who were also high in creativity.. The convic­
tion of Getzels and Jackson seems to be that high creativity· and extreme­
ly high IQ are equally effective, independent factors which enhance 
achievement. Their results ware replicated, and similarly interpreted, 
by Torrance (1962). 
Anderson (1960) formulated a view similar to that of Getzels and 
Jackson about achievement, with a few important exceptions. As tested 
and sunnnarized by Cicirelli (196,), this view hypothesizes that trIQ has 
an effect on academic achievement up to a certain threshold IQ level, 
where further increases in IQ would have no further effect on achieve­
ment but '.'there creativity would begin to have an effect (p. 305) 0 1t If· 
achievement is seen as a measure of effectiveness, then a t low levels of 
intelligence IQ :;:$ the critical determinant. At medium levels, both IQ 
and creativ~ty interact, enhancing each other and increasing effective­
ness. At high levels, creativity enhances effectiveness, while further 
IQ increases do not. This hypothesis would not validate the description 
of the creativity-intelligence interaction as a ceilL~g effect, since it 
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only treats their interaction with respect to achievement. However, it 
does put emphasis upon creativity as a critical factor capable of' alter~ 
ing intellectual effectiveness independently of intelligence (like Get­
zels and Jackson). Further, it harmonizes with Torrance1s (1959, 1962, 
1964, 1965) view that creativity is siL~ply a different (and perhaps 
superior) kind of intellective process. 
Cicire1l1's extensive testing of the Anderson threshold hypothesis 
did not find, however, that it was supported by the evidence. This 
might have been expected, considering HollingNorth's investigations of 
so many years before (Hollingworth and Cobb, 1928). She had compared 
groups of gifted children with high (146) and very high (165) mean IQ's, 
and found significantly higher achievement in all different content 
areas among the group with extremely high IQtso Further refutation of 
the Anderson hypothesis is reported by Cicirelli. He cites an unpub­
·lished work by Pielstick (1963), woo found an actual reversal of the 
Anderson prediction. According to the Pielstick results, "The correla­
tion between creativity and achievement decreased as IQ increased 
(Cicirelli, 1965, po 304)." 
Of what significance are the combined :results of Hollingworth, 
Cicire11i, and Pielstick? Although they neither ccnfil~ nor deny the . 
yalidity of the ceiling effect in creativity-intelligence interaction, 
they may indicate a direction we might take in searching for the factor 
respolfSible for the ceiling/) They present us with a question: if 
achievement increases throughout all levels of intelligence, but is not 
continuously enhanced--and may even be negatively affected-by high 
levels of creativity, why should the highly intelligent child behave 
creat;lvaly.? Certainly crestiva behaviors would not gain him a larger 
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portion of the reinforcement accruing to ac..l1ievement, and they might. 
even lose that reinforcement for him. Perhaps, then, there is some 
social variable which is suppressing increases in creativity with in­
creases in intelligence at a ver.r high level. 
II. THE SUPPRESSOR-VARIABLE VIEW' 
Observations by Getze1s and Jackson (1962) and Torrancs (1962) 
support the idea that a social variable suppresses creativity among the 
highly intelligent. They found that, all other things being equal, 
teachers prefer high-IQ students with low creativity to less bright 
students with high creativity--even if their achievemerrt levels are 
equal. Further, Hollingworth asserted that mentally gifted subjects 
with IQ t s over 150 have significantly more adjustment difficulties than 
subjects within the 130-150 range (Hollingworth and Cobb, 1928; and 
Hollingworth, Terman, and Oden, 1940). Apparently, at the 150-IQ level, 
the well-documented social advantages of high intelligence are supers.eded 
by some less familiar disadvantages. 
The Getzels and Jackson, Torrance, and Hollingworth observations 
all hint at social pressures acting upon the highly intelligent to dis- . 
courage or stifle their creativity. It seems to be the result of some­
thing more than chance that the ceiling level in creativity increases 
among the highly intelligent finds such a close analogy in the ceiling 
level of optimal social adjustmento It is impossible to avoid the sug­
gestion that mounting social and interpersonal difficulties, expecta­
tions, and pressures might singly or collectively constitute a suppres­
sor variable which inh:l..bits increased creativity among the highly intel­
ligent .. 
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A hypothetical system based upon the suppressor-variable concept 
'Would be well able to account for the ceiling effect in the creativity-­
intelligence interaction. Increases in intelligence could produc& in­
creases in creative potential, but at the same time precipitate slowly 
accelerating incremen'tis in the effects of certain socio-environmental 
variables having a tendency to decrease creativity. At some level, 
these socio-environmental factors, labeled together under usuppresso;r' 
variable", would produce effects equal to those of the increased' crea­
tivity potential. From that IQ level upward, there would be no net pos­
itive correlation between :intelligence and creativity. A ceiling would 
have been reached. MOdifications of this hypothesis can account for the 
low positive correlations between intelligence and creativity, as well. 
What are the options open to us if we do not accept the suppres­
sor-variable hypothesis? Vfe can choose among a number of closely related 
points of view which are currently in vogue: 
1. Creativity and intelligence are essentially independent fac­
tors of intellective ability (Guilford, 1967; Wallach and Kogan, 1965a, 
1965b; Ga1anter$ 1967; no specific ceiling referred to). 
2. Creativity and intelligence are slightly correlated, but mainly 
~ndependent, factors of intellective ability (Torrance, 1962, 1965; 
Getzels and Jackson, 1962; all placed here by virtue of their findings; 
no ceiling referred to). 
3. Creativity and intelligence are correlated over their lrn~er 
ranges, and uncorrelated above a specifiable or variable ceiling (Bar­
ron, 1968, 1969, and others). 
The first and second viewpoints are derived essentially from 
Guilford's (1967) model, and assert that intelligence as it has tradi­
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tionally been vievved is convergent, conforming and reproductive in na­
ture--while creativity is essentially the opposite: divergent, construc­
tive, and non-conforming. 2 Both viErwpoint,s, then, po:int to what Torrance 
(1962) called the "antithetical" quality of creativity and intelligence. 
The qualification that slight correlations may be found is added by 
those investigators who happened not to obtain insignificant correlations 
in their research. Both of these positions have two difficulties in CODl­
mono 
First" if the two ttability factorslt are so vitally opposite in 
nature" how can it be that they occasionally coincide in a single in­
dividual? Wallach and Kogan (1965a, 1965B) and Getzels and Jackson 
(1962) did find groups of children high in both creativity and intelli­
genoe, and the undeniable reality of men like Einstein must in some way 
be dealt with. Further, the correlations obtained by Getzels and Jackson 
between intelligence and the creativity-test battery were greater than 
those obtained among the creativity tests themsel'V"9so Although intelli­
gence did not account for most of the variance in the creativity tests, 
it was, nonetheless, the most constant indicator of creativity in a wide 
variety of test contexts o How, then, can we say that the two variables 
are independent? 
Second, although Getze1s and Jackson emphasize heavily the differ­
ential environmental phenomena in the homes of creative and noncreative 
2Convergent thought is understood to be a process in which one 
single, correct response can be derived from the information given, 
while divergent thought is a process where the information presented is 
elaborated or extended in any number of possible and satisfactory direc­
'tions. 
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ch'3dren, and discuss at length the creativity-stifling aspects of our 
culture fI they seem not to recognize the 1mplica.t10ns of these environ­
mental variables. It shQuld be clear that creativity may be largely 
env-lroTJDlentally determined, from this data. Yet the authors, in suoh 
theoretical positions as ,they take, treat ?reat1vity always as simply 
a different aspect of intellectual. ability.. wa.llach and Kogan seem to 
avoid implications of their data, as well--findi.ngs of important. per­
sonality dist~~ctions between oreative and nonoreative groups, for 
example. 
Although the third position avoids many of these diffioulties lrJ 
introducing the ceiling concept, it has one major problema it does not 
provide an exp~D!t1~ for the ceiling phenomenon. All of the positions 
mentioned would no doubt l'.ave to a.dopt soma kind of ceillng-ef'fect qualc.a 
if1ca.tiona t yet the others a.re no more a,ble to explain 1t. 
And this is "&he grsa.t failing of a.ll of the work tha.t has been 
done 1n the area of creatlvity research" There Mve been rallY attempts 
at describing the in'c,eract1on of oreativity a.nd intelligence in terms 
of more or lass stat.1st1c.a.l concepts (independence. ceilings, etc.) 0 
But there has l)een :0.0. systemat10 theory pr~posed to a.ccount for. the 
phenomena. once they have been described,. We' have been told that ere-
s.tiv1ty a.nd intelligence reaot in a certain way.. But we 11.1.va never 
been told, in more than hints and ltnplica.tlollS-9 why i-it is that this j,G 
their manner of interaction0 
III. OBJECTIVES 
In this paper, .'t.heur 'tie have two prim.a.ry pu.rposesa first, to 
develop a. theoretical szn:rtem. which can to some extent !~.ep}f.1Mt the cIata. 
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resulting from the interaction of creativity and intelligence, and, to 

use that system to construct predictions of the relationship of crea­

tivity and intelligence to other variables; and, second, ~o arrive at a 

hypothesis for the creativity-intelligence interaction which is in bet­

ter logical and evidential harmony with the entire body of the litera­

ture than ara any descriptive systems at present. 

It is proposed that the data already III existence, if brought into 
a consistent and logical synthesis, ''Would provide considerable support 
. for and delineation of a nevi theory of creativity and intelligence and 
fulfill the primary objectives we have stated. At very least, an attempt 
at such a synthesis would sharpen the focus of experimental efforts, 
which are at present scattered in many different directions-showing a 
strong tendency to be redundant in exploring certain fields which would 
provide little new information even if deCisively defined, while being 
strangely luCking in other areas which seem to be of critical signifi­
cance. 
The suppressor-variable hypothesis we have suggested wjJ~ be the 
tentative foundational structure of the new theory of creativity-:intelli­
gence interaction. We shall use it as a guide--for a fresh organizing 
principle for existing data--and hope that it reveals nuances in the evi­
dence which have not as yet. been appreciated. We also ax:}:€ct tha-t; t.ha 
organizational principle itself, the suppressor-vari~ble hypothesis, 
will lead us to suspect stru.cture where none rr.ay be visj.ble-.lc,hat ~e can 
be led to look at important data which may not as yet have been consid.... 
ered relevant to the creat.ivity-intelligence investigation. 
We intend to follow the following general pattern in organizing 

our effo rts: 
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1. We shall define intelligence, in order to provide ourselvas 
with some valid basis for accepting intellectual measures as signifi­
cant to our study, and in order to point out, in. the ver:" nature of 
intelligence, factors whioh support or contradict, our hypothesis. 
2. We shall define creativity, in order to p;'ovide ourselves with 
the tools for comparing its processes to those of intelligence; and we 
shall examine whether or not it can be treated as, a global behavior 
pattern, or must be seen as a, colleotion of environmentally determined 
responses. Throughout this section, our concern will be to show whether 
or not there is any characteristio intrinsic to creativity which would 
make it incompatible with intelligence. 
). We shall compare erea.t1vity a.nd intelJJ.igenoo at a. cognit1va 
level. a.ttempting to show that they have a. common basis in assoc1a­
t10nal processes--but also searching for the variables which differen­
tiate between creativity and intelligence in an individual. 
4. We shall discuss arousal or excitation, exploring the poss1­
bU1ty tha.t increased arousal levels among the highly intelligent might 
e1ther facil1 tate or 1nh1bit creativity a.mong them. 
5. We shall present evidence on inhibition, demonstrating.the 
olose coordination of excltator.y and inhibitory processes in all higher 
eognitlva opera.tiona f and a.t tempting to disoover if iuna.te ca.pac!ties 
for inhibition and/or delay of gratification can be responsible for 
the suppressor v.ariable. 
6" We shall invest1gate the 11tara.ture on anxiety, 1ntelligence, 
and creativity, still in a search for variables which might be respon­
sible for the suppressor-Y~riable effect~-which might disoriminate 
between creativity.and intelligence. 
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'7 e We shall discuss "styles" of perception and cogn1tion. the 
more or less stable patterns of 1nfo~ation intake we might expect among 
the highly intel11gent, and the possib1lity that these might interfere 
with creative processes. 
8. We shall look at specific environmental effects ca.pa.ble of 
mediating a. s~ppressor-varia.ble effect--those sooial or cultural stim­
uli with a high proba.billty of o·ccur.r:ence among the highly intelligent 
which might tend to inhibit creativity. 
90 tIe shall present a concluding statement of the suppressor­
v.ariable hypothesis--attempting to derlv~ as many implications andl 
or predictions from it as possible, and to form these implications 




E. Go Boring once provided us with a definition of intelligence 
which has surVived fifty years not so much by its own dubious merits as 
by the faults, of its various competitors. "Int.elligenoe, If he asserted, 
!tis what the G.ntelligenc~ tests test (Boring, 1923, p. 35) 1I"t1 This 
definition is operational, at least in spirit, but serious students of 
the nature of intelligence have never been able to find comPlete satis­
faction within its circularity. Boringts statement may still be the 
best we can say about what intelligence is, but, we can at least attempt, 
an understanding of the meaning of intelligence from several and various 
other points of view--with· the hope that we can provide for ourselves an 
intuitive and logical basis for Boring's definition. 
Matarazzo (1972) points out that in the process of defining any 
theoretical concept, several major steps must be taken~ First, we must 
grasp for the subjective essence, the intuitive and personal meaning of 
the concept o Then mus"t come a stipulative definition, followed by a 
low-level operational definition. A thorough research effort at that 
point results in concurrent validation, exemplars, or cor:r'elates of the 
concept, which lead to a second operational definition of considerably 
more predictive power than the first. This process continually repeats 
itself, and new ev:Ldence in validation or refutation constantly causes 
changes or elaborations in the operational definition. It is only after 
much reshaping and confirmation that the definition has a high degree 
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of reliability.. 
Historically, it was for Alfred Binet to posit the first stipula­
tive definitions, derived from his O"Nn, intuitive grasp of what we all 
mean when we speak of intelligence. 'These are some samples of his at­
tempted definitions, over a period of eighteen years: 
Intelligence, that is to say, reasoning, judgment, me:nor.r, 
the power of abstraction (as cited in Matarazzo, 1972, p. 65). 
That which is called intelligence, in the strict sense of 
the word., consists of "bRO principal things: first, perceiv­
ing the erlerior world, and second, recons:i.dering these per·­
ceptions as memories, altering them and pondering them (as 
cited in Matarazzo, 1972, p. 66). 
The tendency to take and maintain a definite direction; 

the capacity to make adaptations for the purpose of attain­

ing a desired end, and the power of autocriticism (as cited 

in Terman, 1916, pe 45). 

A subject has the intellectual development of the highest 

age at which he passes all the tests. • • (as cited in 

Matarazzo, 1972, p. 67). 

With this last statement, Binet moved from the reaim of the L'1tu­
itive expression to an operational definition. He suggested in it that 
intelligence is indicated by the level of the tests passed. That is, 
intelligence is what intelligenc·e tests test. 
All operational definitions have the same advantages and disad­
vantages, and this one is no exception. If other psychologists can 
agree that their intuitive definitions are satisfied by the kind of test 
Binet proposes to use as the operational criterion, then they can agree 
upon the criterion. For many years, intelligence tests have been used 
as if this kind of agreement had already been reached. In actuality, 
hm,ever, there has never been a solid agreement among theorists about 
the intuition-level definition of intelligence. The foundational steps 
have baen hastily and badly built, and simply do not support the super­
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structure of the operational definition. In this chapter, we shall in­
vestigate three of the areas of division which have prevBnted consensu~ 
about the theoretical definition of intelligence in the years since 
Binet: the problem of the uni- or multi-factorial nature of intelli­
gence, the problem of the hereditary or environmental dominance of in­
tellectual development, and the problem of whether or not higher mental 
processes ara-qualitatively different from lower ones. 
'Io THE NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL FACTORS 
While the intelligence test rose to a high level of popularity, it 
remained a matter of disagreement whether or not intelligenee was a uni­
tary "thingtt to be measured, at all$ If intelligence is not a unitary 
phenomenon, we might certainly ask ourselves what it is that the intel­
ligence test measures, and question the validity of its measurement. 
Guilford (1967) .argued that intelligence was not unitary at all, 
and that it should be considered only in terms of i..'I1dividual and inde­
pendent factors. He had broken away from the Spearman group, who were 
oonvinced of the existence of at least a general factor of intelligence. 
The general factor was assumed to appear in every intelligence test, 
although each test would be affected by its tapping of different spe·· 
cific ability factors (Spearman, 1904). Guilford disagreed. 
The proof that there is no general factor of intelligence must 
begin, Guilford (1967) suggests, with the indisputable variability of 
abilities we find within individuals. Even retardates can have signif­
icant musical ability, and subjects can show unusual competence at re­
membering colors only to be deficient at sentence memor,y. Another sup­
port for placing e~phasis on the factorial nature of intelligence is the 
21 
evidence that during childhood growth and during m.ental decline of old 
age, various aspects of intellectual functioning increase or decrease 
differentially. Guilford also alludes to the lack of perfect, unitary 
correlations among intelligence tests. No one, of course, has ever been 
able to argue successfully that intell:i.genca has no factor character at 
all-that there could not be some aspects of intellectual ability more 
easily manifested in one test than in another. Guilford, however,. pIa cas 
a heavy emphasis upon the factorial nature of intelligence, to the ex­
clusion of any general factor. 
The ~ery basis of Guilford's Structure-of-tha-Intellect (81) model 
is his factor analysis of data from many administrations of ability-test 
batteries. When analyzing data according to the content of the tests 
involved (verbal, figl~al, etc.) he seamed to find factors in the data 
corresponding to these content areas. On the other hand, factors also 
seamed to appear when the analysis was based on the kind of cognitive 
operation performed on the test, or the kind of product a~hieved in the 
answering process. Guilford thus had three different dimensions thxough 
which he could successfully factor-analyze intellectual processes--three 
continua along which to arrange specific abilities. He could not resist 
the temptation to put his three continua into a three-dimensional form 
(a cube) alleged to represent the total human cognitive structure, and 
to call each of the 120 cube cells an intelligence tlfactor. n The des­
criptive definition of each cell-factor was an arbitrar".! result of which 
three of the dimensional factors intersected in that cell. The cells 
were thus assumed to be the elemental factors of the intellectual pro­
cesses. ¥Any of these specific factors (about eighty-two) had been or 





are olaimed by other investigators (Cronbach, 1970). Some are merely 
assumed to exist as actual factors b~cause the cube modal predicts them, 
and others have been found to be dual instead of unitary in nature as 
they had been assumed to be. Twenty-four factors correspond roughly 
to ttcreativity, tt and thirty to interpersonal or social response pat­
terns-two ability areas which have classically been excluded altogether 
from the intelligence question. 
Guilford's SI system is arbitrary, unwieldy, and overwhelmingly 
complex. But that should not be the basis of its out-of-hand rejection, 
if the model is really an acc~rate picture of human cognitive structure. 
There are, however, soma valid reasons for caution in regard to the 
model, not the least of which is that the system is based on t.he valid­
ity of the factor-analysis technique. 
Cronbach (1970) comments:: "Guilford's factor analyses ara de­
signed to fit the dpta to his hypothesis; they do not tell whether his 
complicated scheme is necessary (p. 339). n In point of fact, suggests 
Cronbach, factor analyses may conceal the true nature of the problem: 
Guilford's is a fine-grain analysis, and fine-grain analyses 
are not necessarily useful. The photoengraving process of the 
newspaper breaks a photograph down into minute gray and bla ok 
dots; when we look close enough to see that detail, we lose all 
sense of what the picture is about (Cronbach, 1970, p. 341). 
l~tarazzo (1972) is perhaps even less kind~ implying that results 
on the order of those Guilford obtained with intelligence-test data have 
been duplicated with random, fictitious data, USing his methods. 
Matarazzo argues further that even if the factors Guilford de~lved from 
his data were "real, n they would not necessarily correspond to the title 
he attached to them. Thera is no way of ascertaining that a test known 
to lo~d very heavily on a single £-.actor is actually testing any certain 
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ability. We can only assume that any ability is represented by our fac-· 
t,or loading because it has a sort of face validity in- respect to that 
faotor. So, with Guilford's system, we may well- have come fU11 c1rcle 
to the origil"...al problem: how do we know that what we test. is whtlt we 
think we are testing? 
or course, in spite of all objections to Guilford's approach, 
there can be no denial tha-t there is a j;act.ori.al character to inteUi­
genea" as evan Binet was ·well aware~ 
"'hat wa call our mind, our :tntellect, is a group in internal 
event.s "Very n1.l111erOUS and very l.raried, ando " • The unity of' 
ou.r psychical beginning sho"Jld not be a ought elsewhere than it, 
the al'Tangement9 the s:yntbesis--:i.n a word, the coordination of 
all t.hose incidents (as cited in Matarazzo" ~972$ p. 66). 
Binet, although aD"owing for tho existence of factor trends in the 
phenomenon called illt.elligance, placed enlph.asis ur.>On -the. inte!"action of
- . . 
t.hose trenCs,9 ratheL" than their independence. This is one way t.A) solva 
the factor problem~ We can take a point of Vi9'N outside ·the organism, 
and decide that 1'99 ara interested in tJle total relative efficiency of the 
indivldual;. as compared to his peers. An individual's abilities may coma 
in factor packages. But even if they do" the great difficulty of con... 
st.ructing tests which tap one factor and only one" demonstrates that 
flu_man beings seldom use one factor at a tj..L'U.9 e HU1lBn intera ction with 
the enviro:nment is much nlora complex than that. It does not seem un­
reasonable, -chen, that a test '¥1ith s everal ~J ell-chosen subtests could 
be quite an accru"ate reflection of an individual's total relative ef­
ficiency and adaptability within his environment. As Wechsler (1958) 
writes, 
Illt.elligence, operationally defined, is the aggregate or 
global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to 
think rationally and to deal effectively with his en~on­

mant. It is aggregate or global because it is composed of 

elements or abilities which, thottgn not entirely indepen­

dent, are qualitatively differentiable. By measurement of 

these abilities, we ultimately evaluate intelligence. But 

intelligence is not identical with the mere sum of these 

abilities, however inclusive••• The ultimate products of 

intelligent behavior are a function not only of the number 

of abilities or their quality, but also of the way in which 

they are combined, that is, their configuration (p. 6). 

In support for his position, Wechsler points out that anJ70ne with 
a clear excess of one particular ability i~ not really much better off', 
in terms of his total relative efficiency. The standard intelligence 
test should generally be able to avoid h~rsensitivity to such exees­
ses, and remain an adequate indication of' the inmvidual's overall prob­
ability of successful environmental dealings. 
Is intelligence not, then, a "thing"? We have argued for the gen­
eral validity of the intelJ.igence test$ even should intelligence prove . 
not to be a unified entity, but rathe~ an interaction of factors. But 
must we accept Guilford's argument that it is pnf.Y factors and nothing 
more, however interactional? 
Evidence produced by Alexander (1935) indicates that the answer 
to that question is verI' complex. He found that intelligence test re­
sults could be largely explained by the presence of a common factor, but 
not entirely so. There were also evidences of several broad, fairly­
independent factors (verbal~ practical, and so on), but these were def­
initely correlated with each ot!1ero Presumably, this intercorrelation 
accounts for the substantial intercorrelations among intelligence tests. 
In addition to the broad factors, some of the variance in Aloxander's 
data could only be acco1.U1ted for by introducing some kind of non-intol­
lective, perhaps motivational, variables. Both Spearman- and Guilford­
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type premises were in part supported, although the general factor idea 
came out a litUe better than we might have expected. It seems that­
when we administer an IQ test, we are measuring some enti-t;y, plus some 
entities (factors) and their interaction, plus soma personality or mo­
tivational variables. 
Although we have attempted to find a workable synthesis of the 
unitary and multiple factor theories, it is just possible that l'Vhen we 
discuss whether or not intelligence is a unitary entity we are missL~g 
the point entirely. Perhaps our treatment of the second major area of 
controversy in intelligence theory will Sh~R what exactly can be used 
among the evidences we have already examined. 
U. THE BASES OF nJTELLIGENCE: HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT 
This second kind of fragmentation faced by intelligence theor­
ists is the source of mo~t of the controversy engendered by intelligence 
research over many years. No matter what our position on the question 
of factors, it is inevitable that we ask ourselves what is the original 
source of intelligent bohavior. At some level that source must be 
physiological in nature, and if this is true, then physical heredity 
becomes an inescapable concern. It is of great significance in our 
understanding of intelligence to be able to separate its hereditary and 
environmental aspects. 
Agai.n, we are dealing with a problem having two-:t;'old implications. 
If' there is a question about the hereditary/environmental composition 
of intelligence, then there is a question about the very natura of 
intelligence-about its theoretical or stipulative definition" Those 
who believe that intelligence is bas~d in hereditary, biological phen­
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omena must necessarily have a different intuitive understanding of it 
than, have those who believe it to be the result of environment and 
learning. But then, if there iss question about theoretical defini­
tion, there is also a question about the operational definition which 
should result from theory. 
The past fifty years have seen a fierce and open war, where cor­
relation coefficients have been thrown swiftly back and forth between 
those who believe that IQ tests test environmental effects upon the 
individual and those who believe that they test hereditary effec-ts. 
These two factions have perhaps made one significant error~ They have 
both concentrated their efforts on proving or refuting the operational 
definition of intelligence (the IQ)" without ever having come to agree­
ment on a theoretical definition. Perhaps it was at the first step that 
they should have begun. 
In fact, it has been suggested that many of the difficulties psy­
chologists have been having with the concept of intelligence stem from 
the fa ct that they are talking about two very different kinds of in­
telligence: the innate, and the learned (Hebb. 1949). Those who have 
made clear this distinction at the level· of the theoretical definiti?n, 
have had, it seams to this writer, much better success in accounting fbr 
the ~ata and moving on logically to the operational level. 
Piaget (1967, 1969) has not really been involved in the mainstream 
of the intelligence investigation, except as it played a part in his 
understanding of early cognitive development. His ideas ha-~ proved 
most helpful to others, hc~vever, in spite of the fact that he himself 
had no need to fit his ideas of inteJ~gence into existing theories, 
nor to move on to operational criteria :which in any way differentiate 
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individuals according to intelligence. 
In bri&f, the Piagetian system seas the necnate as an organism 
capable of exercising "hereditarily determined sensory and motor co­
ordinations that correspond to instinctual needs (1967, p. 9)." These 
are the rudimentary sensori-motor schemata or cognitive structures, 
which enable the infant to assimilate sensory information. But a s the 
child performs these basically rigid behaviors, generalizing them to 
stinnlli for vihich they were not originally responses and modifying them 
through the coordinating effect of repetition and the shaping of envir­
omental contingencies, he is doing something more than assimilating. 
He is accomodating his own system to his environment, elaborating and 
building upon the rudimentary schemata. 
These elementary schemata are then differentiated into new 
motor systems (habits) and new perceptual organizations. The 
point of departure for this differentiation is arways a re­
flex cycle. This cycle does not, hcw~ever, merely repeat it­
self. It incorporates new elements and together with them 
constitutes broader organized totalities by means of progressive 
differentiation (1967, pp. 10-11). 
For Piaget, Jrintelligence" is manifest in any behavior which is 
instrumental in achieving a pre-established goal. Thus, it is only 
the mental structure and activity which result from the interaction of 
the child's environment and hereditary schemata that can be called in­
telligence. The hereditar.y capacities themselves are not intelligence, 
but presumably they have significant influence on the intelligence which 
does l~su1t. Here, our interest in Piaget reaches its limit, for he 
has no particular interest in understanding individual differences. 
This idea that intelligence is s' product of the differentiation 
of innate potential through interaction with the environment is partly 
adop~ed by Cattell's (1963) theory of abilities. Cattell differs from 
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Piaget in that he labels both potential and ma·nifest abilities tlintel­
ligence. tt But he does distinguish between them. His "fluid" intelli­
gence is a~ost literaD.y a reservoir of innate, neurological, and phys­
iological capacity which is basic to all intellective behavior, but is 
dominant in those behaviors not specifically learned--that is, not hav­
ing the nature of a skill. nCrystallizedll intelligence, on the other 
hand, is intellective behavior in which a skill has been learned in 
specific response to a stimulus situation. C~~tallized abilities do 
have some relation to the individual's original fluid intelligence, but 
they are more importantly affected by environmental and/or cultural in­
fluences. Furthermore, it is Cattell's contention that fluid intelli­
gence can and does continue to affect behavior throughout the life of 
the individual. The traditional intelligence test is, therefore, a 
mixture of fluid and cr.ystallized abilities, and Cattell feels it un­
suited for the task of defining intelligence. He argues that tests can 
.be constructed which will tap each kind of intelligence: a Uculture­
free" test for fluid ability, and many tests specifically responsive to 
various crystallized abilities (factors). 
Cattellts system, if accepted, would account quite well for exist­
ing data, making allowance for factorial as w.ell as general characteris­
tics inherent in intelligence, and at the same time coming to some kind 
of terms with the heredity/environment problem. There are, however, 
several difficulties in accepting his conclusionso 
First, certain very specific abilities do seem to have very little 
relation to over-all reasoning ability or intellectual efficiency (for 
example, rapid color-naming; see Cronbach, 1970--or foreign language 
achievement; see Guilford, 1967). There is no difficulty here since 
) , 
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these phenomena are in harmony with Cattell's de-emphasis of fluid in­
telligence a s a detenninant of the crystallized abilities. But many 
specific abilities are strongly related to more general intelligence 
measures, and that is the so~rce of the difficulty. It would seem 
that Cattell does not give enough weight to the possibility that spec­
ific abilities may be quite dependent upon the general fluid abilityo 
In this respect, a modified version of the Cattell 'theory, like the hier­
archical model proposed by Cponbaoh (1970) and synthesized from the s;ys­
tems of cattell, Vernon, and others, would be more acceptable. 
A second objection to the Cattell system is that it is somfflvhat 
difficult to accept his assertion that a test can be tl~Y culture-free 
-that is, that a test can be a pure and direct measure of fluid abil­
ity. It is difficult to conceive of any situation in which absolutely 
no social learning or concept learning would have effect--even more 
difficult when one considers that a test of fluid intelligence would 
have to be without associations 'to previously learned-about stimuli for 
all, or almost all, of the people tested. As Piaget (1969) considers 
learning, every stimulus-assimilation process is modified or elaborated 
in some way by experience. Acquired strategies for dealing with the 
environment are most likely to be interwoven in a highly complex way · 
and drawn into even very novel situations by their interrelationships. 
In sum, it is difficult to accept the contention that bare, fluid in­
telligence is any where exposed for us to see and test it. 
Hebb (1949) seems to provide an anower to these particular prob­
lems with a few significant differences in the structure of his theo­
retical systemo He differentiates tt~telligence !,tt which is one's in­
nate,. physiological capacity for inte;Uigent behavior, and ttintelli­
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gence ~,If which is "the functioning of a brain in which development has 
gone on, determining an average level of performance or comprehension 
(p. 294)." In all persons except the neonate, development has occurred, 
and any overt manifestation of intellective behavior must necessarily 
be classified as intelligence~. Even in the neonate, the variables 
responsible for i:ptelligence ~, while not contaminated by experience, 
are most probably inaccessible to observation. Such things as ease 
and strength of neuronal associations, potential number of associations, 
neural metabolism, reticular activity, vascular efficiency, and neuron-
count, which miCht well be the independent variables represented con­
ceptually as intelligence !, have no know~ relation to infant behavior. 
Thus, they are of litt.le value as measures at this time, and intelligence 
A remains out of our reach. 
Intelligence £ is the interaction of the individual's potential 
for thought and reason with his learning and environment. A high da­
gree of intelligence ! is a necessary, but not sufficient, precursor of 
high intelligence~. Intelligence ~ can be externally limited by disease 
or poverty of stimulation. But in most casas, human beings have very 
similar stimulation levels during development, and nriJrimal brain damage 
(see Hayes, 1962, for supporting arguments). And because of the high 
probability that individuals have similar learning opportunities in the 
most basic and essential aspects, intelligence ~ should be in approxi­
mate proportion to intelligence! in almost all indi'\riduals, and provida 
a valid indicator for it. 
It has not been realized that if the effects of earlyexperi­
ence are more or less generalized and pernanent one can concede 
a major effect of experience on the IQ and still leave the IQ 
its constancy and validity as an index of future perforruance 
(Hebb, 1949, p. 295). 
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It is important to IX'int out the phrase "if the effects of early 
experience are more or less generalized." We cannot necessarily ex­
pect individuals of radically different cultures to per-lorm a t the same 
level of efficiency on a test designed by one of their cultures. Never­
theless, within any culture it is possible to find an individual's in­
tellectual efficiencY relative to his peers. That does not mean that 
any test will be free of cultural bias, or that any manifest ability is 
untouched by environmental influence--but it. does mean that an individ­
ual can be validly tested by his own culture, and perhaps in his own 
cultural idiom by someone from another culture. 
In order to get the best possible prediction of an individual's 
probability of success in a future environment, one should tap the be­
haviors most directly reflective of intelligence!. That means that 
an intelligence test should avoid areas where there is a high probabil­
ity of overlearned responses (which represen't grossly unequal learning 
opportunities) and certain ot.her abilities which correlate badly with 
general mental efficiency--much for the same reasons Cattell wished to 
avoid them. In the present framework, hO'Never, we are attempting only 
to get the most accurate indication possible of intelligence!: we do 
not purport ever to achieve direct measures of intelligence A.!. 
The Hebbian system allows us to c'onsider essentially all manifest 
intelligence as learned behaviors and thus is able to handle those the­
orists who continually emphasize its cultural nature. Attempts at cal­
culating the number of IQ points attributable to environment are really 
quite beside the point, since it is very likely that all our manifest 
intelligence (IQ points) is learned. Judd (1928) is no doubt justified 
in criticizing this kind of activity. He also points out that much of 
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"hat individuals are able to learn is the result of their capacity for 
symbolization and language. Language and symbols are a means for cul­
tures to acc~~u1ate learning and to pass it on to the next generation 
of individuals. Without them, we should have to rediscover basic prin­
ciples during e~ch generation, and would appear much less intel~Lgent 
than iVe now do in the tests designed for our ci.vilizationo Toll this 
sense, many IQ points in any individual could be attributed to the Arabs, 
who gave us a number system, or to other previous cultures, whose learn.... 
ing was efficiently passed on to us through the medium of interp3rsonal 
communication. 
Hayes (1962) makes the same point, arguing that thought is possi­
ble without language, but such thought is unlikely to be highly produc­
tive. Language enables men. to process and manipulate, store, and use 
information they have not individually acquired through axperience, but 
have had accumulated and given to them by present and previous cultures~ 
"The efficiency and flexibility of language appear to be essential for 
anything approaching even the simplest of recent, human cultures • • • 
(p. 327)." Most of any individualts adult knowledge, then, is cultur­
~lly determined and transmitted, some of it is gained through personal 
experience, and !ll of it is learned. 
Intelligence is a concept .invented to account for differences 
between individuals within a century, within a culture. Although we 
may wish for sophistication in our understanding of it (and can reach 
some sophistication through consideration of c~ltural·variables), it 
remains a concept tied to the problem of individual differences withL~ 
a culture. It is most productive as an abstract representation or label 
for differential efficiency at learning certain behaviors among individ­
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uals with roughly the same learning opportunities. In Fisher's (1969) 
proposed definition (at an intuitive level), "Intelligence refers to the 
effectiveness, relative to age peers, of the individual's approaches to 
situations in which competence is highly regarded by the culture 
(p. 669). 
It should be pointed out that this intuitive definition could 
quite easily rely upon the intelligence test as its operational cri­
terion. This time, however, in accepting the intelligence test as the 
operational criterion of intelligence, we have included consideration 
for the fact that it is a cultural construction, which will test an 
individual's ability to respond to cultural demands. 
The cultural demands of an intelligence test are more intellectual 
than behavioral, and more molecular than molar. Interestingly enough, 
these molecular measures do tap abilities which all~v the individual to 
meet cultural demands at a more molar level. This is demonstrated by 
healthy correlations between IQ Bcores and measures of scholastic 
achievement (Terman, 1925; Hollingworth and Cobb, 1928; Cicirelli, 
1965; and Feldhausen and Klausmeier, 1962), popularity (Jacobs and 
Cunningham, 1969), responsibility and morality (Jaggers, 1934; Unger, 
1964), persistence (ltlles, 1954; Terman, 1925), and delay of gratifica­
tion (Melikian, 1959; Mischel and Metzner, 1962). 
There is, for all of its appeal, something missing from a defin­
ition like Fischer's:: soma indic~tion of the source of the individual's 
competence, and, therefore, any implication about whether he is judged 
intelligent because he happens to ~e good at the skills his society 
demands at the moment, or because he is able to ascertain demands and 
meet them in a variety of possible ways. It is our a rgument that the 
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intelligent person is not necessarily inna-tely be-liter at what intelli­
gence tests test than he is at any number of other tasks. If he has 
developed these skills, it is because he is not o~lymore effective at 
reading cultural preferences, but also because he is better able to 
chamal his behavior in efficient ways on a variety of tasks. We do 
not accept the suggestion that intelligence as it is culturally de£ined, 
does not reflect intelligence !, or renects only an arbitrarily se­
lected aspect of ito 
III. MID-COURSE SUMMARY 
We have nmv discussed two controversial areas which have been 
instrumental in preventing a theoretical concensus upon which an oper­
ational definition for intelligence could be based. We have examined 
the unitary- VGrs1lS multiple-factor controversy, and the nature/nurture 
controversy. For the purposes of this paper, a sunnnary at this point, 
before we embark upon the third area of controversy, will provide clar­
ification of our position. It will provide us the tools for handling 
further suggestionso We shall try to synthesize the points of each 
theory which are salient to our hypothesis, and we shall rely heavily 
upon Hebb. 
Intelligence can be described as a biologically based potential . 
(derived from inheritance or prenatal, environment) for efficient, com­
petent interaction with the environment--an interaction which produces 
learning. It is this learning which is the sum. total of manifest in­
telligence, and which is tapped by an intelligence test. Manifest in­
telligence has a largely general-factor character because of the depen­
dence of many different specific abilities upon the same biological 
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variables (intelligence !), but any individual may have varying degrees 
of ability on dlfferent tasks (either because of learning or physiology). 
In fact, a few tasks (musical ability, language-leaJming ability, and 
so forth) may be little related to the basic or general intelligence, 
but may rather be a ttributed to Borne other specific physical variable. 
Further, we argue that although intelligence tests measure only 
intelligence~, the nearly universal opportunity for essential levels 
of stimulation and learning within a culture provides that manifest in­
telligence will be a satisfactorily valid indicator of innate intellec·.. 
tual potential. 
This theor.~Gical definition of intelligence, synthesized f~)m 
various conceptual viewpoints, could form the basis for accepting the 
intelligence test as an operational criterion, if it were widely agreed 
upon. It asserts that although the test is not free of cultural in­
fluence, it is a valid indicator for individual effectiveness relative 
to peers within the cultur'e and provides a good reflection of intaJJi­
ganca!. That is all the support one needs for use of the intelligence 
test as an operational criterion--except that until many theorists can 
agree upon this matter, proper refinement of our definition is impos­
sible. 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES 
Higher mental processes a roe the t..lU..rd tradi-tiional area of contro­
versy in intelligence theo~r (although the controversy,has recently be­
come roughly a consensus). The problem here is the distinction between 
"silnpletr learning, and processes of a very abstract, complex nature. 
They appear, from an eXtra-cognitive viewpoint, to be quite different 
36 
processes, and it has long been a matter of interest whether ore not they 
relied upon the same mechanisms--especially since individual differences 
in capacity for the more abstract operations might be the source of dif­
ferences in intelligence. 
The classical point of view was that higher mental processes in­
volved neurological mechanisms qua~itatively different fram lower ones. 
It was assumed that basic processes were mediated by simple association­
al events, or habits, while the higher processes must have some obscure 
(and probably iniiate) st.ructural requirements without which their func­
tioning was not possible. It was these complex cognitive or neurologi­
cal structures which were thought to be the basis of il1telligence and of 
individual differences in intelligence. 
Hebb (1949) and others (Thorndike, Bregman, Cobb, &Woodyard, 
1926; Hayes, 1962), placed themselves in strong disagreement with the 
traditional explanation. They all argued that all human, or even ani­
mal, thought processes can be explained in terms of simple associational 
structures. There are many supportive evidences for this position. 
After thorough comparison of human to animal subjects, Hebb was forced 
to conclude that Uthere is no evidence to support the idea that learning 
~ general is faster in higher species--even at matt~ity (Hebb, 1949, 
p. ns)." This equality in the ability to learn among species suggests 
that there is a simple, universal character to all learning--perhaps 
even a basic universal element, like the association. Hayes (1962) 
reviews many other evidences in support of this conclusion. 
From the v/idely held conviction that higher mental processes are 
not qualitatively different from others, we deduce that these high~level 
functions must be made possible through the .sheer number of associational 
Ltr 
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elements or the complexity of their simple inter-associations. Thorn-
dike, e~ al. (1926) add: 
In their deeper nature the higher forms of intelleotual oper­
ation are identical with mera association or connection fo~ 
ing, depending upon the same sort of p~~101ogical connections 
but requiring many more of the:~ (P. 415). 
A further evidence for the suggestion that the elements of all 
thought are associational in nature is also indirect" It is found in 
the construction of computer simulations of mental processes. Newell, 
Shaw, and Simon (1958), in a simulat.ion of human problem solving~ dis­
tinguish the elements necessarJ for a system capable of solving prob­
l13ms. There must be symbolized information (memories or associations).t 
primitive information processes (pres~bly, the various fixed methods 
by which new associations can be formed), and programs (definite set 
of ruJ_es for use of primitive associational processes). 
Hayes (1962) points out that "only a few kinds of logic units or 
operations are needed in the most powerful computers (p. 322).," so 
that higher mental processes need not be different (and more difficult) 
kinds of operations, but simply recombinations of Eil.emental ones. He 
also likens human lIinJlBte intellectual capacitylt to a computer's memory 
banks, and human "manifest intelligenceU to its program (or education) 
of operation (p. 322). It is apparently possible to construct a' COIn­
puter capable of' fantastically complex tasks using simple elements, ~f 
an associationsl nature, and this gives credence to the argument that 
the same kind of structures and operations may occur in human beings. 
No matter what the campley~ty or storage capacity of a computer, 
its £'unctions are based upon simple associational elements and their 
interaction. As a result, in the simple storage of a bit of novel infor­
''-Ci , < 
38 
mation computers would not be expected to differ significantly in the 
speed or efficiency of storage. However, there nD_ght be significant 
differences bet?Joen computers in the total number of elements whioh could 
be stored, and in J('ha efficiency of their recombination and their re­
(:,all in relation to new, r e1evant problerns. An analogous dichotomy 
can be observed in human memory processes. 
Rot.e memory pel"fonnance (that is, the recall of simple information 
with no meaning outside itself, like nonsense syllables) fails to dis­
tinguish br~ght from dull subjects (Ct'onbach, 1970). This may simply 
reflect the universal level of difficulty in the formation of simple 
aS50ciatipns with little or no reference to other knowledge. Rote mem­
ory probably reflects the simplest kind of learning, and it is therefore 
no surprise that most individu.als find it equally difficult. 
other memory processes are a somewhat different matter. Some 
indivi.duals seem to be significantly more efficient than others at non­
:rote memory (learning and 'recall of meaningful infonr..ation), and this 
variable efficiency is constantly fotmd to be correlated tQ intelli­
gence-te~rt; scores (Matarazzo, 1972; Pollert, 1969). The source of indiv­
idual differences in non-rote memory is difficult to ascertain. Thorn­
dike, at a1 (1926) related higher intellectual functions to the l'l3llllb!'}: 
of associations. Presumably, non-r~.')"te memory does depend upm a high 
number of associations for its functioIl..i.ng. Perhaps the possible num­
ber of associations is 1imited by an i!'lherited potential for inter-neur­
onal c.onnections. On 'l:,he other hand, the mediator of better memory cap­
acity may be some efficient manner of associational inter-connecti.on 
which makes informational elstlents more available for recall. Highly 
intelligent subjects seem. to have a tendency toward holistic organiza­
,drn',» 
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tion of perceptions, and this kh1d of organization is known to be conduo­
ive to memorization in anyone (Gardner, Jackson, &Messick, 1958; Beck, 
1968; Saugstad, 1952). All that is known for certain is that individual 
capacity for reca~ of associations is a critical factor in intelligence, 
and basic to all human problem solving (Guilford, 1967)--the exact means 
of efficienoy in recall, whether number o~ kind of associational connec­
tion, is in need of determination. 
In addition to the mechanics of association, there may be other 
factors whioh are crucial in memory processes. There is some evidence, 
for example, that certain mptivationpl factors may mediate individual 
differences in memory and intelligence. Hayes.(1962) argues, in fact, 
that the only heritable illfluence on the potential amount and complexity 
of learning is motivational. Motivational variables are known to enhance 
memorization (for examPle, Weiner, 1966). We shall treat this area of 
interest at a later time. 
Memory, of course, does not represent the only kind of associa­
tional process. These processes are involved in the development of per­
ceptual systems, slr;mbolization, discrimination, and generalizatio~. 
Although a detailed theory of the associative nature of intelligence j.s 
not developed here, it should be emphasized that all of the mechanisms 
postulated for differentiation among ~dividuals along a continuum of 
intellectual efficiency are reducible- (at least in theory) to very sim­
ple, bio~ognitiye elements on the order of the elemental association. 
According to most theorists, there does not appear to be any need for 
more complex mechanisms than these to be invoked in any explanation of 
intelligent bahavior--although the interaction of these machinisms will 
no doubt- prove to be of great complexityIt 
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It is hypothesized that some innate ~~ysiological effici~cies at 
interrelationship9 organization, and/or categoriza'~ion 0,.:£ simple asso­
ciationa1 eleme~ts are the basis of intelligence--with the possible in­
clusion of some important innate motivational or arousal variables. 
Hebb has constantly stressed the equipotentiality of such associationsl 
structures, and we wish to stress it again in a slightly novel appli­
cation. 
It would not seem likely that the basic processes of higher in­
tellectual activity, having such an elemental nature, would be strongly 
predisposed in very specific directions. For if all human thought is 
reducible to simple elements, those elements are obviously capable of 
recombining in many different Vlays. This is testified to by the inter­
individual variety of cognitive styles, and the intraindividual flexi­
bility of behavior in human beings. It has been argued that higher men­
tal processes are simply an elaboration of simple ones through learning 
and experience. Although almost all individuals are ablta to interact 
properly with their environment to the extent that they develop basic 
abilities for memorization, generalization, discr.L~nation, and so on, 
the direction in which their more highly developed cognitive activities 
tend to differentiate may be determined. to a Significant. extent by the 
particular environment of the individual. . 
Because the higr~y intelligent person ver.y likely has innately 
superior processes of associative recombination and coordination, it 
seems likely that he would tend to be more efficient than the average 
at almost any intellectual activity demanded of him. It has been shown 
that highly intelligent subjects have fairly consistent, across-the­
board. superiority in the culturally approved sub-tests of traditional 
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intelligence tests. We are merely arguing that were our cuJ.ture differ­
ent, these same individuals would also be different-that their co.gni­
tive processes are not only more efficient, but that th~y also have a 
greater potential fOl~ adapting to and meeting the demands of their en­
vironment. 
V. FINAL SmJlh.1ARY 
This ends our attempt at constructing a theoretical system upon 
which to base an operational definition of human intelligence. We now 
have several justifications for accepting the intelligence test as our 
operational criterion, as long as the sample population is specified 
and certain other qualifications are borne in mind: 
1. Tested behavior is learned behavior, but it is reflective o£ 
an innate potential (intelligence !). 
2. Tested behavior is culturally influenced, but significant 
nonetheless in determining the cognitive efficiency of jndividuals rel­
ative to their peers. 
3. Tested behavior is beha'\1ior selected by the culture as impor­
tant within that culture, but highly intell:i.gent people should have the 
same relative r:otential capability at most other, unselected tasks as· 
they demonstrate on the intelligence test, if the tasks are of a cogni­
tive nature. This potential maYt however, be undeveloped. 
Because of these justifications, we should be able to deal with 
intelligence-test data as a valid manifestation of the collection of 
phenomena ws mean when we speak of intelligence (intelligence !). We 
shall devote no further efforts either to justification or to qualifi­
cation of our definitions of inte~ig~nce. Those we have already recog­
.... M· ... t~ -- , 0 
42 
nized will from this point on be assumed. 
It is important, however, that more than justifications and quali­
fications be retained from this chapter. we have also tried to get at 
the essential nat~~e of intellectual processes. Every understanding 
which it is possible to glean from what we have discussed about the 
workings of intelligence will be needed, ~f we are to deal with the 
interaction of intelligence with other variables within the individual. 
We now move on to our second major area of concern: creativity. 
CHAPTER III 
CREATIVITY 
According to the step-by-step method of definition we have been 
following in this paper (Matarazzo, 1972), we should tr,y to estabJish 
for ourselves a generally acceptable, intuitive defirlition for creativ­
ity. On the face of it, this task would seem. a great deal more diffi­
cult for creativity than for intelligence. The h:i.ghly subjective nature 
of typical working definitions of creativity is darno;nstrate.d, by the 1'01­
lowing anecdote: 
(At) a leading Midwestern University•• an old, experi­G 
enced teacher and scholar said that he tried to encourage 

originality in his students. In a graduate course, he told 

the class that the t~r.m paper would be graded in terms of 

the amount of originality shown. One school teacher in the 

class was especially concerned about getting a high n~rk in 

the course. She took verbatim notes, continuously and as­

siduously, of what the learned professor said in classc Her 

term paper, the story goes, was essentially a str:L.'1ging to­

gether of her transcribed lecture notes, in which the Pl~­

fessor 1s pet ideas were given a prominent place. It is re­

ported that the professor read the term papers himself. 

When the- sC-.~ool teacher's paper' ¥las returned, the profes­

sorts mark was an A, with the added comment, "This is one 

of the most original papers I have ever readu (Guilford, 

1950, p. 448). 

Originality has long been one of the most widely agreed upon syno­
nyms for creativity, and obviously it can have validity probla~ of its 
own. Fortunately, most creativity researchers are able to be more con­
sistent and empirical than are college lecturers and high school teach­
ers. But it has proved difficult, even for them, to decide upon ori­
tena by which to define creatiVity. Here are some of their efforts. II • 
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I. ATTEMPTS AT AN INTUITIVE-LEVEL DEFINITION 
From philosophers, thinkers, and creative artists has been culled 
a general pattern of agraeme~t about the nature of creativity. In part, 
creativity is perceived to be an awareness of new, hidden relation­
ships--an awareness made possible only by past discipline and learning 
which are reapplied to a present situation (Koestler, 1970). For 
Poincar~, creation 
does not consist in making new combinations wi-th mathemati­
cal enti't,ies :..llready knO'vm. Anyone could do that, but the 
combinations so made Ylould be infinite in number and most of 
them absolutely without L~terest. To create consists pre­
cisely in not making useless combinations and in making those 
which are only a small minority. Invention is discernment, 
choice (PoincarA, 1952, p. 35)1 
Stephen Spender (1952) stresses concentration, and memory ~hich 
is task directed-that is, a memory for sights and sounds and smalls 
which could have possibilities as future elements for creat~on. He 
alsQ calls upon "inspiration, n a nebulous word which might be translated 
as the sudden appearance of a good (selected and useful), novel idea. 
Einstein alludes to "combinatory play [which] seems to be the essential 
feature· in productive thoughtlt and adds that this play is ttaiIUed to be 
analogous to certain logical connections one is searching for (Einstein, 
1952" po 43).n 
C~ativity, then, according to some of those most ~enerally rec­
ognized as being unquestionably in possession of it, is the remembrance 
of past learning or experience, recombined (playfully?), and selected 
for usefulness, often with concerted a ttention toward a predetermined 
goal. 
,Frank Barron (1952, 1958, 1959, 1968, 1969) was one of ~he first 
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psychologists to concentrate his efforts on outlining a definition of 
creativity, in t~rms as precise as possible, and exploring its implica­
tions. His intuitive-level definition is a composite, derived from 
sources like the ones we have just touched upon. it suggests thai orig­
inality is the ~ine .qu~ n0Il: of creativity (Barron, 1969). O'thers 
(Brogden and Sprecher, 1964; Taylor and Holland, 1964; Getzels and 
Jackson, 1962) have concurred. Originality is well established as a 
criterion of creativity. It is a very useful concept, because it can 
quite easily be operationally d~fined: originality is merely the un­
usual, as nspecified statistically in terms of incidence of occurrence 
(Barron, 1969, p. 25). n 
But most investigators also agree with Barron that originality, 
in itself, is not enough to provide clear identification of creativity. 
An original response Itmust correspond to some extent to, or be adaptive 
to, reality (Barron, 1969, p. 25).1f Thus, mere eccentricity is not 
cr~ativity--it must have soma selective process performed upon it; it 
must have some value to justify itself, much as suggested by Poincar~ 
(1952; see also Brogden and Sprecher, 1964). 
This evaluation of originality as to its usefulness and adaptive­
ness is the main area of controversy in creativity research. Original­
ity is easily accepted as an operational criterion of creativity. But 
it is much. more difficult to define and measure the ways in which orig­
inality should be useful or selected. The difficulty is two-fold: it 
is hard to determine what criteria individuals should impose on them­
selves, and therefore what behavioral correlates should accompany origi­
nality in the creative person; and it is difficult to judge the level of 
creativit.y represented by any individual on a task which we wish to make 
an operational criterion of creativity. 
The questions about the selective aspects of creativity have not 
by any means been resolved. Mainly in this area have arisen disagree­
ments among theorists about the theoretical or intuitive-level defin:t­
tion of creativity--and disagreement is certainly plentiful. From each 
theoretical faction in the controversy has come a different test of 
creativity, and as a result many different tests have been adopted as 
operational criteria for creativity. 
Because of this hopeless sp~inteting" we shall tentatively ac­
oept all of the creativity tests as operational criteria of creati'vit.y, 
and shall later present some justification for such a leap of faitho 
Accordingly, ignoring the chaos at both the intuitive and operational 
levels of definition, we shall move on to the third level. 
II. VALIDATIONS, CORRELATIONS, AND THE UNITARY CONCEPr 
Vlhen he had a rough personal definition of the object of ~~s in­
terest, Binet put together a test, and went out to sse if it 'Would WOrd: 
as an operational criterion. In validating the test, he compared i t,5 
results with pooled judgments of teachers about the "intelligence" of 
his subjects Having met with considerable success in that kind of com­0 
parison, he at least tentatively accepted his own operational definition. 
This kind of process is the third step in the task of definition 
suggested by Matarazzo (1972), which he calls a step of validation, cor­
relation, and the discover.r of exemplars. It is not unique to intelli­
gence research, but has also gone on in the fiold of creati.vity investi­
gation. 
Two, methods have been used wit.h particular frequency to deal with 
validating eriteria for creativity (Torrance, 1964). The first method 
is identical to one used by Binet. A test is chosen as the possible op­
"erational criterion of creativity. It is administered, and bigh- and 
low-scoring groups are selected on the basis of its resultse Then, 
these groups are exami:'led to see whether or not there are any behaviors 
they emit which can be identified as creative (besides those me8sured 
directly by the test), and which also distinguish the high and lo1.~ groups 
from each other. The second method is to choose some behaviors as cri­
teria for creativity, to construct groups on the basis of these ucrea­
tive" behaviors, and then to see if there is any other test or tests 
which will differentiate between these groups. 
Many tests have been found to differentiate acceptably between 
groups in one of these ways. But when these many tests of creativity 
are compared to each other, we find an alarmingly weak relationship 
among them. Whereas well-accepted tests of intelligence (the Stanford-
Binet, WAIS, Army General Classification Test, Army Alpha, Army Bata, 
and Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) have correlations on the order of 
.7-.8 with each other (Matarazzo, 1972; Wechsler, 1958), creativity tests 
(none of which could actually be classif.ied as ''wall acceptadrt ) have 
t. 
intercorrelations of around .2-.3 (see Getze1s and Jackson, 1962; Barr.on, 
~969). 
Correlations such as these are high enough in some cases to pro­
pose that there is a relationsh~p bet~een variables affecting two dif­
ferent creativity tests, but they are hardly high enough to indicate 
that we are measuring the same entity when we administer the two tests. 
Especially in the light of creativity's weak but fairly consistent posi­
tiva correlation with intelligence, it seems foolharqy to cling stead­
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fastly to the idea of a unitary and gsneralized "creative response ten­
dency," independent of intelligence (Wallach and Kogan, 1965a, 1965b). 
Can we find analogue to the factor theory of intelligence research 
in creativity? A faotorial aspect to the creativity phenomenon seems 
likely, at very least. Each test of creativity has a correlation so 
low with most others, under most conditions studied,. that it must be 
tapping fairly independent variables. It is possible that creativity 
is so ttfactoradtt as to be nearly situation specific--or perhaps task 
specific, with high sensitivity t~ situational stimuli. 
There has, however, been little discussion of a factor theory of 
creativity. Perhaps this is because from the very outset there has been 
less assumption that creativity is a single, innate, unitary tIling. 
Very few have suggested that one is "born" wlth creativity, in the 
sense that one might be born with intelligence. The~e has been no no­
ticeable tendency (perhaps because of the Sisyphian nature of such a 
position) to suggest that anyone measure of creativity can define it. 
Although there is always the stated or u..l1stated assumption that crea­
tivity is a phenomenon unitary enough to be used to distinguish those 
who have it from those who do not, at least in relative terms, the em­
phasiS has always been upon broad-based and varied assessment in such a 
task (Torrance, 1962)--as if there ware not one creativity, but many. 
Actually, if creativity tests all showed .2-.3 correlations with 
each other and factored out upon multivariate analysis into several semi­
independent factors, we should have a clear basis for theorization, al­
though it would be different from theories constructed up to now. But 
there are other data which constructively complicate the issue. 
Some creati\~ty measures, although rare in number, ShOVi quite good 
1'"'= «g'l 
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correlations with each other. Barron' 5 Independence of Judgment Test 
correlated 07 with teacher ratings of creativity, Mednickts Remote As­
sociations Test (RAT) correlated ~7 with ratings of creative writing, 
and biographical information has several times shown relationships of 
.30-.55 with othel'l creativity meaSUl"es (all referred to in Taylor and 
Holland, 1964). 
Some of these atypically strong relationships are fairly easily 
understood. The RAT, for example, is a measure of t,he subject's abilj.ty 
to solva a three-part verbal relatidnship problem, 'where the answers 
are words not in common usage. It stands very much to reason that if 
a person has free access to tu~common words for usa in problem solv~ng, 
he has a much better chance of being a good creative writer. 
But the example of the intercorralation of the Independence of 
Judgment Test with teacher ratings, even. making allc~ances for the un­
reliability of ~he ratings, is not merely the result of a relationship 
between variations of a single task. Presumably, creativity, as seen 
by the teacher, and independence of judgment have no logical relationship 
to each othar--unle$s it is through their corr:mon J.~elat,i.on to creati'v­
tty. Here, then, is evidence of some kind of generalization of creative· 
responses, either from one task t.o another, or from one level of behav.ior 
(cognitive independence) to another (overtly behavioral, rated creativ­
ity). 
Another kind of compljcation in deciding whether or not creati'~ty 
rnaBsures are independent or tap a global phenomenon is. found in the work 
of Wallach and Kogan (1965a, 1965b). Although half-conrinced at the cut­
set that the mpst consistent variable measured by creativity tests was 
intelli.gence, they decided to alter typical testing condit.ions and to 
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look for some situational variable which might be able to save the uni­
tarx-phenomenon concept of creativity--an idea too attractive to be eas­
ily abandoned.. They reasoned that a typical tttest" situation, with its 
constrictions and tensions and pressures, could not possibly allow sub­
jeets to show their full creative ~apaeity, since creativity is closely 
related to plaY"experimentation, and spontaneity. Therefore, they ad­
ministered their tests in a "creative" situation. Subjects were not 
placed in large groups, there were no time limits, and the academic 
trappings which are usually found in a test situation were removed to 
the fullest possible extent. With great efforts and precautions, con­
ditions were made to resemble a IIgame lt situation. Teachers and princi­
p'als ware not involved, the word "test ll was not mentioned, and young 
ladies administered the tests. 
The resUlts of these manipulations 'Vi ere rather surprising, even 
wh.en due account :1.s taken .(or their limited generality. Correlations 
among the creativity measures was .4. This is unusually high, consider­
ing the number of tests involved {five}--even though four of the tests 
deal with word usage, and three of these are extremely similar in natura. 
One of the tests, however, is a visual test, and although the authors 
do not mention its specific reliability in relation to the other tests, 
we shall assume that some generalization was evident across tasks. It 
is also very likely that the change in test conditions, rather than pro­
viding a truer measure of creativity and thus higher correlations between 
tests, presented a- wide variety of play !reues" and in that way increased
. . 
the generalization of creative responses. 
The rest of tha Wallach and Kogan results do not bear directly 
upon the question of creativity as a 1J1litary phenomenon, but they do 
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suggest caution interpreting the high correlations obtaine~ among the 
creativity measures. Curiously enough, the high correlations were not 
the result of an across-the-board increase in the creative output of 
all the creative subjects--although this might have been expected to be 
the case. The data showed that other variables were interacting with 
creativity level in determining the responsiveness of individuals to the 
playful atmosphere. An extraordinarily low correlation was obtained 
between intelligence and the creativity measures in this situation 
(replicated by Galanter~ 1967). 
Under ordinary conditions, we can expect correla tions of .2-.4 
between creativity and intelligence--if the sample has a fairly broad 
IQ-score range (Ripple and May, 1962). Since the magnitude of the cor­
relation between creativity and intelligence has been decreased, there 
are two possible explanations for the effect of the situational manipu­
lations. Ei.ther the high-IQ children are less creative in this s itua­
tion, or the low-IQ chj.ldren are more creative in it than is usually the 
case. It does not seem very likely that any group would be less crea­
tive because of a non-test$ untimed, non-authoritarian atmosphere. Tnat 
leaves the possibility 'chat the low-IQ children were more responsive to 
the creative context of the testing than the high-IQ groupo Why? Three 
suggestions might be extended: (a) high-IQ children were better able to 
interpret the situation as j.t actually was, a testing procedure, and 
were less free to respond unusually creatively than were the less obser­
vant children, (b) high-IQ children were less able to chang~ their be­
havior patterns in !'esponse to a quick change of cues, having a more 
internalized comple~ of test responses, and (c), originality was the 
only criterion used to determine the creativity level of the test 1"e8­
it fS j lfWb gt; 
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ponses; it is to be expected that originality would be. much easier for 
lees-bright children to produce than would adequate. selective processeso 
. Tn the area of selection, bigh-IQ children would have their clearest ad..· 
vantage in responding creatively, and this would not be represented at 
all in the data. 
Although there is not enough information available to answer the 
questions raised by the results of this study, they do provide an indi­
cation that when we ara studying interrelationships among creativity mea­
sures, it is unsafe to ignore other variables which might be distorting 
the results. In this case, the modif.ying variable was intelligence, and 
intelligence has often been inadequately' treated in the research of crea­
tivity. Fortunately, Wallach and Kogan did not simply match for intel­
ligence, and thus lose information about its effects, but rather divided 
their sample into a two-by-two matrix to deal with differential levels 
of both creativity and intelligence. Without such procedures, it will 
be impossible to make logical sense of the creat,ivity f:L-eld. Answers 
we may get to the question of the unitary quality of creativity would 
have the possibility of being based on unsound presuppositions. 
We have seen, then, some e vidence that cI'eativity is a global phen­
omenon, but we do not know for certain how reliable the evidence may be. 
T~ere remain, however, other kinds of evidence of the global quality of 
creativity. These data are the correlations between creativity tests and 
tests of personality traits or patterns. They are another example of 
exemplar or correlate validation, and have been vigoro\lsly accul1lulated, 
in spite of the tentative nature of their foundation. Almost all meas­
ures assumed to be assessments of creativity have been thoroughly cor­
related with personality traits. The only compelling aspect of this evi­
ttl" . a$ , ., Hi 
dance is the consistency with which certain personality patterns have 
been found to correlate with creativity, no matter which creativity mea­
sure is used. 
Every human being who is not profoundly retal':ded is capable of 
creative behavior, just as he is capable of intelligent behavior. But 
some individuals" if not more orea~ively capable than others, are at 
least more frequently found behaving creatively. There seem to be cer­
tain cognitive and personality characteristics which have a higher·..than­
average probability of occurrence in these people--whether beca,JSo these 
characteristics are conducive to creativity, or because they are coder~n­
dent variables with it. 
Cocharacteristics of a cognitive type are good memory, cognition, 
evaluation, convergent productions, and especially cLi..vc'1rgent productions, 
to follow Guilford's general system (1967). More specifically, Taylor 
and Holland (1964) express the covariables as original:Lty" redefinition, 
-adaptive and spontaneous flexibility, associational, expressional, and 
ideational fluency, elaboration, and evaluation (see also Barron, 1968, 
1969) • 
Cocharacte~istics bearing a closer resemblance to personality 
traits include: flindependence, self-suffici~ncy, tolel'ance of smbigu­
ity, 'fem:inine· interests, and professional self-confidence (Taylor, 
1964, p& 180).tt Creative people have also been suggested to display an 
abundance of fantasies, play, humor, problem- and pattern-awareness, 
autonomy, judgmental independence$ stability, dominance, self-assertion, 
pr~ference for complexity, self-acceptance, adventurousness, curiosity, 
and self-control (Taylor and Holland, ~964; also Bal~n, 1952, 1958; 
Day, 1968). 
110st of the personality "traits" correlating with our creativity 
construqt are difficult to measure with any accuracy, and are not known 
to be stable or generalized over situations, even if they could be 
accurately ascertained (Mischel, 1971, pp. 147-150). Therefore, they 
are themselves in urgent need of clear operatioral definition and have 
difficulty in supporting the weight of some additional undefined con­
struct. Nevertheless, they do form part of a clear and logical pattern, 
which is consistent over many tests for differentiating creativity 
according to "personality" variables. It is necessary to deduce as much 
from this kind of evidence as it is possible to deduce. Even their 
unreliability and situation specificity can be used as a sort of infor­
mation--for when, in spite of such unreliability and specificity, lfe care 
upon such clear patterns, they are very likely to indicate something, 
although it may not be what we expect. 
Although the personality-test correlations with creativity measures 
are evidence of a global, unitary pattern of creativity, they, too, are 
insufficient proof that such a pattern reflects the actual case. 
We have come near to the limit of the useflllness of correlational 
data in creativity research. It is clear that they have given us sig­
nals about fruitfUl areas of search, but they can never answer in a 
final way the question of the molarity of creativity. Nor can they be 
situationally specific enough to explain why creativity comes about. 
Nor can they be cognitive enough in approach to explain what processes 
are at -che basis of creative respond.ing 8 For these questions, we need 
other tools. 
III.. CREATIVITY TRAINING A1TD THE UN'IT1~RY CONCEPI' 
Experiments in the ,training of creativity offer an excellent 
source of information about whether or not creativity is a global phen­
o.menon. If 'ViS can discover enVirOTh11sntal manipulations which resuJ~t in 
creativity, we shall be in a position to make valuable guesses about hm! 
it is that creative behaviors come about in nonexperimental situations. 
Fux'tihermore, through training studies it is easiest to ascertain how ex­
'tensiV'el:;:- creative behaviors are interl'¥:JJ.ated-.....that is, -whether specific 
ones al~e generalj,zed to other tasks or situations, whether other respon­
ses result spontaneously 1Xj om the acquisitj.on of one creative response, 
wht::rtiher very specific beha1fiors generalize to It.ore molar behaviors, and 
so OZ1 f1 If these kinds of getleralizations do occur, they will be substan­
tial e\ridence for the global, l.Ulitary character of' creativity. 
Uni'ort,una-t.ely, the complexity of these problems as. well as the 
different possible levels 'of generality, the huge variety of possible 
discriminativa stimuli, and so on, demands that a rigorous and system­
atic body" of research be compiled which deals with each possible combin­
ation of various t.ypes of variables. And this quantity and quality of 
research have not yet been achieved. The studies 'which a 1"a presented c 
here are an example of t·ha i..'1adequa cies of the present status of the re~ 
search--not so much by their i.neli,vidual weaknesses as by their collec­
tive ones. They indicate, nevertheless1 some critical points of inter­
est and significance, to wl'l..ich we shall call attention,. 
Mal tzrnan and his assccia tea, for E'.xa!~lple, (1,~Itzman" 1967; Ualtz­
man, Simon, Rasking, and Licht, 1967) have made many closely related 
studies in the training of orig:i.nal verbal responses. Theiri method, 
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for the most part, has been to demand several different sets of respon­
ses to the same set of stimulus words--a procedure designed to encour­
age the practice of creative responses without introducing any reinforce·... 
ment into the training. For their consistency and concentration of 
study, they are to be commended, although this writer is of the opinion 
that no claar reflections of reality will be obtained from situations in 
which contingencies are the variables held constant. Appropriately 
enough, in the light of our reservations about this approach, it has met 
,'lith ve'r,J' mixed success .. 
For example, Simon, Lotsof and Wycoff (1966), using the Hatzman 
technique on fourth, firth, and sixth graders, reported that their sub­
jects emitted no more original responses to a new list after one day of 
training, although they did show results after three days of training. 
The authors point out that college-age subjects do shmv learning effects 
after only one day. 
McDonald and Martin (1967), with a slightly different isechnl.que, 
used verbal reinforcements to shape original associations. The.y were 
successful, although there was a differential ease of training, depend-' 
ing upon whether subjects were high or low in creativity at the ~ima 
the training was initiated. However, when t~e subjects were administered 
the RAT, a test of crea"tivity which ?epends upon the use of novel word 
associations, E£ transfer (generalization) was observed~ Simon, at a1. 
(1966) also had difficulty in obtaining generalization of word-original­
ity training. They found some transfer to measures of personality traits 
co~related with creativity, but only in older subjects, and only after 
fairly extensive training. 
From these two studies we infer that ,training, when concentrated 
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on ver,y molecular tasks, does not transfer verywell--even to other 
tasks at the same, molecular level and of a closely similar type. Al­
though Simon, et ale (1966) obtained some transfer tendencies to more 
molar behaviors (personality trait tests), thairTesults can be held 
somewhat in doubt" given the McD::mald and Martin (1967) failure to ob­
tain generalj.zat1on acros~ much more closely related tasks" and the 
tentative nature of personality assessment. 
Levy's (1968) training procedure included both the specific rein­
forcement of certain responses and a more molar method of creativity 
training, based on modeling and role identification. He also tried to 
measure the effects of this multidirectional technique upon both molec­
ular and molar behaviors. The best combination of training m~thods for 
both molar and molecular task performance was a composite of reinforce­
ment for specific original responses, modeling of specific responses, a 
general "rele" model, and praise to the model in the presence of the 
child--and this combination did have significant results. 
Results strikingly similar to these were found by Brown (1965) in 
his study with adult subjects. Again, the composite training method 
worked bast. To s~~rize his method in slightly more operant terms 
than those used by Brown, creativity and conformity were introduced to 
the subjects in the form of animal sy.mbols--which were used to ev~luate, 
reinforce, or punish behaviors as they were emitted by students in the 
classroom. At the same time, strong. emphasis was placed by the teacher 
on challenging clich6s, supporting new ideas, and so on. The training 
procedures were quite significantly effective. 
In both of these studies using composite training teclmiques, one 
critical limitation stands out clearly: although subjects were well 
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capable after training of emitting creative responses of both a specific 
and a general nature, they did not manifest any significant change until 
- given some extra cue that the kinds of responses learned or learned 
about during training were now appropriate in a different situation. 
In both studies, subjects demonstrated significantly increased creativ­
ity only after the:r had been asked to take the posttraining l.t.est~s as 
their models would take them. Presumably, this suggestion brought -the 
rewards observed by the subject-to be accorded to the model into the 
subject's contingency expectations. 
To clarif.y this phenomenon, Brown (1965), whose study included 
animal-symbol models of both creativa and conforming behavior patterns, 
asked some of his subjects to take the posttraining tests as would their 
conformist animal model. Surprisingly enough, Brown found that under 
these request conditions, subjects could appear significantly mora oon­
forming on the tests--their behavior actually did closely approximate 
the conforming animal model t s • Although they had constantly he ard ent .., 
icism of this modal, and praise of his polar opposite, subjects had equal 
co~~and of and replicative powers for the behavior patterns of both of 
them. This presentation of cues to the subject for which behaviors are 
expected is labeled "triggering" by Brown. Evidently, in the process Df 
~odeling and reinforcement, subjects "learned" all of the new responses, 
performed none of them spontaneously, but. per.fonned either kind well when 
"triggered1l to do so. 
In another striking set of findings, Renner (1970) demonstrated 
generalization of creativity training at a molar level to completely 
dissimilar global tasks. College-age subjects were presented with lec­
tures on the novelty and complexity of art accompanied by slides of 
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modern paintings. From pretest to posttest subjects showed, as might 
have been expected, significant increases in tolerance for novelty and 
complexity in visual stimuli. More significantly, experimental subjects 
also shmted more tolerance for novelty and complexity in'musical stim­
uli. Finally, and most significantly of all, experimental subjects per­
formed mot'e creatively than controls on a test of verbal divergent 
thinking (a Guilford creativity test). 
These results are doubly impressive becanse, to all appearances, 
learning and transfer of global, creative behaviors was accomplished 
without need of a triggering stimulus. Of course, it j_s very possible 
that the constant emphasis on art throughout the treatment and testing 
procedures provided a very subtle discriminative stinru:l:-us for narty" 
responses. What is important is that even if a stimulus was present to 
trigger the creative responses, it was not an outright and explicit 
command. People can evidently be taught to act creatively in appro­
.priate situations; they need not always release creative behaviors a 
package at a time, on cue, like vending machines. 
There is indication in this study that the only discriminative 
stimulus accutely necessary to the subject is some manifestation of a 
ncreative" atmosphere, in which creative responses appear likely to be 
reinforced. This was what Wallach and Kogan (~965a, 196~o) attempted to 
achieve, but they were probably les~ successful than slides and art lec­
tures and so on. Artistic training WBy in itself be more effective in 
generalizing creative behaviors, because of the fact that the complex of 
behavior patterns (or role) it represents is very familiar to us. Our 
familiarity might be the result of direct artistic training or of con­
sistently modeled behaviors (artist-acquai~tances, or media representa­
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tion of-the artistic life style), but it can be easily assumed that we 
know how to behave ttartisticallyn in the proper setting" whether or not 
we have ever performed any specific behaviors before. 
\Vbat pattern are we to make of these few examples of creativity 
training projects? Clearly t hey do not sample widely or deeply enough 
to tell us much for certain (and this is not a weakness limited to our 
sample). But we have seen enough to hint at several general principles. 
First, it has been often demonstrated that in any particular sit­
uation a tendency toward creative or original or uncommon responses ~ 
be learned, and so also can a tendency toward common responses (Brown, 
1965; McDonald and Martin, 1967). The ease of this learning is depen­
dent, however, on several variables. 
For example, in a procedure shaping an uncommon response tendency 
through reinforcement, learning was stronger in older subjects (Simon, 
et al., 1966). However, when an uncommon response tendency is enhanced 
by a change in discriminative stimuli (setting), lower-IQ subjects seem 
more responsive (Wallach and Kogan, 1965a, 1965b; Allen and LeVine, 
1968). Mental processes can be assumed to be more efficient in both 
older and brighter subjects, but these groups show opposite tendencies 
in the studies presented. It is possible that the acquisition of new 
behaviors is easier for individuals with better cognitive development 
and differentiation, but that those behaviors already acquired are more 
strongly internalized and durable in the more highly intelligent. How­
ever, other interactions make such a simple explanation unlikely. In­
telligence and pretreatment creati\~ty levels are known to interact sig­
nificantly, although it is not known why this is the case (~"allach and 
Kogan, 1965a). 
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The second major ~neralization to be derived from the studies wa 

have reviewed is that the molecular/molar nature of the creative behav­
. iora trained has a strong effect on the effectiveness of the training. 
Specific training of very specific creative behaviors, like novel word 
a~sociation, seems not to generalize suocessfully to any other behaviors, 
whether they are global or specific--even when -chey are strongly simi­
lar to the learned originality task (Simon, et a1., 1966; McDonald and 
Martin, 1967). If this were all we knew about creativity, Tie should have 
to surmise that each minutely specific creative behavior must be indi­
vidually learned, and is strongly resistant to generalization. 
However, the picture is entirely different when we consider train­
ing procedures comprised of both molar and molecular elements. If a 
training process includes reinforcement of specific tasks of original­
ity as well as modeling of many creative behaviors and/or a presentation 
of creativity rules to follow, the learning of specific, original res­
ponses is readily learnede' Under these same training conditions, learn­
ing may generalize to other, more general behaviors, if discriminative 
stimuli are present to encourage transfer. With an appropriate stimulus 
situation, learned creativity at a completely global-behavioral level 
can transfer to other equally general behaviors. In summary, it seems 
~ost efficient, in terms of ready,learning of both specific and general­
ized creative tendencies, to inco~porate into the training many differ­
ent shaping and modeling and cue-presentation techniques. Until our 
culture has progressed to the point where almost all a,ctivities can be 
acceptably considered fair territory for creativity, it may also be im­
portant to involve in the trainL~g situational stimuli which are clear 
cues that Ucreativity is spoken here" U such as nru.sic and art. 
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IV. SUMMARY& A RETURN 'ro DEFINITIONS 
Is creativity global in nature~ The answer seems to be that it 
can generalize. if enhanced by broad-spectrum training and if presented 
with appropriate discrimina.tive stimuli. I t is our guess the.t area.tiv­
ity tends naturally to generalize but 1s extremely sensitive to discrim­
ina.tiva stimuli. Broad spectrum training pro\"1des the.t more stimuli m­
herent 1n a novel situation will be functional as cues for creative be-
havior-and cues which are verbalized. or represented as symbols, will 
make generalization even easier. It is this reliance upon discrimin­
at1ve stimuli for the generzlleat10n of previously learnede creative 
responses whioh gives them the appea~nce and the pattern of task­
specific or 81tuation-specifio bemvior, even though they may always 
be well within the subjeot's capabilities. 
It probably happens that those individuals reinforced and not 
,punished by their enVironment for a certain creative behavior pattern 
are also usually reinforced for other creative behaviors, but not !!l 
others. The demands of the environment would sha.pe different profiles' 
for each 1nd1vidual, but on the whole, environments would tend to be 
accepting of a. certain degree of original!ty for each class of behavior0 
We suggest tha~any behavior, if novel or deviant or original to ~ oer­
ta1n degre~, would be unacceptable to a culture-ld.th some qualifica­
tions (deviant art is more acoeptable than deviant theology). 
When we put a. subject in a. laboratory, a.nd train him to :respo;ui 
originally or creatively in one particular way, we are probably not 
causing a revolutionary change in his general pa.ttern of expeota.tiona 
about his environment's reward or toleration of originality. Thus, it 
63. 
should prove to be no surprise that his specifically trained original 
behavior does not transfer:- to other situations. If, however, we use a 
compos1te a.pproach in his training, and. especially if we train not only 
specific behaviors but also whole behavior patterns (both cognitive and 
social), and if we provide cues that the training situation can be com­
pared or generalized to a new 81tua.tlon, we may a.ctually change his 
reward expectation for a whole oomplex oforiginal bahavlor-~nd we 
shall see genera.lizatlon, Our subject will have learned to expect his 
environment to accept and reinforce a higher level of originality than 
was h1s previous expeotation. 
It may prove helpful to look to this concept of the acceptable 
"level of orlg1na.11ty" for a. solution to the problem of definj.ng Qre­
ai!brlty. Ra.ther than seeking to fInd creativityD the entityD we can 
think of creat1vity as a. continuum, a.long ~oh a.lmost a.ny behavior 
could be placed. Any single response oould thus be evaluated in terms 
of its degree of creativity. Since creativity has been roughly agreed 
to be represented by originality plus quality or utility. a. crea.tive 
response could be evaluated etatistica.lly for 1ts frequency of occur­
rence and then by consensus as to 1ts value.. By the same token, a. 
creative individual could be distinguished by the rate of statistically 
mre but subjectively useful and valuable behaviors he has emitted. 
This kind of approach could not only. standardize and objectifY differ­
entiatlon of area.tiva indIviduals" but it would also help us get -:8.t 
(or by) the problem of what creativity is and whether or not it is 
global. 
Aooepting the hypothetl~l and atlpulative definition of indi­
vidual crea.tivlty a.s the rate of statistically uncommon but judged-to­
! • 
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be-valuable responses, of an.y sort, we can now return to the problem of 
the opera. tlona.l. definition of crea.t1vity with a better perspectiva for 
solving it. 
Oreativity is the measured degree of originality and usefulness 
in any set of responses, relative to peers, for any kind of behavior­
exam1ned. Any oreativity test-, then, can be used a.s a.n operational 
criterion for creativity at that task--as long as ~sponse originality 
is taken into a.ocount. }'leasurea of fluency a.nd the ratio of original 
responses to the total number emitted are other ways to approach cre­
ativity assessment. and eaoh MS its merits! these will be marginally 
aceepted~ We shall thus accept most measures nominated as tests of 
creativity, but only in regard to the particular behav:tors they require. 
And we shall not expect tha.t these IIlE'Asures and. the responses they l:"aP­
resent will be strongly related to allY other response tendenoy, espe­
c1a.1ly in an experimental setting. 
CHAPTER rv 
AN ASSOCIATIONISTIC APPROACH 
TO CREATIVITY AND INTELLIGENCE 
We have tentatively defined creativity as the production of sta­
tisticaJ~y uneommon, but valuable responses. Ttds definition is prac­
ticable in the examination and evaluation of overt behavior, but it is 
of little use in investigating how it is that creative responses come 
about. By this we mean both the socio-envil'orunental "how" of creative 
behavior (that is" its external causes), and th,e cogn:ttive "how" (that 
is, its internal causes). This chapter will deal with the cognitive 
processes of which creative behaviors are the products" and suggest 
possible explanations for the way in which they hava their effect. It 
will also compare creativity, at a cognitive level" with intelligence 
--in an effort to show whether the two variables have any intrinsic 
antagonism, or, to the contrary, any essential cOgP~tion. 
I. NOVEL ASSOCIATIONS AND SELECTION 
For our purposes, Donald Campbell (1960) provides the best model' 
of the fundamental' nature of creative thought processes. It is not only 
a model of creative thought, however. It is also a sketchy conceptual­
ization of all higher thought processes. 
Campbell conceives of intelligent behavior as a manifestation of 
an organism1s freedom from direct stimulus control--the introduction of 
mediating processes between t he ,environment and the organism. With 
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increasing complexity, species become increasingly better able to deal 
with and receive information from their environments without direct 
physical interaction (see also Hebb, 1949; Piaget, 1967; Gibson, 1970; 
and Diamond, Balvin, and Diamond, 1963, for corroborating views). 
But the development of complex systems for indirect manipulation 
of the environment depends strongly upon the influence of that environ­
mente An organism at the primitive level e~its random locomotion, re­
ceives direct sensory input, and has its random behaviors ttselected tt by 
that input--usua'lly,in a very simple, approach/avoid manner. This is 
what Campbell calls "blind variation and selective retention. II V{hen an 
organism is capable of somewhat less direct methods of sensory input, 
it has merely acquired a means of representing to itself a sensori-motor 
exploration of its environment. It has a way of obtaining information 
without direct manipulation. With each increase in a species I neuro­
logical complexity and each process o~ environmental selection, the 
species becomes more adept at internal, representational manipulation 
of its environment. At the highest levels of development, we call this 
ttL"'ltelligent behavioru (see also Hayes, 1962). Campbell elaborates: 
At this level there is a substitute exploration of a sub­
stitute representation of the environment, the "solu-'c,ionn­
being selected from the multifarious exploratory thought 
trial~ according to a criterion which is in itself substi­
tuting for an e.."Cternal state of affairs. Insofar as the three 
substitutions are accurate, the solutions when put into overt 
locomotion are adaptive, leading to intelligent behavior which 
lacks overt blind floundering and is thus a knowledge process 
(p. 384). 
Innate intelligence (that is, inteD.igence A,) an~ learning inter­
act in this process, and have their effect on the quality of the pro­
duct. Individu~ls may differ Ifin the accuracy and detail of t.heir rep­
resentations of the external world (Campbell, po 391). n Presumably, 
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with greater intelligence a greater intake of sensory information can be 
acoomplished, and with less distortion and better retention than might 
occur in a less efficient 5,Ystem. At the same time, learni~g experience 
r~tiplies the amount of stored information, which, among other things, 
enables the organism1s internal representation of the environment to be 
garnished with greater detail and accuracy. Learning also increases 
the number and range of responses possible to the organism. Most import­
antly, the informational elements acquired in learning are essential 
building blocks for random recombination--the recombination which is 
half of· the creative process. 
When various random associations are made, they are subject to 
many selection criteria. This is fortunate, for the number of useful 
solutions is probably just an infinitesimal minority of the total pos­
sible associations (as Poincar~, 1952, observed). The primary selective 
criterion is, of courss, that an associative combination be an appropri­
ate lIfit" to the enviromnent--that is, that it be realistie, to use the 
term in a slightly unusual and literal sense. But other criteria also 
operate on combinations--criteria derived from experience in problem 
solving, rule verbalization, and so on•. Some individuals should be bet­
ter at maintaining simultaneously more such selection criteria, thus in­
creasing their "likelihood of achieving a serendipitous advance (Camp­
bell, p. 391)." Logically, highly intelligent people should be better 
able to accomplish such a f~at. 
What Campbell describes, j.n short, is really a matter of happy 
variations, or associations, arising partly by accident, partly because 
of the cognitive furniture of their host. Certain of these associations 
or combinations are chosen as solutions because they meet the criteria 
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of the problem-solving situation, or because they meet the criteria of an 
artistic product. 
This .point of view is not incompatible with more extra-cognitive 
approaches. Barron or Taylor might see Campbell's creativity as a pro­
cess of producing original or creative prod~cts (novel associations) 
which is enhanced by j.nte~ligence and sen~itivity to the environment 
(accurate representation of reality as stored information), by learning 
(which provides a large number and variety of elements available fGr 
association, producing large possible numbers of useful associations), 
and by flexibil.it.~ (a lac..~ of selection criteria which might inhibit the 
appearance of useful novel associations)o If creative products are 
overtly evident in any individual, it is very likely that these varia­
bles are in effect. 
Caropbellts model is of course quite consonant with simple associa­
tion theory, as it has been described in relation to intelligence. We 
-have argued that human thought processes can be reduced to a fevl basic 
operations, of which the most basic is (or is something very like) the 
association. The associative model of thought and intelligence seems 
tailor~ade for Campbell's theory of,creativity. 
In fact, if all human thought processe$ are based upon simple ele­
ments and operations, and if creativity can be reduced to analogous or 
identical elements and operations, what distinguishes creativity from 
intelligence? If we speak of intelligence, we must start 'with neurolo­
gical efficiency and innate potential, but we end up by evaluating an 
individual's efficiency and adaptability relative to his peers. Effici­
encr.y and adaptability are obviously the result of rich potential for 
random recombinations and effective selection criteria. Is creativity, 
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can it be, distinct from these processes? 
For Campbell, creativity is not something in a diffarent cate­
gorl from other kinds of thought-it is simply another high-level pro­
cess of variations and selection at an eXtreme point on the creative­
ness continuum. To be more specific, a creative association is simply 
a random association which has a lower chance of statistical occurrence 
in the general population than other associations, but which at the 
same time survives adequate selection criteria. 
Since "intelligent" associations and their .resultaut behaviors 
are b.Y nature adaptive and realistic, the only distinction that remains 
to creative products is their originality. The factors condueive to 
the process of random variation and selective retention are, among 
others, retention and usability of past encountered solutions, and good 
representation of the environment, with detail and accuracy. 
Anyone of these fac,tors is basic to intellective processes 8S 
welJ. Increases in an.y one of them should cause, or enable, increases 
in both intelligence and creativity to occur. 
In point of fact, it is difficult to understand why intelligence 
and creativity do not precisely coincide. Barron (1957) points out one 
aspect of this paradox: 
If one defines originality as the adaptive and unusual, and 
if one defines intel11gence simply as the ability to solve prob­
lems, then at the upper levels of problem-solving ability the 
manifestation of intelligence will be also a manifestation of 
originality. That is to say, the very difficult problem which 
is rarely solved requires by definition a solution which is 
original (p. 735). 
If it is true that diifieult problems a re solved only with the 
help of creativity, then it is doubly true that creativity is only pos­
sl.bIe with the facilitation of intelligence. Zaragueta (1953) suggests 
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that intelligence is creative elaboration, and creativity is the ex­

pression of that elaboration. This suggestion fits quite well with 

. the evidence ,ve have presented to this point. Each improvement in the 
biological efficiency of an ~ndividual would result in better cogni­
tive systems of retention or recombination or selection. This super­
iority would be overtly manifest as intelligence~. But since the 
variables enhancing intelligence ~ would be those very variables en­
hancing creativity, intelligence ~ would be creativity--creative ela­
boration, expressed. 1~y is this not exactly the case? Why are in­
telligent behaviors not equivalent to creative behaviors? The paradox 
of their inequality is the essential stone in the theoretical founda­
tion of this paper and it is important that we now examine ,the exper­
i.t'1lental 1iterature for some clue to its solution. We must search for 
some factor which differentially influences intelligence and creativ­
ity, or soma indication that the assumptions we have made about their 
bases are incorrect. 
II. MEMORY AND SETS 
As we saw while attempting a definition of intelligence, most 
theorists and test constructors agree that memo~J is a primar,r factor· 
in intelligence, vitally important in ever.y intellective operation. 
Guilford (1967) saw it as fundamental to all problem solving and even 
to creative processes. Many investigators have found relationships be­
tween memory and creativity. Therefore, memory seems .to wind itself 
through both creativity and intelligence, and should be examined as a 
possible source of their differentiation. 
In a study with rats, Bruner, Mandler, 0' DO'vvd and Wallach (1964) 
, ' 
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found that only those subjects which had been overtrained in a maze 
task showed the ability to transfer or generalize their learning to a 
second task which was the exact opposite of the first. Although the 
transfer was affected by motivational factors, no transfer occurred 
un4er any motivational state Unless the subjects had first overlearned 
the task. Apparently, the animals had to have the associative elements 
they needed to manipulate firmly fixed in their memories before a novel, 
or "creative," solution could be arrived at. 
One examination of the relationships between intelligence, cre­
ativity, and memory was carried out by Pollert,(1969)o He hypothesized 
that memory was importanc to creativityJ and his results supported this 
hypotheSiS, with one predictable exception: two rote memory tasks 
showed no relation to non-verbal creativity and only a very small rela­
tion to verbal creativity and intelligence. Rote memory is known to b9 
quite independent of intelligence tests (Cronbach, 1910). If it is 
also independent of creativity, our hypothesis about the common origin­
ation of intelligence and creativity can only be supported. 
P~llert also found that all o'cher measures of memory (that is, 
meaningful memory, like memory for verbal details, objects, number, and 
color) w~re significantly correlated both to intelligence and to at 
least on~ of the measures of creativity. Pollert's conclusion was that 
"most di'(ergent thinking involves the manipulation of information re­
trieved from mstrJ:>ry or storage in addition to external stimuli (po 155). tI 
Supporting evidence of the facilitating effect of memor,y upon cre­
ativity is to be found in the work of Kerr and McGehee (1964), who ob­
tained correlations'of .16, .53, and .30 between creative temperament 
profiles and several different memory tes ts. (the la,st two correlations 
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are significant). These results are especially interesting because 
they seem to relate memory, wlti.C:.l:l. could only exert its creativity­
facilitating mediation at a cognitive level, to a global manifestation 
of creative behaviors. Thus, creativity does seem to be dependent u!~n 
intellectual, as 1-isll as socio-e~n"'irofl.men-t/al, variables. 
Of course, it is reasonable and logical that a good memory should 
increase one's potential for creativity. Campbell's model of creative 
thought provides a significant role for the storage and availability of 
elements for recombination--without these elements, creativit.y is not 
difficult: it j.s impossible. McKellar (1957), even while taking a more 
phenomenological approach to creativity, is strong in his emphasis upon 
the importance of stored perceptions, or trmemol'1.es. n As he puts it, 
trno imagination can occur that is not composed of elements derived from 
actual percep~ual experience {p. 23)." 
The anecdotal evidence for the importance of memories or past ex­
perience in creative processes is almost limitless (Ghiselin, 19,2), 
and it is supported by empirical evidence and reasoned argument. But 
is there not also reason to suspect that memor,y could be an obstacle to 
. creativity? If associational elements are too easily accessible, might 
they not conflict, block each other, or result in the d~nination of old 
solutions in new and inappropriate contexts? Can variation be limited 
by retention, and memory be a handicap in creative problem solving? 
Saugstad (1952) att.empted to unravel the problem with all experi­
ment on incidental memory and problem solving. He distinguished between 
a holistic, Gestalt-type memory and an Itincidentaltr memory--a memory of 
isolated, concrete items. His results were more puzzling than enlight­
ening. Task-related memory had no rGlation to problam-solving ability 
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(the Pearson r was +.001). Incidental memor,y, on the other hand, 
showed negative correlations with problem solving and with school 
grades. These correlations were only significant for boys, andwithin 
the boys, incidental memory seamed more of a handicap among language 
majors than among physics and mathematics majors. 
Although the entire meanipg, of these results is not claar, they 
do provide an indication that some kinds of memor~ (not necessarily 
those correlated with intelligenoe or achievement) can interfere with 
problem solving of a creative nature. But since there was a significant 
sex difference in the effects, it is impossible to avoid motivational 
considerations. 
There are other studies which indicate that the problem is not 
as simple as we should like it to be. The overlearning study of 
~er, at alc (1964) reconciled previous studies by indicating both 
that overlearning (or good memory and usage of information?) was a 
help to flexibility in problem solving, and that it was a hindrance. 
The reconciliation was accomPlished only by consideration of motiva­
tional variables. 
Conceivably, problem solving could represent either creative or 
intelligent behavior, or both. It is therefore possible that in hav- . 
i~g some negative effect on problem solving, a rr~mor,y variable is dif­
ferentiating be'tween creative and intelligent cognitive behavior. The· 
most likely possibility is that such a variable covaries with what W.9 
know as intelligence, while it inhibits creativity_ Whatever the na­
ture of the memory variable, it could provide some answer for the prob­
lem of the apparent semi-independence of creativity and intelligence. 
But uI? to this point we have been discussing Itmemorytl in a very sj.mplis­
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tic manner, and we do not have the conceptual tools for handling it dif­
ferently. Memory is not a simple association. At very best (that is, 
in the simplest possible case) it is a multiple association, and it is 
probably merely an aspect of complex cognitive systems from which it 
can ,be only arbitrarily isolated. Until we have some idea of what 
those systems might be, it will be hard to tmderstand whether memory, 
as a tlaet" which inhibits or enl'...ances future solutions, effects the 
differentiation between creativity and intelligence. Therefore we must 
embark on an elaboration of our understanding of cognition. 
III. HIF1Ul~CHIES OF NOVEL ASSOCIATIONS 
We have described a general associational system for dealing with 
creativity and intelligence, follcw/ing the recombination-and-selection 
model of Campbell (1960). Campbell's model, however, never reaches 
specj.ficity when dealing with cognitive constructs, and we should like 
to develop a more precise understanding of them. One particular aspect 
of the recombination model serves as a critical point in another hypo­
thetical system. This system is Mednick's (1962), in which a more dir-' 
ectly cognitive approach is taken. The critical point in common with 
both systems is illustrated by this perceptive introspection of Poincare 
(1952): 
Among chosen combinations the most fertile will often be 
those formed of elements drawn from domains which are far 
apart# Not that I mean as sufficing for invention the bring­
ing tOGether of objects as disparate as possible; most com­
binati '.Ins so formed would be entirely sterile. But certain 
amon£: "ism, very rare, are the most fruitful of all (p. 36). 
The ('l'iginality of which creativity is composed oan be defined as 
an assocj.ative combination of statistical raritytl But it is the reasons 
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such rare combinations occur (when they do occur) that hold particular 
fascination for Mednick. He believes an associat,ion to be rare because 
it associates two very unlikely fiel~ (see also, Bronowski., 19.58). A 
novel recombination is born not of two novel elements, but of Uvo 1101'­
dinarytr elements which have a very 1mv probability of co-occurrence. 
Together they are, to use Mednick's terrninology, a "remote association. It 
.A remote association can be defjned according to a norm popula­
tion, or within an individual. If an association has a probability of 
.0002 of occurrence among a random sample of lJilltmvn, Ohio residents 
in response to the word "rock,1I it can be described as original. If 
it is an appropriate or useful association, it might also be described 
as creative. Unless the individual producing the response is highly 
deviant from and incompatible with his social milieu, that response 
will have a fairly low probability of occurrence within him as an indi­
vidual, as well. l't will probably not be the first response he emits: 
it is a remote associatione The reason it occurred in his mind, and 
not in someone elsels, is that his remote associations are somehow more 
accessible than others'. 
The probability of occurrence, within an indivj.dual, of a partic­
ular association depends upon its remoteness •. For Mednick, "remoteness" 
is directly proportional to the number of other associations arising in 
response to a stimulus before this particular association occurs. If 
each association possible for a certain stimulus were arranged along a 
continuum, with the least likely responses at the outer edge and the 
most likely ones at the inner edge, we should have a picture of our 
subject's "associative hierarchyn for that particular stimulus. If we 
had plotted each response after one thousand stim,llus presentations, 
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we might have half of a normal-shaped curve of probability along the 
continuum. This curve would tell us the probability of any response 
for our subjact to this stimulus. But probability, in this case, is 
really equivalont to the degree of dominance of a response. It should 
be readily seen that two individuals could have exactly the same words 
in their response hierarcp..ies tc? a ce~ain stimulus, but have very 
different overt response pattel~ because of the different profiles of 
dominance or probability theywoald show for the events in their hier­
archies. 
In any individual whose associative hierarchy is ttsteep,U there 
are a few well-used responses to a certain s t,imulus which dominate all 
others. The remote associations rarely get the opportunity to come 
into play, and typical responses could not be called creative. In a 
Uflatff hierarchy, on the other hand, the high-probability responses 
are less dominant, remota associations have almost as high a pxobabil­
ity of occurrence as ordinary ones, and creative behavior frequently 
occurs. 
Mednick argues that individuals could have steep but deviant 
hierarchies, and he includes these peoPle within his definition of cre­
ativity. Their inclusion is an artifact of our definition of origj.n-" 
ality as a low statistical probability of occurrence within a popula­
tion sample. It is a useful definition, because of its clarity and ease 
of assessment. But as we have seen, selective criteria and usefulness 
in creativity are also important. M1d there is still another signif­
icant characteristic of creativity which is not included in measures of 
originality. 
, Usually, those capable of responding ttoriginallyll have such a 
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. capacity because of a wide-ranging variety of possible responses (that 
is, a flat associative hierarchy)~ It is because of this that they are 
able to be. flexible; in another situation, with different stimuli, the 
individual will be capable of yet another original and appropriate be­
havi·or. On the other hand, the parsoIl with a steep but deviant hier­
archy is capable of only a few dominant responses-he has no approp­
riate behaviors in many stimulus situatioIlS, and 1vill be rigid) not 
flexible. If he is fortunate, his devtant dominant responses will be 
. appropriate and culturally a cceptable~ or even desirable, and he will 
be called "creative" (by Mednick, and perhaps by his culture)-althQugh 
his creative life may be short-lived, since he is capable only of re­
peating his first successes (this is recognized by Mednick). If he is 
less fortunate, his de'nant behaviors will be inappropriate or unac­
ceptable to his culture, and he will be labeled "neurotic. 11 But this 
"neurotic" behavior is no more inflexible or tL'"1adaptable than that of 
. the rigid Ucreative. It 
Thus, it seems careless to leave unqualified our dependence upon 
statistical rarity, even with the qualification of usefulness. Crea­
tivity is desirable not only be.cause it introduces novel events into 
a culture, but also because it provides flexibility for the indivi~uals 
within the culture. If we lose sight of it,s real evolutionary value, 
we shall be the victims of our mvn definition. Therefore, flexibility 
must be :lntrinsic in our understanding of creativity (Guilford, 1967) r; 
Mednick finds considerable support, however, for his contention 
that creative responses are the product of a flat associative hierarchYe 
For instance, Bousfield, Sedgewick, and Cohen (1954) found that the total 
number of associations made by a subject t~ stimulus words was strongly 
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and inversely related to the rate of associations. Since the creative 
subject's responses to any stimulus should have roughly equal dominance, 
Mednick had concluded that i1the high creatj.ve subject (flat hierarchy) 
would respond relatively slowly and steadily and emit many responses 
while the low creative subject would respond at a higher rate but emit 
fewer responses (Mednick, 1962, p. 223)." And such appears to be the 
case. This position is more supported than refuted by widespread find­
ings of higher verbal a nd/or ideational fluency among creativas (Barron, 
1968, 1969; and others). 
If we a~it that associations do have a continuum of probability 
in response to a certain stimulus, and that this continuum, in a very 
abstract sense, has certain properties which differ from individual to 
individual, then we have merely described a very simple associational 
process, taking place on an elemental level. What leads us to ~elieve 
that these ver,y fun~amental phenomena have any analogue in overt cre­
ative behavior? 
In a study of his own, (reported in Mednick, 1962), Mednick found 
that groups of research scientists rated high or low in creativity 
could be very easily discriminated by the relative frequency of stereo­
typical responses they gave to stimulus words. The Im~-creativity group 
responded more stereotypically on eighty percent of the words. 
Mednick's Remote Associations Test (the RAT, which has already 
been described in this paper) has also found substantial validation. 
Mednick reports that RAT scores correlate significantly (! =+ 07) "with 
rated creativity of students in a design course, a nonverbal task sit­
uation--this result, in spite of the strongly verbal nature of the RAT. 
The test also correlated +031 with the Originality Scale of IPAR, and 
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-.31 with the Crutchfield tonformity Score. High RltT scorers proved 
to be significantly more "liberalu on questions of sexual morality and 
women's rights, and scored higher on the scales of the Strong Voca­
tional Interest Blank which are mos·t strongly correlated to other mea-
Bures of creativity and which are also relatively uncommon interests in 
the normal population (for example, artist, psychologist, physician, 
mathematician, 'and author-journalist ) • 
Many criticisms have been leveled at Mednic..'k;:ts RAT as a craativ­
ity measure. Some are more telling than otherso Arguments about 
whether or not the RA.T is a measure of convergent or elivergent thinlti.ng 
(Taft and Rossiter, 1966) are aimed at a straw mane Quite clearly, the 
RAT is a test of convergent thinking in the true ser~e of the word, 
"convergent. tt Three s·t,imulus words are given, and one "right" word is 
given in response. However, convergent processes have been accepted 
and agreed upon (Taylor and Holland, 1964) as part of the total crea­
tive process, and proof that the RAT is a convergent test is not proof 
that it is not a measure of creativity. 
Arguments that the RAT is an originality test (Hood" 1969) are 
perhaps equally beside the point. r~ originality is not creativity 
" (and it is not), then it is at ver.y least a major and vital prerequis~ 
~te. Without original responses upon which the selective criteria can 
operate, no creativity'is possible. At any rate, some~sk-appropriate 
selection of the original responses is also required in the RAT. Per­
haps Hood (1969) is objec'i:iing in part to the very spec,ific nature of' 
the RAT when he accuses it of neasuring originality instead of creativ­
ity; no global behavior is measured by-it, nothing even c~ose to real­
lire gross behaviors is e1icited. Orl' the contrary, what wa see in the 
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RAT is something just about as close to the original neurological as­
sociation or ttingramU as we can FOssibly obtain from measures of overt 
behavior. 
But in a very real sense, the elemental quality of the RAT is 
what makes it a valuable measure. Here it :Ls possible (not proven, but 
p.:>ssible) that we have a measure of the ,rsry basic processes which en-, 
able more molar creative behavior to occur. If, as we believe, the 
element.s of creativity and inteLligence are identical, then the R.4.T 
should measure intelligence as well. Its detractors have argued that 
-c,his is exactly -rlhat the RAT does measure, and that that factor should 
be eliminated from ito But if the natures of creativity and intelli-, 
genca are intimately related to elementary associationsl processes, lv-e 
cannot have a test of one at that l~nrel without tapping the other. 
Thu~!, it should not prove surprising that the RAT correlates .62 with' 
the otis 1Q" and .66 with the full-scale (verbal and quantitative) Scho..· 
lastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores of undergraduates (Gamble and Kellner, 
1969). Schlicht" at ale (1968) argued tha·t since the R..A.T is a verbal 
test, a non-verbal intelligence test would shmv no relatiolwhip to ito 
..t\.lt,hough they found that the correlation was lower than usual when crea­
tivitywas compared with the Cattell Culture~Fair test of intelligence, 
it was still significant (+.36 for males and +.30 for males and females). 
The Mednick measure of the avail~bility of remote associations 
thus 999ms to be tapping a mental process closely related to intelli­
gence, and essential to creativity. But it seems to indicate at the 
same ti~a some divergence be~neen the· two phenomena at the lowest of 
levels.., And so far, we have no information ·to help us to understand 
how that can beo 
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The clue lies in the independent variables vlhich Mednick hypothe­
sizes facilitate remote association. He suggests that remote 'associa­
tions are the immediate results of a flat associative hierarchy, an 
abundance of associative elements, serendipity, the ability to select 
the creative combination, and cognitive mediation bet\veen and among as­
sociations. We have already di~cussed how a flat associative h:terarchy 
can facilita'te novel associations. It frees the mind from the chmins­
tion of common responses and gives a higher probability of occurrence 
to more origina1 responses. Some of the other fa cilitators of remote 
associations (the n~~ber of associative elements, serendipity, and the 
ability to select the creative combination) are all strongly similar 
to those Campbell suggested, and provide obvious and logical benefits 
for the appearance of remote associations. 
It is the idea of cognitive mediation which is our stepping-stone 
tm1ard a more complex conceptualization of creative thought. Media­
tion provides a way of looking at the elicitation of novel responses as 
something more complex and more believable -fjhan a simple S-R chain. 
There must be some way for associational hierarchies to affect each 
other--othenvise, only the dominant associations would ever be elicited, 
aven in creative people, and especially on a first trial (as in "insight" 
learning). 
Mediation is a process in which "the requisite associative ele­
ments may be evoked in contigui~y through the mediation of connnon ele­
ments (Mednick, 1962, p. 222)." 
AJ.~hough he almost laboriously avoids any differentiation of' this 
associational process into levels, or vel~ical hierarchies (in associa­
tive hierarchies" elements are presumed to be peers" horizontally 
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arranged), vertical differentiation is exactly the path down whj.ch 
Mednick's mediation idea leads •. 
If remote associates appear to be more accessible in a ~ertain 
person, a claim that he has a "flat associative hierarchyU is no ex­
planation of his behavior. Why does he have a flat hierarchy? And 
what does the term mean, aside from its applicability in describing 
behavioral data? Mediation provides one of the answers to these ~ues­
tions. Simply stated, an individual with a flat hierarchy must have 
many interconnections between hierarchies--many elements common to more 
than one hierarchy which can call the others into play. This prO""vides 
a means for relatively unexpected associations to be made; remote asso­
ciative elements can be made available through mediation. 
If this argument is sound, there should be some relationship be­
t'ween facility at cognitive mediation and facility at providing remote 
associations. Higgins and Dolby (1967) attempted to test the existence 
of the relationship between mediation and remote-association abilities. 
The authors devised a learning task in which pairs of words (half ~f 
them related to each other by a common, but unstated mediator; half of 
them nonmediated, but not unrelated) ware learned. In spite of some 
methodological problems which tended to act against them (like the su~­
ject's awareness of the mediation sequence), the results were signifi­
cant. With the learning of the nonmediated pairs held constant, RAT 
scores correlated significantly and negatively (-.312) with errors made 
in mediated-pairs learning. Although this study has limitations and 
needs very much to be substantiated by additional and perhaps more so­
phisticated evidence, it does provide some very interesting support to 
the idea that the process of mediation 'of simple concepts or symbols 
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(like:words) is significantly related to th~ flexible and creative na­
ture Qf associational processes. 
In their attempts to train uncommon word associations, Simon, at 
al. (1966), based their work, as we have seen, upon that of Maltzman 
(1967). One incidental effect they discovered was that uncommon stimu­
lus words were most frequently !ollowed by uncommon response words, 
while the opposite trend resulted from common stimulus-words presenta­
tion. ' They could L~terpret this result as supportive of Maltzmanls 
argum~nt that "common" and "uncommon" represent two separate associa­
tional classes, and that since associations are stronger within any 
class, common stimuli result in common responses while uncommon stim­
ulus result in uncommon responses. It seems to this writer, hm~ever, 
most fnefficient for so many (an unspecifiably large number) associa­
tive ~lements to be stored and interconnected in classes according to 
their functional and logical relationships, but at the same time farm 
'8 class (that is, have direct connection) with every other element of 
their ,comparative leval of commonness or rarity. Some kind of search 
opera~ion, at a higher level of cognitive organization, capable of sen-' 
sitivity to the commonness dimension, is far easter to envision than this 
duplidation of elements in many separate classes. Even if each element 
needed to have a kind of chemical code or tag (perhaps dependent on 
rate of usage), the complexities of such a system of high-level search­
ing a~e far less overpaNering than those of MBltzmanls hypothetical 
systenl. 
The idea that cognitive processes differentiate vertically into 

levelS of operation is inevitable. As Neisser (1967) comments, without 

allowing for some kind of executive process, !twe must think of every 
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thought and every response as just the momenta-ry resultant of an inter­
acting system••• (p. 293)n--a system whose elements are at a single 
level and whose organization is determined only by associational "habittt 
strength. 
Of course vertical differentiation really serves both vertical and 
horizontal mediation. It is difficult to imagine many levels of control 
without interaction of the levels, and when there is interaction of 
levels, there are alternate pathways to different parts of the same 
level--that is, horizontal mediation. It is in theories of such media­
tion that we may find the reasons for differential dominance of common 
or uncommon associations. 
DI: the other hand, assuming there are levels of command in human 
cognitive systems, the associational processes must be basic to all 
th~se levels and to all of their interaction. It must be basic to 
higher thought processes; it must be basic to creativity. The renote­
associations !nodel does predict and find creativity at the global level 
as a result of flat associative hierarchies. Therefore, even when we 
move to a more complex view of cognition, we may find that principles 
applying to simple remote associations also apply to more general cog­
nitive .systems. But it is as we begin to sp9ak of' the interaction of 
various associative hierarchies at various levels that we suspect the 
major differentiation between creativity and intelligence will be dis­
covered. 
IV. HIGH-LEVEL HIERARCHIES 
Schroder has hypothesized a "conceptual systems t.heorylt (out­
lined in Schroder, Driver, and Streufer, 1967) which is an attempt to 
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describe the individual's interaction with his environment as a func­
tion of his information-processing abilities and his cognitive struc­
ture. Karlins (1967) has su.mtnarized the SChroder theory in this way: 
Over a given range of stimuli, information-processing ability 
varies among individuals and is measured in terms of its inte­
grative complexity. Higher integrative complexity refers to a 
greater number of perceptual categories for recei"'Jing informa­
t~on about the world, and more conceptual or combinator.y rules 
fop organizing such units of information. Structural complex­
ity is described as varying along a continuum that represents 
gradation in integrative complexity (p. 264). 
From this \riewpoint, Schroder and his colleagues generate several 
specific predictions, wh.ich Karlins outlines and dra1'lS into comparison 
with predictions generated by Mednick. 
Because of their greater integrative complexity, some subjects 
will be able to make a broader range of intercategory combinations-­
more "remoten classes of information will be able to be brought to­
gether. These same subjects, whom we might call the "Schrodern crea­
tive subjects" should have, bonds between different categories which 
are of more even strength than those of less integratively complex sub­
jects. It is 81"gu.ed that more statistical \IDcertainty is generated by 
wide as opposed to narrow but in-depth sampling of information cate­
gories, and that integratively complex subjects would be more able to 
handle such uncertainty--that is, to tolerate it. Of course, uncer­
tainty might not be generated in one's exploration of one's own infor­
mation categories in memory because their content would not be unfam­
iliar. But if the subject were to sample inforrnation from an exte mal 
source (such as the resources of a computer) this uncertainty aspect 
would come into significance--and in any case, wide search patterns 
might be expected of the SChroder creative subject for other reasons 
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Karlins does not mention. 
The similarity of the Schroder and. Hednick systems is quite strik­
ing. Each predicts a sorl of hierarchy basic to cognitive structure. 
Each predicts that among creative individuals, such hierarchies of as­
sociation will be flat, and large numbers of associations will be more 
likely to occur. 
The significant difference between the two hierarchies suggested 
by the two theorists is the level of abstraction or generality of the 
members of those hierarchies. The elements of the Mednick hierarchy 
are simple word (or idea) responses; the elements of Schroder's are 
idea classes or categories which could themselves conceivably be hier­
archies (for example, nrelig:ton,n or usickness tt ). 
It appears, then, that Schroder's system is the outside of a 
Chinese-puzzle nesting of hierarchies within hierarchies, with the 
same principles of causality operating to produce creativity and orig­
inality at each level. At least we know that the prj.nc1ples Schroder 
assumes are believed to be the same at a very nmch lower level (Med­
nick r s). V/hat levels may lie between Mednick and Schroder, or within 
them or beyond them, and what ~ rules may be" is not indicated. 
It might be expected, or rather it might even be hoped, that 
measures of Mednick's creativity and Schroder's creativity would show 
a strong relationship. The results of research efforts to the pre­
sent, however (Karlins, 1967; l~rlins, Lee, and Schroder, 1967) have 
not been easily subjected to synthesis. 
Part of the difficulty of comparison rests j-n evaluation of the 
test used by Schroder and Karlins to discrimll1ate be~veen groups high 
and low in Ifintegrative complex:i.tyit (Schroder creativity). The Para­
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graph Completion Inventory (PCl) r~s no obvious, direct relationship to 
the Schroder theory, and is so open-ended that scoring of :tt may be a 
largely subjective matter. 
A study was w.ade, however, to validate the use of the Schroder 
PCI in separating creative from noncreative subjects (reviewed in Kar­
lins, 1961, and in Karlins, et a1., 1967)a Karlins made one further 
assumption before preceding with the validation: that a subject's re­
corded use of the resources ~f a computer in a complex problem-solving 
task would be closely analogous to the unrecordable uses he makes of 
his own cognitive information resources. We have already mentioned 
one qualification that assumption should include, but it does seen 
reasonable that some relationship would exist be-tvisen the ways in which 
one uses one r s own memory "banks" and those of a computer. 
The results of the experiment were that the Schroder PCl did dis­
criminate between flat-hierarchy creative sources (as determined by the 
fact that many of the computer's categories were tapped, and questions 
were more broadly distributed among them) and steep-hierarchy noncre­
stive subjects. The RJI.T scores of the same subjects did not discriminate 
signifi CBn'c,ly, although correlations were in the predicted direction. 
Abilities tapped by the RAT and the pcr 'were mutually enhancing; the 
highest number of categories searched and the highest breadth-of-search 
scores were found among subjects in the group high on both the RAT and 
the PCT. 
Although we may not agree with Karlins i assertion that no higher­
order integratory mechanisms are necessary for remote association, his 
general explanation for the weak relationship between the tests could 
be ~entatively accepted. He argues that Mednick's ass ocia tional theory 
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may apply only to the lowest levels of a creativity scale, and uthat 
both conceptually simple and complex individuals may be associatively 
creative, but that only structurally complex individuals are integrative 
complex [1hat is, Schroder-creativtl) (p. 267).1t His position does not 
provide an explanation for. the possible existence of subjects high on 
the PCl and low on the RAT, although there ~y be other, unrelated var­
iables accounting for them. 
In substance, 'VIe have already argued that the RAT should be a 
measure of fundamental potential for creativity--that it only begins 
to discriminate between creativity and intellieence, and that some fur­
ther kind of complexity is the probable source of their distinction. 
This argument is supported by the finding that the number of categor­
ies searched in the computer-use task is significantly and positively 
related to Guilford's Uses For Things creativity test, but unrelated 
to the 1Vonderlic IQ (Karlins et al., 1967, p. 166). At one of the most 
open-ended, global tasks which might be imagined (ltbuild a hospital and 
use the computer to get information for itu), the style of association­
formation seems not to be significantly rela ted to int.elligence. Some­
where between the first box and the last box in our Chinese puzzle (or 
in what. we can see of it), lie some answers for our questions about the 
creativity-intelligence distinction. We shall try to look between. 
V. COGNITIVE DIFFERENTIATION 
We can now quite safely assume that bo"lih crea"liivity and intelli­
gence have their foundation in simple associational processes. But we 
also know that in some way, intelligence and creativity become differ­
entiated from each other--othervvise, it would not be possible for var­
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iablos to have effect~ on one and not the other. 
It is our task, then, to try to outline possible processes of cog­
nitive differentiation between creativity and intelligence. We shall 
follow, in a rather theoretical path; the differentiatory process from 
the associational stage to its end product in executive-type cognitive 
operations. We shall elivide our efforts into two sections roughly 
equivalent to low-level, primary differentiation and high-level, sec­
ondary differentiation. We see these levels as more or less analogous 
to two structures hypothesized by Schroder to be necessary for cogni­
tive complexity: perceptual categories., and combinatory rules. 
Perceptual Categori~! 
Although the brain probably has approximately fixed kinds and 
numbers of neural interconnections and limits to growth and differen­
tiation placed upon it by metabolism and blood supply (Hebb,1949; Riro­
land, 1960), and possibly a few innate structu~a1 pathways or a·rudi­
mentar'J organization (Hebb, 1949; Piaget, 1969; 1tLDner, J.970), its var­
ious activity areas are quite probably within themselves undifferen­
tiated and equipotential (Hebb, 1949; Diamond at al., 1963; Bennett, 
Diamond, Krech, and Rosenweig, 1964; Milner, 1970). It is the task of 
learning and experience to provide differentiation--and to provide a 
differentiation which corresponds to some extent with an external re­
slity. 
The process of perceptual learning must be thought of as 
establishing a control of association-area activity by sensory 
events (p. 123) ••• We can then regard the stage of pr~~ry 
learning as the period of eS'wblishing a first environnrental 
control over the association areas, and so indirectly, over 
behavior {Habb, i949, p. 12~). 
Hebb's theoretical system traces the development of higher cogni­
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tive processes from tho first elemental neural associations. When neu­
ral events corresponding to senso~ stimulation are simultaneous, they 
become related to each other. 
It is proposed that a repeated (simultaneous) stimulation 

of specific receptors will lead slowly to the formation of 

an 1tassemblytt of association-area cells which can act briefly 

as a closed system after stimulation has ceased; this pro~ 

lQngs the time during which the structural changes of learn­

ing can occur and constitutes the simplest instance of a 

rSpre-sentative process (image or idea) (Hebb, p. 60). 

Of course, as Diamond, at al. (1963) point out, the process of 
neural differentiation cannot be simply the ,result of intercellular 
faoilitor,y associations. In order for the organism to be capable of 
intricate and environmentally appropriate behavior, it must learn to 
discrfminate among stimuli. Discrimination is learning to be respons­
iva n~t only to what a stimulus is, but also to what it is not. Our 
sensitivity to a unique element of a stimulus must elicit some inhibi­
tion of our response to previous and similar stimuli if we are to be 
able ~o respond to the neW stimulus differentially. Therefore, neural 
assoc~ations must have an inhibitory as well as a mutually excitatory 
nature. This kind of inhibitor,y process makes discrimination possible. 
Inhibition is also the process which enables generalization to 
occur, .and generalization is extremely important in the development o£ 
~ognitive processes. 
In most cases, generalization is taken to be a state of being. in­
sensiilive to distinctioflS ~etween st.:tmuli (Deese and Hulse, 1967; 
Tempone, 1965). But this need not be the case. In a study by Gardner 
(ss reported in Gardner, Holzman, KleL~, Linton and Spence, 1959), sub­
jects were asked to categorize objects. It became apparent tr~t subjects 
who g~neralized more broadly were not simply less aware of distinctions 
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than were the other subjects. On the contrary, 
• • • some broad-range S5 noticed many subtle differences 
in objects in the Sorting Test. The essential difference be­
tween the S5 at the opposite poles seemed to be in the degree 
to Which they were impelled to act upon or ignore an rr~araness 
of differences (p. 39). ~ 
:un any philosophical or linguistic usage of the word Itgeneraliza­
tion" 1t is understood that one ignores an ffivareness of distinctions 
for the purpose of making use of similarities along a certain continuu.lTl. 
Indeed" if any population of elements is to be available for recombina­
tion a~ong more than one continuum, their distinctions must first be 
learned. Then, according to the purpose of the moment, any number of 
generalizations can be made, each of which is constructed among the 
element,s having the quality selected, for attention--all other qualities, 
all other distinctions, are ignored. 
In the develo~~ent of basic perceptual categories, or ar~ other 
cognitive classificatory systems for that matter, the process is the 
sarna. First, there is the generalization of ignorance. SimLlar stimuli 
elicit similar responses and facilatory associations are formed. Then, 
there i:s discrimination. The organism learns, consciously or uncon­
sciousl~, to inhibit old responses to similar stimuli; nmv responses 
are made and are contingent upon certain specific aspects of the stim­
ulus. There may be finer and finer discri.mination, in which smaller 
and smaller parts of an originally broad-range response pattern al~ 
eliminated in the presence of specific cues. But the organism would 
be hopelessly fragmented and specific if it were not "then possible to 
generat:e new, "aware" generalizations--generalizations which can be 
more 8'nd more inclusive, reaching a high level of abstractiono 
These generalizations are expected to, be flexible in nature, 
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because of heavy overlapping. They involve temporary inhibition of 
respons!es to sti.l'l1uli ha'\ring a certain quality_ One response can thus 
be involved in many completely different generalizations. If such were 
not th~ case, no flexibility would be found in human beings, and so it 
must be assumed to be a natural tendency--a tendency of vi:bal signifi­
cance tn cognition. 
It is no wonder that Harlow is reported (in Diamond, at a1., 
1963) als making the comment that traIl learning and all thinking may be' 
regarded as resulting from a single fundamental operation, the inhibi­
tion of inappropriate responses or response tendencies (p. 287).n 
.Alre capacities for discrimination and generalization related to 
intelligence? 
Hebb (1949) indicates that one locus of individual differences 
in neu~ological efficiency is the differences in potential for discrim­
inato~ acuity. There is additional evidence that intelligence is the 
result of or a c0variable with efficient discrindnation processes, har/­
ever. Tempone (1965), with a tec~nique borrowed from Mednick and 
Lehtinen (1957), studied visual discrimination abilities and their re­
lationShip to mental age. Subjects divided into high, average, and low 
menta,l......age groups according to the Pinter General Abilities Test were 
sign:i:ficantly different in their performance on the discrimination 
problem at better than the .05 level of probability. Children with 
higher intelligence were better at visual discrimination, and made fewer 
arrots through over-generalization. 
]n a study with mental patients, Desai (1960) correlated scores 
from Rqven 1 s Progressive Matrices Test (·Nhich is, according to Matar­
azzo, I972, substantially but not overwhelmingly correlated with the 
93 
r~ 
WAIS) and Epstein's Over-Inclusion Test. Correlations between the in­
telligence test and the n~~er of errors due to over-inclusion (-gener­
alization) was negative and significant (beyond the .01 level of sig­
nificance)e Desai comments that the sample was higher in average in­
telligance than the norm, and had a smaller standard deviation; it is 
ver.y pdssible among a normal po~ilation, correlations between the two 
tests would have been even higher. High-IQ subjects, then, shrnv a 
significant tendency to avoid errors of generalization--to avoid the 
kind of generalization which would show a lack of discrimination, 
rather than an overriding of discriminations. 
~t is of supplementary support that Spotts and Mackler (1967) 
found a significant positive correlation (E less than .01) between 
Otis IQ and field independence on both the Embedded Figures Test and 
the Hidden Figures Test. Highly intelligent subjects may be able to 
"discr:itminate" a figure from its field" And Kerrick (1956) found that 
high-IQ subjects used the 'Osgood Semantic Differential Scale more 
fully than did low-IQ subjects, relying less on extreme positions and 
more evenly on all positions (level of significance for the differ­
ence was better than ~ = .01). Thus, high-IQ subjects show a tendency 
to use finer discriminations in evaluation, as in many other kinds of. 
tasks. 
Furthermore, we know that intelligence is strongly related to 
memory processes, and Relson and Cover (1956) discovered that subjects 
perform better on memory tasks when items to be memorized are pre­
sented in more specific categories. They suggest that over-general 
categories a11m, too much interference and impair memorization. We 
sugg~st that the facility for memorization found among highly intel­
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ligentsubjects may be the result of better discriminations and better 
categor,y systems WOQld be of little help in the learning of nonsense 
syllables or other rote memory tasks, and these would not be expected 
to be (and are not found to be) any easier for the more intelligent 
subjeot than for his less intelligent peers (Cronbach, 1970). 
All of these evidences indic~te that high intelligence is, or 
brings' with it, a broadly based efficiency at making discriminations. 
They also suggest that when intelligent subjects regeneralize (speak­
ing now at the level of the formation of the most elementary perceptual 
and conceptual categories) their categories are narr~v and maintain a 
high lavel of discriminatory potential. For more abstract purposes, 
a higher order of generalization, with each of these categories as an 
element in the new generalization, is constructed. It is hypothe­
sized that a higher potential number of both facilitory and inhibitory" 
associa1tibns in the highly intelligent subj ect make him capable of 
mainta~ning more discriminative and fine-grained categories, and per­
haps enable him to construct more levels of ItawareU generalization than 
an average person might have over the same total difference in level 
of abstraction. 
These kinds of processes begin at a layel so basic as to he be­
yond our intuitive understanding. By the time we reach the level of 
activity represented in the RAT, for example, many differentiation/ 
gener~1ization processes must PAve already gone on. The subject must 
! 




t~c tt~ining, and so on. In fact, the cognitive structures which 
enabl~ a subject to do well on the RAT are probably at a high&r level 




after all, is accomplished to a great extent ~J higher mechanisms; it 
is the generalization of the test items into higher categories that 
makes oither associations to them accessible. 
But Schroder's system is argued to be a V6r.y high-level analogy 
of Medrll.ck' s. What, then, is the difference between what has here 
been prpposed and Schroder's system of proposals? Very little, exoept 
that it is here argued that the total capacity in an individual for 
such complexity of differentiation and integration is in actuality his 
potential for intelligence (that is, that his complexity capacity is 
his int~lligence A). Schroder, on the other hand, believes this com­
plexit~J at its most global and social level of manifestation, to be 
creativ?:ty. He cOIIunencs: 
Vfuen personality structure is taken as the anchor for view­
ingi behavior, then we are focusing upon creativity--the abil­
ity to generate diversity and conflict, to evolve alternate 
organizations or integrations of diverse perceptions and de­
cisaons (Schroder, et al., 1967, po 11). 
Schroder's (and Karlinst) assumption is that higher irrtegrative 
complexity is necessary to and sufficient for the "alternate organiza­
tions" which are equivalent to creativity. And of course, we could not 
disagree in the assumption that creativity is the ability to generate 
ualternate organizations or integrations." 
Bruner (1964) provides an exciting argument which is partly sup­
portive and partly elaborative of this position. His is a kind of "one­
better" approach. Creativity is envisioned to be simply a high-level 
sort of, generalization (where generalization is what he calls "generic 
learninglt). This higher level of generalization can be called ltgeneric 
coding,:n although Bruner admits that the difference beiA"leen generic 
learning and generic coding is one of degree or level only. Generic 
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processes are compared to an empt~~g operation, in which the abstrae­
tion is a "contentless depiction of the ideal case, empty in the sense 
that geometry is empty of particulars (po 307)." If this is creativ­
ity, then creative works of great moment and magnitude are merely prod­
uets of generic processes at still a higher level--a reabstracted, 
generic t1supercoding. n Comments Bruner: 
It seems to me that the principal creative activity over and 
beyond the construction of abstracted coding systems is the 
combination of different systems into new and more general sys­
tems that permit additional prediction. It is perhaps because 
of this that, in ~~tehead's picturesque phrase, progress in 
the sciences seems to occur on the margins between fields (p. 308). 
This is an attractive Jacob's Ladder, but as a theoretical system 
it presents almost as many questions as solutions. If creativity de­
pands entirely upon the L~dividualts ability to construct viable gen­
eric systems, why is it not directly dependent upon intelligence? 
Examine the multitude of ways in which highly intelligent subjects 
prove themselves capable of such system construction: they are superior 
at memory tasks, information storage, discernment of similarities, re­
call of remote associations, vocabulary, symbol manipulation, arith­
metic operations, and general comprehension (Wechsler, 1958; and others). 
Any higher syste~ization of categories and generalizations must cer­
t~inly depend upon systems like these, as well as a high potential for 
fine discrimination; we have consistently seen that the higher systems 
are derived from the lower (Karlins, 1967). It seems impossible that 
the causes of the problematic creativity-intelligence <;tivergence can 
have any basis in only these kinds of structural potential. The anSNer 
must have something to do with the direction in which such structures 
are put to work, or their management by other structures. That is 
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where we must next search, in hope of finding our suppressor variable. 
Sets and Comqinatory Rules 
We ara nO'~ int·.:)rested in higher-level patterns of response ten­
dencywhich either direct differentiation a~ lower levels, or direct 
the us's of· differentiated structures, or are themselves the products 
of differentiation processes. 
First, let us examine sets. 
We have already, in another contextl discussed sets. But they 
hc·ld lle'W relevance at this point in our discussion because they are 
phenomena which seem to guide or direct behayior--presu.mably according 
t.o 	principles previously darived fr(")1n learning and experience. 
If mere intelligent persons were more readily able to acquire 
principles by -which to direct their behaviors (and this is not an un­
reasonable suggestion), they might be more susceptible to sets or 
negative transfer to nmv situations. Are they more prone to negative 
sets than others? The research data is a chaos on this question. 
One significc:lnt posit:tve correlation between an inteD.ectua1 mea­
sure (the Miller Anal()gies frest) and a measure of rigidity which has 
questionable validity was obtained by Kapos and Pattu. (1958). Two j.n­
significant positive relationsrJ.ps are reported on the same variables 
". 	 by Kapos and Fattu (usi..'1g the Scholasttc Aptitude Test), and Galanter 
(1967) . 
Two researchers report inSignificant negative correlations between 
academic achievement and rigidity (Galanter, 1967; D:lvids, 1956), ~nd 
Lester (1966) found a negative correlation between the Otis Quick­
Scoring Test and resista~ce to extinction. These three results are 
98 
:<-<::,,~~ 
confirmed in part by P~keachts (1948) finding that the Einstellung ef­
fac~J which is really a negative set, was negatively correlated with 
the Stanford-Binet. 
These studies provide proof that if there is any relationship 
betr/een manifest rigidity o~ negative sets and intelligence, it is not 
a simple one, and not a strong one, and mOl~ probably negative than 
positive. The best indication of the real state of things is probably 
provided by Duncan (1959) in a review of problem-solving research. He 
concluded that more intelligent subjects are more likely than the aver­
age to be good at problem solving and at overcoming negative sets-­
while they are at the same time possibly able to benefit more than 
their peers from positive sets. 
It should be obvious that mere susceptibility to transfer would 
not be of any net significance, since negative effects would tend to 
cancel out positive effects, and so on. ~bat does rr~ke a significant 
difference is how one handles the sets, and Duncan reports that highly 
capable subjects seem to get more out of pretest directions, and to be 
able to overcome negative sets if necessary. 'rhey are neither more 
susceptible nor less. They simply are able to manipulate their mvn 
sets to greater advantage. 
It may turn out that what we are examining here are examples of 
generic learp~ng derived from more concrete learning. In essence, an 
individual may recombine categories evolved from sensory information 
to form a higher generalization which can tall him how. to deal with 
that information. For example, Harlow (1949) was able to train his 
monkeys to acquire a generic learning set for dealing with their nega­
tive, task-to-task set. This point of view about sets is, of course, 
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vary much consistent with Brunerts (1964) position. 
But Brunerts explanation of creativity as an increasingly ab­
stract process of generalization--up and up and up--cannot be sufficient 
to explain all cognitive systems. It is no more sufficient to that 
task than a radical associationist view which posits a process going 
out and out and out. It may be profit~ble to try another tack alto­
gether. 
A slightly different way of examining the problem is to use 
Neisser's (1967) analogy between sets and schemata, and to look at 
them both as combinator,y rules--rules for· searching and recombining 
existing categories of information. ~~en schemata have been developed 
for dealing with information, even though they are themselves derived 
from it, they act upon it, transforming it (Posner, 1965; lJeisser, 
1967) in ways that make it more useftu. These schemata are generaliza~ 
tions for a purpose, and it is conceivable that they might have varying 
directional tendencieso Not all schemata are in the direction of 
greater abstraction; they could perhaps be capable of organizing infor­
mation toward exactly OPI~site ends. Neither is there any need to see 
them as endlessly nested upward. There may be a completely dif£erent 
kind of organization at some cognitive level. 
We have already hinted that to explain cognitive processes fully 
we must call upon something like an executive computer program, whose 
heur:i.stics are lllee operational sets. Neisser (1967) suggests: 
Some programs may even have a hierarchical structure, in 
which routines at one level can call those which are tllrn'ler tt 
and are themselves called by others which are Uhigher." 
However the regression of control is not infinite; there is 
a "highest," or executive routine which is not used by any- . 
thing else (p. 296). 
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Neisser clarifies the fact that human "executivell program must 
(presumably) be capable of being der:i.ved from experience and learning, 
and must also be capable of self-modification. It is still, however, 
relatively independent of the vicissitudes of everyday learning axpe~ 
rience, and it exerts a definite shaping force on all products of the 
neural "computer. tt Conceivably, it cOuld direct operations lV orking 
at a higher level of abstraction without itself being at a lower level 
of contro1--that is, without itself being used by the more abstract 
generalization or operation. 
0f course, we have no present proof that such systems exist, but 
they seem to be the only logical way out of the "up-and-up-and-upu dil­
emma. Further, there are clues to their existence, and to the possi­
bility that they are closely related to the creativity-intelligence 
problem. 
Riegel, Riegel, and Levine (1966), in basic agreement with the 
Mednick and Schroder hierarchical models, set out to discover something 
more than the models suggested about hierarchical differentiation. 
They tested the hypotheses that: (a) creative subjects have flat asso­
ciative hierarchies, and (b) creative subjects have different patterns 
or classes or responses to a sttmuluse Fourteen tasks were presented 
to 'che subjects, and divided for analytical purposes into five cate­
gories: imitative, logical, grammatical, infra-logical (that is, phys­
ical), and free associational. 
As expected, high-creativity s~bjects showed greater differentia­
tion on the free associationsl task. They also showed greater differ­
entiation on all of the other tasks, except for grammatical and infra­
logical. In these two categories, low-creativity subjects had greater 
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differentiation. Over all categories, highly creative subjects used 
significantly more terms of logic and relations in description, while 
the non-creative used significantly more terms of functions, parts or 
attributes. Thus, the task categories which were higp~y differentiated 
for each gro~p seemed to represent the kinds of approaches taken by that 
group to all tasks. 
\Vhat this study appears to demonstrate is that individuals are 
not merely highly differentiated, with flat hierarchies, or little dif­
ferentiated, with steep hierarchies. Karlina had stipulated (1967) 
that individuals could have different interest or ability areas, in 
which they could show opposing patterns of differentiation (flat or 
steep). But what we see here is not merely a difference in hierarchy 
slope, or a difference in interest area or ability field. ~fuat we see 
is evidence that differentiation can be invested in the direction of 
either the concrete or the abstract--that individuals can have schemata 
which direct their'behavior (and their processing of information) in 
stylized directions, among whose possibilities are abstraction or con­
creteness. 
VI & CREATIVITY AND SCHEMATA 
Is there a creativity schema or schemata? If so, what is its 
(their) nature? The presence of creativity schemata can only be guessed 
at, but if they exist something can be predicted about their nature. 
First, they will be the perpetrators of the creativity/intelligence 
divergence--conbinatoTJT rules which depend upon cognitive potential 
(intelligence) for complexity, but do not automatically coexist with 
that complexity. Second, they will be highly placed schemata, respons­
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ibIs for either wide-ranging or specific areas of creative behavior. 
Third, they will be capable of directing the highest levels of ab­
strac·t processes, as well as facilitating them. 
Fourth, they will be schemata embo~ying the principle of flexi­
bility, capable of generating systems and regenerating them quickly, 
and intrinsically tending toward remote association. ~~th, they will 
come into existence through some facilatory environmental effect--some 
pattern of reinforcement of past behaviors. Sixth, in their absence, 
other kinds of schem8ta, also capable of abstraction but oriented toward 
concrete information processing, concrete sensory inVut, and factual 
manipulation, will be developed--these, too, will arise becausB of an 
environmental selection process. Seventh, any concei~ble ratio of 
creative/noncreative schemata is possible, with the pattern of their 
proportional dominance drawn along existing lines and patterns of en­
vironmental selection. 
We need now to look at some research data which can provid~ con­
firmation or qualification of these postulates. 
For example, there is evidence that creative behaviors are learned 
best not specifically, but as a class of responses. As we saw jn the 
creativity-training review, Levy (1998) obta~ned his best training of 
creative responses when composite techniques were used, including a role 
model, which presumably acted as an organized system of rules for the 
benefit of the child. Furthermore, transfer to novel contexts occurred 
only when this model was evoked. The subjects could incorporate the 
model as a schema for temporar.y behavior regulation, although they had 
not yet internalized it. Brown (1965) and Renner (1970) obtained re­







best learned and transferred as a group, especially if same verbalized 
rules or symbolizations are involved. 
Additionally, the general tendency of creative individuals to 
show predictable patterns of interpersonal, problem-sol'Jing, and pre­
ference behaviors indicates the possibility of modes of cognitive or­
ganization which are consistent thr~ugh several levels of abstraction 
and which pivot around the principles of flexibility and originality. 
These modes could well be the creativity schemata. And thus evidence 
does appear as to their existence, their nruletr-like character, the 
breadth of their effect, and their dependence upon flexibility; our 
first three postulates have support. 
There are other evidences in support of the fourth postulate and 
those after it. While creative people may be equally capable of spon­
taneous--or slightly triggered--emission of both common and creative 
responses, noncreativ8 people have a great deal more difficulty exhib­
.iting creative behaviors. Riegel, at ale (1966) found, for instance, 
that h:i.gh-creativity subjects used fewer logical responses than low-
creativity subjects on the free association task. But when asked to 
produce logical responses, they were well capable of doing so, and used 
many associations frequently used by low-creativity subjects. We find 
a similar phenomenon :in the results of Mednickt s (1962) RAT, where the 
first associations emitted by high-creativity subjects may be very com­
mon ones, but uncommon responses are quick to follow, and almost equally 
available. 
McDonald and Martin (1967) found that low-creativity subjects were 
exceedingly difficult to train to uncommon 'Word associations, while 
highly creative subj ects (whose typical mod,e of response was originality) 
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were easily shifted to making common responses by means of verbal rein­
forcement. Vlhen readministered the RAT after ttconnnonalityn training, 
they showed no decrement in their scores. Flexibility twice demon­
strated. 
Duncan (1959) noted that previous use of an object in a co~~on­
place manner inhibits unusual use of that object later. On the other 
hand, previous unusual use of an object does ~ create a "functional 
fixedness, II and subjects who have been .so exposed to originality are 
later able to use the object in its c~stoID8ry manner. Creativity was 
in a manner of speaking Itinducedlt in these subjects, by exposure to 
novel uses (or various uses) of an object. Presumably, subjects who 
come to our attention already creative have internalized some way of 
looking at objects and ideas in flexible and various ways--this is 
their schema. 
We point to a study by Eisenstadt (1966), in which it was found 
that on insoluble rebus puzzles, highly creative subjects gave up an 
average of 'bNenty-two seconds sooner than the group lou in creativity. 
This difference was not due to the low efficiency or interest of the 
highly creative, because on the soluble puzzles they achieved as many 
solutions as their peers and did so in a shorter time period. It can 
only be suggested, in the light of the other studies revi~ved here, 
that the highly creative subjects had a capacity for quiek changes of 
strategy which enabled them both to arriva at a proper solution more 
rapidly" and also to avoid persistance at methods which did not, or 
could not, be successful. 
All of these experiments hint at the overwhelming importance of 
flexibility to the highly creative individual. He seams to be able 
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to move back and forth among strategies with little difficulty. He 
must, as the fourth postulate suggests, have means of rapidly generat­
ing and regenerating systems of operation. And the most likely form 
for that sort of capacity is a kind of high-level. schema or executive 
program. 
It might be argued that creative or noncreative schemata are 
simply opposing tendencies of recombination--one toward novelty and 
the other toward commonality, or one toward abstraction and the other 
toward concreteness. But the evidence reviewed argues to the contrary 
--that creative schemata include both the cow~on and the uncommon, the 
abstract and the concrete, while schemata directing the less creative 
person's behavior are not so multifaceted. With this suggestion in 
mind, it should be a simple matter to decide which kind of cognitive 
organization is most desirable and adaptive. 
Another principle evident from the data is that creative or non­
creative schemata are affected socio-environmentally. All training 
procedures were able to show some effects, although results ware not 
as easily achieved as might have been expected. Therefore, postulates 
five through seven find support. The appearance of even this degree 
of responsiveness to reinforcements and modeling treatments impli~s 
that ·the original schemata are constructed in response to environ.m.ental 
effects. 
17.hat do the data tell us about intelligence and the creativity 
schemata? Let us reexamine the Wallach and Kogan eA~~iments (1965a~ 
196'b). Boys were asked to divide a group of fifty objects into cate­
gories of their own constru~tion, accord..i.ng to which ones "seemed to 
belong together." They were then s sked to express their grouping 
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rationale, and these rationales were analyzed. Possible categori~ing 
principles were assumed to be phYSical-clescriptiv-9 (for example, "hard 
objects tt ), conceptual-inferential (ufor eatingtt), and relational or 
thematic (ngetting ready to go out"). 
The results of analysis showed that high-creativity subjects, no 
matter what their intelligence level, tended to use both inferential 
and thamatic categorieso Boys high in intelligence but low in creativ­
ity showed a strong dominance of inferentiat categorization, while 
boys low in both used the.matizing a]~ost exclusively. 
In order to discover whether the highly intelligent boys who were 
low in creativity were simply incapable of thematic organization, the 
authors administered a test of that particular ability., When they had 
no choice (and very possibly, failing any ass~gned task vlould be odious 
to this group) these boys could thematize as well as their intellec­
tual peers who were also creative. 
Wallach and Kogan (1965a) conclude: 
In sum, creative boys seem able to m~itch rather flexibly 
between thematizing and inferential-conceptual bases for 
grouping; the high intelligence-low creativity boys seem 
rather inflexibly locked in inferential-conceptual categor­
izing and strongly avoidant of thematic-relational categor­
izi~; finally the low intelligence-low creativity boys tend 
to be locked within thematic modes of responding and relatively 
incapable of inferential-conceptual behavior (p. 363). 
Evidently, the children low in creativity were limited by that 
lack, and those low in intelligence were limited as viell--even though 
they were creative. Only the high intelligent children, then, were 
fully capable of flexible behavior" but they tended to avoid it strongly 
ir' they were not also creative. 
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VII. SUMMARY 
On the basis of the research we have reviewed, we can make a few 
tentative suggestions. In ~nderstanding creativity the emphasis, it 
would seem, needs to be placed upon the originality of behavior at an 
associational level and the flexibility of behavior at the level of 
higher cognitive structures. 1'-hile it is ver,y possibly true that the 
great products of creative thought are high-level abstractions, this 
may not be so much because of the nature of abstractions (for surely 
abstraotions can sometimes be uncreative) as because of the nature of 
creativity (creativity provides a flexibility of recombination which 
is conducive to workable abstractions). What we find about intelli­
gence is that it tends toward abstractness; but unless creativity is 
also present, the individual can apply abstractions rigidly. Such a 
person would be less likely to come upon a highly creative solution 
to abstract problems; he would also show less flexibility at the level 
of social behav~or. His noncreative schemata, not being flexi~le and 
inclusive of creative patterns, would limit him in spite of his capaci­
ties for abstraction and complication. 
Highly intelligent persons, because of the complex character of 
their cognitive organizations, undoubtedly have much greater benefit 
tQ derive from creative cognitive schemata than most others. Their 
larger informational stores, more accurate representations of reality, 
and larger potential number of interneural associations (as hypothe­
sized) would mean that flexible schemata could lead in them to crea­
tive production of considerable significance. 
But the style of individual's schemata is very likely due to en­
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vironmental selection, and the highly intelligent person may not be 
ttselectedlt for creativity. Vt'hat has happened? He must have a complex 
cognitive system, or he would not be intelligent; it must be assumed 
that the cognitive complexity is channeled into noncreative dire~tions. 
Perhaps the storage and manipulation systems for information handling 
are highly differentiated, but "programmed" toward specific, rather 
than flexible, ends. Perhaps abstraction categories are ver.y complex, 
but do not have a large overlap, so that rapid and flexible construction 
of many different generic systems is not possible--categories could be 
highly differentiated, but have a minimum number of interconnections 
at a very high level. 
'Vhatever its exact mechanisms and derivation, it is easy to see 
how such a cognitive state might be environmentally determined. Gen­
eralizations which were task relevant might be rewarded by the environ';'" 
mant, and reinforced in a physiological sense. Connections would thus 
be established between categories in terms of specific, task-relevant 
characteristics. Future generalizations would have no interconnec­
tions eoccept these to use as mediators-no way to tlcall" for elements 
according to some other criterion. Other generalizations might even 
have been environmentally punished, so that specific schematic impedi­
ments were set up against non-task-related generalization. The schem­
ata derived from environmental contingenies during childhood might 
continue to direct the behavior of the adult. 
But training resultj.ng in the severe limitation of generaliza­
tions at a high level would be difficult, for overlap is very natural 
within the human nauro-cognitive system. And if the cognitive schemata 
we have described are to fill the role of the suppressor variable for 
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which w~ have been searching, some explanation must be found for why 
highly intelligent children--who have a natural associative abundance 
and coghitive complexity--should be directed by their environments 
toward schemata antithetical to their own tendencies. For this prob­




Ip Chapter II the suggestion was made that what is testable of an 
individual's intellectual efficiency--that is, his manifest intelli­
gence--is merely a collection of learned behaviors which we suppose to 
reflect, his innate, biological, potential intelligence (Hebb's intelli­
gence !). It was also argued that the basic elements of cognitive pro­
cesses are very simple operations, based upon simple associational ele­
ments. Intelligence, then (intelligence ~), is due to biological limi­
tations upon the number of potential associations, the acuity of per­
ceptual ttequipment," metabolism, or other unknown variables (Hebb, 
1949). 
'In this chapter and in the following one, we mean to explore in­
telligence and its biological variables~ and their relation to crea­
tivity--in.order to investigate why it is that highly intelligent chil­
dren may develop tendencies away from creativity, in spite of their 
natural predilection toward it at a cognitive level. We wish to deter~ 
mine if there is a physiological phenomenon covarying with intelligence 
(or perhaps even responsible for it) which is also intrinsically in op­
position to some aspect of creativity. 
I. INTELLIGENCE AS MOTIVATION 
Keith Hayes (1962), has written a fascinating and original sum­
ma~ ~f his own theory of intelligence which is of utmost relevance to 
III 
our present discussion. He posits t,hat msnifes·t intelligence is com­
pletely learned behavior (to which we have already agreed), that poten­
tial intelligence is innate, and that the hereditary basis of poten­
tial intelligence is in a oluster of tttendencies to engage in activi­
ties conducive to learning. • • referred to here as experience-produc­
ing drives (EPDt s) (p. 337). ft 
With his invention of the term ttEPD," Hayes is referring not to 
something exactly equivalent to a "driven in the classical sense, but 
rather to innate tendencies very closely sindlar to the curiosity, ex­
ploratory, or maniVulatory drives postulated by many researchers (for 
example, Hebb, 1949, 1964; Berlyne, 1960, 1964a, 1964b, 1964c, 1965; 
Harlow, 1965; Day, 1968). And Hayes is also arguing that these drives, 
and they alone, are responsible for individual differences in learning 
and (ultimately) in mardfest intelligence. 
Hayes discounts any other strong possibility as the hereditary 
carrier of intelligence differences. He argues that fully established, 
inherited, structural differences in individuals' higher mental func­
tioning could not possibly mediate intellectual variations, since higher 
mental functions are merely elaborations of simple processes of which 
every one is capable and the young h~n brain is extremely plastic. 
All of this seems well substantiated by research, and evident. But he 
also argues that there is no upper limit on memory, inherent biologic­
ally, which reEtricts learning potential. This claim is less well sub­
stantiated, and must be tentative, at best. Obviously, at some physi­
cal level in some physical mechanism there is a heritable, structural 
difference which causes individual variations in EPDts, if Hayes is 
correct. Although EPD's are -not ttrestrictive,fI they are heritable 
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(and they must also be structural) differences. It· is not clear why 
some potentially restrict~v~ variable could not be physiological and 
heritable in some way analogous to EPD's. Of course, if Hayes is accu­
rate in his suggestions about EPD's, there is no need to search for 
other mediating variables. 
Hayes concludes his hypothetical exposition with the argument 
that higher animals and human beings have essentially the same capacity 
for learning. Individual organisms between or within a species vary 
in intellectual capability only because of their life span, their cap­
acity for language and symbols and the culturally accumulated lmowledge 
they transmit, or the strength of their EPD's. Within species--for 
example, among human beings--it is the EPD1s which account for all var­
iance in intellectual performance. Thus, EPD's in a ver.y real sense, 
~ intelligence. 
In spite of. the difficulties inherent in the construction of a 
theory with so few facts to work with and such ambitious goals, Hayes 
managed to produce a radical and original point of viEn"l which at the 
same time has great merit. He has made the critical distinctj.on be­
tween intelligence as a phenomenon (which is a collection of learned 
behaviors) and intelligence as a biological source of heritable indiv~ 
~dual variation. He has also pointed out the vital importance of mo­
tivational variables as discriminators of intelligent individuals. 
It has long been realized that highly intelligent people have 
significant tendencies toward high motivation. ,But tqe traditional 
interpretation of that trend is that motivation states are environ­
mentally deterrrdned variables affecting academic achievement and thus 
one's performance on an IQ test (usua~y, adversely), and that they 
i f 
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are significant but only partial determinants of a largely inherited 
intellectual potential. Hayes makes a dramatic change in emphasis, 
arguing that rttrue tt or innate intelligence and motivation are intimately 
related, if not mutually inclusive. 
Hayes' entire hypothetical structure, with its supposition that 
people (and even anima~s) are equally capable of complex learning and 
its restricted focus upon EPD's as the only source of human intellec­
tual variation, seems difficult to accept. Perhaps we can avoid some 
difficulties by accepting only part of it. 
First, it is agreed that intelligence and motivation (especially 
exploratory, curiosity and manipulative types of motivation) are in­
trinsically related. The possibility is also accepted that manifest 
intelligence is partially mediated by innate motivational differences, 
and thus that intellectual potential is partially equivalent to moti­
vational "programming. tI What is not accepted is that EPD's are the 
sole source of human intellectual variance, or that there are no innate 
differences in information-processing capacities among human beings. 
In place of the discarded portions of Hayes' theory, we make cer­
tain amendments of our own. We suggest that motivational differences 
and differences in intellectual capacity are correlated phenomena, not 
an identity. Although the increased-motivation of the highly intelli­
gent certainly enhances their learning and accumulation of knm1ledge, 
it is not th~ only or the primary "cause tt of manifest intelligence. 
Mo~over, we suggest that some kind of motivational state and manifest 
intelligence are both dependent variables resulting from the effects 
of an as yet unspecified independent variable. This independent factor 
may well be a biological structure (or a group of them) which determines 
»"t. ewS ) e 
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to a large extent the levels of both motiy,ation and information-process­
ing capability_ In fact, the intersect of these two phenomena--the de­
tection of the possible location of a factor having these two kinds of 
effect--may be the eventual solution of the problem of the plWsical 
basis of intelligence. 
We shall now attempt t,o support these amendments to the Hayes t 
theory with facts. 
II. BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCES OF MarIVATION 
What evidence is there that motivational differences accompany 
differences in intellectual ability? Much of the evidence exists in 
anecdotal form. Eiduson (1962) reports from her study" of forty emi­
nent research scientists the consistent pattern of a drive toward 
work among them--a drive which seemed to center around a desire to 
"fmq ~"things. In a historical study of eminent men, Cox (1926) 
found that even through indirect means of infol~tion about them, she 
could clearly detect among these men a tendency toward roth broad and 
intense intellectual interest. 
These data might be argued to depend more upon creativj.ty than 
upon intelligence. But Terman's (1925) Gifted Group is clearly a 
group defined by means of intellective performance, and not creativity 
~. 
(in fact, this is one of the criticisms most ..often leveled at it; see 
Burt, 1961). But analysis of responses on questionnaires, parent and 
teacher ratings, and so on, gave strong support to the. idea that these 
intellectually gifted subjects had high levels of interest and motiva­
tion. They showed significantly more desire for leadership, devotion 
of effort toward future goals, perseverance, pe~sistence, and desire 
, I d" e g)" 
to excel. They maintained ~Jice as many collections of things as sub­
jects from the oontrol group, and were very clearly superior to less 
able children in their desire to know about things (see review in 
Miles, 1954). 
All of these characterizations can be summarized in two general 
attributes: interest and perseverence. There has never seemed to be 
any question among researchers who have observed large numbers of in­
tellectually gifted children that such children were more intellectual­
ly curious and persistent than their peers. 
One qualification needs to be made here, however. Highly intel­
ligent children have not been found to be universally more curious 
about all things (Day, 1968). There may be a di~ectional variable in­
volved. Evidence on this point can be gathered and implied from the 
work of Getzels and Jackson (1962) and Wallach and Kogan (1965b), al­
though these authors do not address themselves to the point. In their 
.descriptions of gifted children, however, it seems to be evident that 
the intelligent children have high motivation and persistence, and a 
passion to learn, or at least to achieve by learning. But it is also 
clear that this intensity of motivation can be directed in vastly dif­
ferent ways. High IQ-low creativity childre~ in these studies seem to 
show an intense desire to achieve, and to receive social reinforcement 
from other· childl'en or from adults. Their curiosity, if it may thus be 
described, is of a qualified kind, and is perhaps used only in academic 
pursuits. It may, in fact, result in a distorted fixity of intellec­
tual goals and concrete patterns of thought (see the case histor,y of 
"Jay," Wallach and Kogan, 1965b, p. 62). 
1 - t t ¥ b'.~ j, ) J!. 
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III. PHYSIOLOGICAL EVIDENCES 
It is of obvious interest to investigate whether or not there is 
a physical basis to the heightened curiosity and motivational inten­
sity we have seen related to ~pe~or intelligence through obse:rva­
tional and correlational e vidence 0 There are known to be individual 
differences in something widely known as uarousal levels, n and it is 
highly possible that this kind of variable ~ou1d account for the behav­
ioral phenomena of which we have mads note. 
Elizabeth Duffy (1957) is one of the most prominant exponents of 
the ,idea that one's average arousal level is an indicator of individual 
differences. Interes-t,ingly enough, she has made a claar point of the 
fact that intensity and direction of arousal are distinctly differentl' 
although she has also argued that these two dimensioP$ are sufficient 
for classifying all human behavior. It is, of course, intensity rather 
than direction which her research attempts to clarifY, by measuring 
such physical phenomena as skin conductance, muscle tension, electro­
encephalogram, pulse rate, and respiration. 
The most reliable and impressive fj.nding in Duffyrs work is that 
individuals seem to have an over-all general arousal level, roughly 
indicated by a few physiological indicators, and that the average of 
this over-all arousal level is quit-e cons:i.stent over a time within the 
individual. However, individuals do vary in their arousal levels; in 
a stress situation, Gach individual will show himself to be above his 
own average, but in an amount roughly proportional to arousa~ incr,.eases 
among his peers in the same stress situations. Individuals may be very 
different from each other in thsir aro~sal levels under stress or calm, 
. ·'titen 
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and they may va~J greatly in their responsiveness to stress, but they 
are different from each other in clear patterns of deviation from their 
own average arousal levels. 
Duffy warns that internal "arousallt is a concept, a hypothf;ltical 
construct, while all of her measures are overt physical responses-­
many show responsiYeness to operant conditioning" or may be -controlled 
by internal inhibitory processes. They may not actually correspond to 
the internal arousal which is really the object of our interest. In 
spite of this, she argues that they may provide a good indicator of 
internal arousal. The problem is familiar (it may even be the same 
problem): we must estimate a biological potential (intelligence, or 
internal arousal) by measurement of purely overt responses. 
Whether she has investigated the arousal-intelligence interaction 
or not, Duffy does not present any hint about the relationship. She 
reports no administration or scoring of intelligence tests on her sub­
jects, although it is almost unthinkable that such tests would not have 
been given, given the long (if hesitant) courtship between the concepts 
of arousal and intelligence. However, there is evidence from other 
quarters that a relationship between intelligence and physiological 
measures of arousal does exist. 
In his thorough medical investigations of the original Gifted 
Group, Tel~an (1925) obtained evidence that these highly intelligent 
children had higher basal metabolic rates (BMR's) than average chil­
dren. The results were not reliable enough to predic~ IQ ranking 
within the Gifted Group, but they did discriminate between the gifted 
children and the control group. Shock and Jones (1939) obtained a 




'BMR. Hinton (1936) found a much clearer relationship between the 
Stanford-Binet and BMR (~ =+.736), and the Arthur Point-Performance 
(intelligence) Scale (~= +.661). 
Some less direct evidence is available for supporting the 
arousal/intelligence relationship. We know that intelligent individ­
uals learn more efficiently (Harootunian, 1966). If we ascertain ,-that 
conditions enhance learning, there is the possibility that those con­
ditions will be the independent variables responsible for better learn­
ing in the highly intelligent brain. Several studies show that chem­
ical t electrical and ttmoti vationaln arousal or stimulation of the brain 
enhances learning effects (Weiner, 1966; Gaito, 1961; and others). This 
may prove to be the reason that the more intelligent learn more effi­
ciently. 
From all of these different evidences, it can be surmised that 
intelligence j.ncreases very possible correspond l~ith increases in body 
arollsal or activity levels--or with some heightening of brain activity 
which is only imperfectly reflected in measurable physical responses, 
What phenomena might be expected to result from such an intel1igence­
arousal correspondence? 
If only body arousal levels are involved, we might expect only 
heightened rates of activity among highly intelligent people, with con­
comitant increases in learning because of the greater learning oppor­
tunities inhererrc in exposure to many different situations, Body 
arousal level might correspond roughly to Hayes Q EPD's. But arousal 
level seems no-c to be only a matter of gross physical activity, because 
high-IQ children are, for example, more able to control their physical 
behavior (that is, to be still and so on) in school situat:i.ons 
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(Jaggers, 1934). Even Hayes' EPD's are probably more subtle in their 
influence than the simple acttvation of gross body movement. They in-
elude curiosity, manipulation, and exploration. Thus, we axte not 
speaking simply of gross body activity (and if we were, we should not 
be able to find observational confirmation of the hypothesis). What 
we are dealing with is something much more like a need for stimulation 
than it is like a need for activity. 
Hebb (1964) postulates that individuals have levels of arousal 
which are optimum for effective performance in a complex environment. 
Presumably, these optimum levels of arousal could vary from individual 
to individual--although a quantitative view of such individual differ­
ences is well-nigh impossible, considering the absence of any certain 
measure of optimum levels. Duffy may be measuring something ver,y 
close to optimum levels when she measures average levels. But we have 
no proof that these two phenomena are interwoven, likely though it may 
be. 
It is Hebb's contention, supported in spirit and fact by others 
(Barlyne, 1964a, 1964b, 1964c, 1965; Leuba, 1965) that each individual 
is motivated to maintain his optimum arousal level (except at times 
like sleep). If an individual's arousal level is higher than his 
IIoptimumt1 arousal and situational demands require, he will seek to 
lower it--to cut himself off from some of his environmental stimulation. 
If his arousal level is lower than the optimum, he may seek some en­
vironmental stimulation which will raise it. 
In support of ris hypothesis, Hebb suggests several typical cases 
of varying arousal states WhiCh,Car be placed on his continuum, and 
'Which appear to a ffect performance in the predicted Vlays. For example, 
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sleep and coma are levels of arousal too 1m, for adequate functioning. 
Performance during states of drowsiness or boredom is also impaired. 
Alert, interested states result in the highest performance competence, 
especially in complex tasks. At very high states of arousal, like 
fright and anxiety, the adverse effects of deviation from the optinm.rn 
again begin to showR and performance is greatly impaired., 
It is possible that instead of having an intrinsically higher 
average lavel of arousal, the highly intelligent person has an intrin­
sically higher optilrnwm level of arousal than the average. In that ease, 
he might actually need more·-than-avera ge stimulation from his env:iron­
ment in order to be at the optimum level of arousal. It is assumed 
that being; at the opti.mum level is in some way reinforcing (for related 
evidence, sae Glicltman, 1960), and that aspects of the environment 
which helped to maintain that level would be actively sought out. Of 
course, we are imrnediately reminded of the pervasive description of the 
highly intelligent as strongly curious, persistent, and intense in 
interest. How close is this picture we 'have compiled of the highly 
intelligent to a characterization we nught construct of the person who 
is attempting to raise his arousal lev61 through extra stimulation? 
It is actually very close indeed. Aeain, the exploratory, ~urj_-. 
osity, and manipulatory drives seem intrinsically involved. Berlyne 
(1964a, 1964b, 1964c, 1965) and 9thers (Hebb, 1964; Harlow, 1965; for 
example) believe these drives to be the result of some need for stimu­
lation. Berlyne (1964a) argues ~hat explorator.y drives, are satisfied 
by stimuli which have the qualities of uncertainty, novelty, complexity, 
and relevance, for the subject. And it is in these directions that the 
individual with a higher-than-average optimum level must seek for stim­
'., ~, 
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ulation which will heighten arousal. 
If people of higher intelligence have higher optimum arousal 
levels than the average, theywou1d thus be expected to display a 
greater interest in, and persistence of approach tcrnard, activities 
with elements of uncertainty, novelty, and complexity. To a great 
extent, these expectations are fulfilled in the accumulated results 
of studies of the highly intelligent. But another population, also of 
significant interest to us, satisfies the same expectations to a super­
lative degree: the highly creative. 
IV. CREATIVITY AND NEED FOR sTnruLATION 
We have already demonstrated that creative subjects are more 
likely than the average to emit novel, or uncommon, responses (Mednick, 
1962), and this might suggest that they prefer novel or uncommon stim­
uli as well. We also know that those high in creativity sample infor­
mation stores in a wide-ranging way which generates greater statisti­
cal uncertainty (Karlins, 1967; Kar1ins, et al., 1967; Schroder, at a1., 
1967), and this hints at greater tolerance for uncertainty among them. 
But there are some more direct evidences that high levels of cre­
ativity bring with them a preference for novelty, uncertainty, and com­
plexity. Barron (Barron, 1957, 1958, 1968; Barron and Welsh, 1952) has 
discovered that one of the most reliable discriminators of creative sub­
jects from less creative is a test of stimulus-card preferences. Fig­
ures drawn in ink on cards are categorized by the subjects into "likelt 
or tfdon!t liken groups. It has been demonstrated that creative sub­
jects consistently prefer cards which 'are both asymmetrical and complex, 
and which tend toward the chaotico If anything has been clearly shown 
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about creative individuals, it is their preference for novelty, complex­
ity, and uncertainty. 
But, of course, creative people have a very high chan~e of being 
above average in intelligence. It could be that the preferences they 
display for complexity of stimulus input are merely the results of 
their natural need for stimulation. If this is true, we must explain 
why further increases in IQ do not result in greater and greater tol­
erance (and/or need) for complex stimulation (that is, creativity). 
According to the Hebbian view, the only possible reason for an 
individual to avoid complex stimulation is an overheating of the arousal 
mechanisms--in other words, an arousal level which is elevated above the 
optimum. We do not see an actual avoidance of complex stimulation among 
the highly intelligent; they are, as a group, definitely elevated in 
motivation, and in curiosity about and exploration of their environ­
ments. But individuals above an IQ-1eve1 of 130 or so do not shov; needs 
for complex stimulation significantly different from people who have 
IQ1s of 130 but are maximally creative. we can only assume that the 
more intelligent persons have much higher than average optiDnun arousal 
levels, that they need more than average stimulation to maintain opti­
mum arousal, but that they are receiving stimulation from some other 
source which is keeping their measur~ble need for stimulation lower 
than others with 101ler optimum arousal levels c This extra stimulation 
might be in the form of social pressures falling upon the highly intel­
ligent. Another assumption we might make about this problem is that 
the highly intelligent persons who show no more preference for complex­
ity than their lower-IQ, high-creativity peers may have been punished 
for seeking novel and complex stimulation (and behaving creatively), 
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and so avoid it in spite of their higher optimum arousal levels. 
If our assumptions, and their logical conclusions, are accurate, 
the potential for creativity--for handling and seeking after complex 
stimulation, for deriving pleasure from uncertainty and novelty--in­
creases constantly over the full range of intelligence. But above a 
certain IQ level, only a few indi~duals realize their full potential 
for creative thought and behavior. Most come under the pressures of 
the culture around them and are unable to reach the levels of creativ­
ity of which they are capable. 
V. THE BIOIJOGICAL MEDIATOR 
A review is in order, to determine how ,veIl we have established 
our amendments to Hayes' theory. The individual variatio~ of optimum, 
arousal level have been proved to exist and we have suggested that 
they have the possibility of covarying with intelligence. Arousal is 
not, as were Hayes' EPD's, the sole postulated cause of manifest intel­
ligence. Its exact influence upon one's accumulated learning and mani­
fest intelligence as a motivator of experience and learning is unknown.' 
However, it has been argued here that arousal level has something to do 
not only with the amount of searching for st~mulation which is initiated 
by the subject, but also with his capaCity for processing those stimuli 
which reach the cognitive "machinery. n Therefore, whatever independent 
variable is responsible for both intelligence and arousal, it ver.y likely 
has a potentially limiting, as well as facilitating, function in intel­
ligence. It is thus argued that there could be an independent variable, 
with a physiological basis, which is significantly determinant of both 
intelligence (as an infol~tion-pracessing ~apacity) and heightened 
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motivation (as a covariable with intelligence). Is there evidence that 
such a biological mediator does exist?--or evidence of its identity? 
In fact, several posstbilities exist for filling this role. We 
have seen that basal metabolic rate could be nominated--or rather the 
processes which underlie it (respiration, heartboat, sugar metabolism, 
and so on). It is easy to see how a high metabolic rate could heighten 
general arousal and motivation, but its relationship with information­
processing is a little less clear. Conceivably, neural cells -~uld 
receive increased blood and oxygen supply and act in a more efficient 
mBnner. Whatever mechanism is finally discovered to be ~ mechanism, 
it will probably include metabolic processes in its effects'. But they 
are unlikely as a single-factor choice because their correlation with 
intelligence is simply not clear and consistent enough. Hebb (1949) 
suggested potential neural synapses as the possible physiological med­
iator of intelligence differen?Gs, but this is also difficult to tie to 
motivational differences. 
It is not likely that this ~riter can solve all of the problems 
arising from our theoretical assumptions. At this time, there simply 
is not enough information available in any of many fields to do so. 
But one psychologist has posited an 'interesting nominee for this par­
ticular mediation role--a variable capable of affecting both motivation 
and information processing--and we should like to present his sugges­
tion. 
In his book on infantile autism, Bernard Rimland (1960) makes an 
astounding suggestion more or less ~ passing: that individual differ­
ences in intelligence are the direct result of differences in the vas­
culature of the brain--most especially in the reticular formation of 
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the brainstem. He points out: 
Since the human brain consumes one-fourth to one-half of 
the total oxygen input of the body, it would not be surpris­
ing if through sheer logistics, the efficiency of the cerebral 
bascular system imposed an upper limit on the functional ef­
fectiveness of the brain itself. Nor would it be surprising 
if the diameter and quantity of cerebral blood vessels turned 
out to be a heritable correlate of individual differences in 
intelligence (p. 130). 
Rimland suggests that high-level differentiation of the vascular 
system of the reticular formation l~sults in its susceptibility to oxy­
gen damage and consequently in autism among those known to have a high 
probability of reaching extraordinary levels of intelligence. His 
tightly-woven system of support for these hypotheses cannot be consid­
ered here in full. But it is most interesting that Rimland t s arguments 
rely only on the likelihood that a widely effective scanning mechanism 
like the reticular formation could play a strong role in enhancing or 
limiting information processing. For our purposes, it is equally sig­
nificant that the reticul?r formation has long been known to be the 
center of both cerebral and bodily arousal (Hebb, 1949, 1964; Lindsley, 
1964; Malmo, 1964; Milner, 1970, and others). Furthermore, attention 
in itself--the direct product of reticular activity--could well result 
in more effective informational receiving and processing. This little-
understood lO'iver brain organ may be the intersect of the two variables 
w.e have considered, and should certainly be in"16stigated earnestly as 
a candidate for the 1tseat of intelligencen we have been seeking for so 
many years. 
VI. A PARTIAL SYNTHESIS 
It is not clear how the concept of "optimum arousal level" (the 
idea that one is required to find one's own optimum level by seeking 
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or avoiding stimulation) fits together with the idea that arousal level 
may be innately decided (by some mechanism like the reticular forma­
tion) and at high levels would only determine a capacity for complex­
ity, not a need for it. Perhaps the real case is sommvhere in between. 
Unless external variables impinge upon the organism, it is ~er.r possi­
ble that processing information and organizing it and manipulating it 
are intrinsically reinforcing as long as they are below certain maxima 
of optimal reinforcement effect. They may be intrinsically reinforcing 
in that same way that making a kill is reinforcing to an animal, com­
pletely aside from the ~~tter of hunger and food (Glickman and Schiff, 
1967). If these assumptions are true, individuals with higher arousal 
levels would naturally seek complex stimulation because of their higher 
capacity for manipulating it and being reinforced by it. 
But environmental phenomena could negate these reinforcing ef­
fects by over-stimulating the individual in certain ways or by punish­
ing creative behavior of specific sorts. The highly intelligent per­
son would then "need" less stimulation, or would seek to dariva rein­
forcement and stimulation from his environment in other ways, and would 
not demonstrate his potential for creativity on any test of creativity. 
Awarning is necessary here. We canno~ suggest that the highly 
intelligent person is normally operating at a high level of arousal 
without being aware that this ftblessingtt may be mixed. An individual 
attending strongly to his environment, with a strong desire to process 
and integrate the information he receives from it, may well be hyper­
sensitive to that information. Indeed, it was Duffy's suggestion that 
those with higher average arousal levels would be intensely responsive 
to their environment and susceptible te its effects or its selection. 
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A hypersensitivity of this kind could be disastrous in certain 
environments, especially in those punishing creative behavior. It may 
be revelatory that subjects classified as high in intelligence and low 
in creativity often turn out to be highly sensitive to praise and crit­
icism from adults, eager to please, them, and almost insatiable in their 
desire to conform, to achieve in acceptable ways, and to be accepted 
(Getzels and Jackson, 1962; Wallach and Kogan, 1965b present the evi­
dence from which these generalizations are derived). This complex of 
behaviors--which could be labeled ttcompulsivitylt--may be the result of 
an aborted creative potential. Quite possibly, the highly intelligent 
have enormous potential not only for creativity, but also for compuls­
ivity and conformity. But we see no reason to assume that heightened 
arousal levels inevitably, and by their ~~atur~, are necessarily 
inhibitive of creativity. 
CRAPl'ER VI 
.INHIBITION 
Any system with arousal mechanisms would not long survive with­
out some means of inhibiting them. Paradoxically, it j.s alsO' true that 
inoreases in arousal level must be accompanied by increases in poten­
tial for inhibition, or chaos will result. Therefore, if we suggest 
that highly intelligent people have higher levels of average or opti­
·mum arousal, it seems necessary that we suggest they have more capacity 
for inhibition, as well. 
It must be remembered that inhibition and excitation are perfectly 
harmonious and mutually dependent at an associational level. In order 
for an association of the facilitative type to be made, all that is 
necessary (in any simplified model of the real proc~ss) is excitation. 
But if the organism is to discriminate among stLTflUli, we have seen that 
he must inhibit all or part of his old response to the stimuli, and 
then attend to some unique aspect of them~ Generalization involves 
the two processes of inhibition and arousal at more or less the ,same 
level, and in a perfectly compatible coordination. 
In fact, attention itself is possible only because the organism 
is not only aroused, but al~o is free from responding to other stimuli 
in that moment by inhibitive mechanisms. Part of the .highly intelligent 
person's ability to deal with and interpret and store large amounts of 
incoming information is probably his ability to screen out its irrele­
vant .aspects by inhibitory means. Or, we might see very competent 
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" handling of stimulus input as the superior ability of the cognitive 
system to discriminate and categorize--but discrimination and categor­
ization are also dependent upon inhibitory processes. 
There is, then, no conflict inherent in proposing that intelli­
gence covaries with arousal and with inhibitory potential, if we see 

inhibition as quite a specific prO?9SS of the negative feedback type 





Diamond, et al. (1963), who "wrote the classic study of inhibi­
tion, call to our attention another advantage to heightened levels of 
both arousal and inhibition. They argue: 
Nor is it unreasonable to suppose. • • that there is an 
essential difference between the kind of alertness which re­
sults from a balance of strong tendencies toward both arousal 
and quiescence, and that which results from a balance of weak 
tendencies. • • One can readily imagine, for example, that 
the strong system could be able to maintain its balance in the 
face of an overload of stimulation which might overwhelm the 
weak system (Pe 363). 
What we propose is that at increasingly high levels of intellec­
tual potential both an individual's average arousal level and his poten­
tial for inhibitor,y associations are greater. In fact, these together 
may account for pis intellectual efficiency, since generalization and 
discrimination are not possible without the close interaction of both, 
and since intelligence clearly means in part a higher efficiency at 
processing large amounts of incoming information. Higher levels of 
both tendencies enable a system to stay in balance despite environmen­
tal extremes. It is completely unnecessa ry to think of bilateral in­
creases in the strength of these two tendencies are redundant or use­
less. They may be the only way for increases in mental capacity to 
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occur without overheating of any single system. 
If our assumptions are correct, we should expect highly intelli­
gent people to show an elevated capacity for inhibitions. And if this 
is true, we must ask if inhibitory mechanisms could be ttinhihiting1t 
creativity when they are ~ighly developed. 
I. INHIBITION M~D INTELLIGENCE 
It is probably the case that inhibition is a great deal mere 
specific in nature than is arousal,", It may be more difficult, than, 
to obtain a gross physiological measure of an individual's potential 
for inhibitory activity_ That is not necessarily catastrophic. It 
might be easily argued that an individual's ability to learn the inhi­
bition of an overt behavior is at least indicative of his cognitive 
inhibitory efficiency. Since there is little other kind of evidence 
available it is at such studies of overt behavior that we must look-­
for we must examine any possible relationship between intelligence and 
inhibitory processes. 
At least there do turn out to be individual differences in in­
bibitor.y ability at quite a molar level of behaviore The inhibitor,y 
association may be just as universally simple to establish as the 
facilitory association, but measures of it so far have depended on 
behavior considerably mora complex than the induction of rote memory 
items. Because of this, learning of the inhibition of a response prob­
ably always involves at least. a narrow subsystem of the inhibitory pro­
cesses, and perhaps even a larger piece of them. It has been under­
standably difficult for research to make t~e transition from the physio­
logical level to the level of gross, overt behavior, but it is a step 
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which must soon be made, if we are ever to understand the phenomena 
with which we deal in this paper. 
Is there any indication, in the :roughly-measured studies whicn 
have been made, that intelligence covaries with inhibitor.1 capacity? 
There is much indication of it. First, there are all of the discrim­
ination and categorization studies reviewed earlier (Tempons, 1965; 
spotts and Mackler, 1967; Kerrick, 1956; Desai, 1960, for example). 
They indicate that at the simplest (presently) measurable cognitive 
level, highly intelligent subjects are more capable of inhibition. 
Then, there is evidence dealing with the inhibition of body move­
ments in children. Massari, Hayweiser, and Meyer (1969) made measures 
of children's rates of drawing and walking straight lines under dif­
ferent conditions. In the first condition, the subject is asked to 
walk a line and given no further instructions. Secondly, the subject 
is asked to walk or draw a line as slowly as possible. Last, the sub­
ject is asked to walk or draw a line as fast as possible. The child­
ren's scores on each task were correlated with their Stanford-Binet 
IQ1s. 
Results indicated no significant relationship between a child's 
ability to draw or walk a line rapidly and IQ--presumably variables 
such as motor development and strength were more responsible for per­
formance under that condition than intelligence. But more intelligent 
children were better able to fulfill the inst~ctj.on to walk slowly• 
.And they also showed slcrtlsr rates of response on the t.est when the 
instructions told them merely to avoid making mistakes (correlations 
were all significant and ranged from .43 to .60). Evidently, the 
children of higher intelligence were better able to inhibit their motor 
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responses (or "control" them, in the authors' terminology) toward some 
purpose. Furthermore" they 'Were not only be.tter able to do this when 
the purpose was made explicit by request (1twalk slowlytt), but also 
when the purpose had to be inferred from the request (walk slowly, so 
you "don't make mistakesu). 
Clearly, some facility of i~ibition is required for such a task 
as dravling a line "as slowly as you can. tr By habit and chained-response 
learning, the tendency is to draw the ne~~ section of the line irow£di­
ately after the first. This response must be inhibit.ed if the line 
drawing is to proceed at a slow pace. Thus, the superiority of more 
intelligent subjects on such a task is indicative of (if not proof 
of) an inherently more effective system of inhibition. 
Supporting evidence is provided by Levine, Spivak, Fuschill°, 
and Tavernier (1959), using young mental patients and several measures 
of "inhibitionrt (they corresponded to measures of one's conception of 
the future, ability to estimate time, ability to overcome a word set, 
and motor inhibition). It was found that all of the inhibition measures 
correlated significantly with IQ scores except time estimation, which 
approached significance. However, only a few of these measures of in­
hibition correlated significantly among themselves. 
The evidence quite strongly suggests that intelligence is the crit­
ical variable in an individual's developnent of the ability to inhibit 
his responses. This general potential for inhibition of responses is not 
in itself directional, however. Individuals evidently learn many dif­
fe~ent ways to inhibit their responses, and also have idiosyncratic 
discriminative stimuli for res~nding by means of inhibition. 
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II. DELAY OF GRATIFICATION AND INTELLIGENCE 
The delay of gratification research is helpful in supporting 
these conclusions. Studies of the delay of gratification phenomenon 
have been done in great number and variety, and some of them have in­
cluded IQ correlations in their design. For the majority of these par­
ticular studies, correlations of IQ with delay of gratification have 
proved to be significant and positive (for example, 1tischel, 1971; 
Mischel and Metzner, 1962; Melikian, 1959). The exceptions which do 
appear tend by their very nature to clarify the relationship bet~een 
intelligence and the capacity to delay gratification. Let us examine 
toRO studies. One is typical of the majority in the results j.t obtains, 
although its sample population is quite unusual. The other is atypical 
in every way--and an exception which clarifies our rule. 
In attempting to investigate whether or not the correlation of 
delay of gratification with intelligence is culturally affected, 
Melikian (1959) used children of Arab refugees as his subjects. These 
children had all their lives lived in refugee camps, their food and 
shelter being supplied and rationed to them by charitable groups. They 
had attended a YMCA school, and were acquainted through the school with 
some of the experimenters. 
The children were given the GOodenough Draw-A~Man intelligence 
test, and were told that for their drawings they would be paid--not 
according to the quality of their dra-lI'lings, but according to when they 
wished to receive their earnings. The monetary r~iard offered for im­
mediate payment was half the amount of the reward offered for payment 
'bRO days later. Results showed that the children choosing delay of 
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gratification had IQ scores significantly higher than the other groupls. 
In other words, the more intelligent children were better ab1S to con­
trol their ~~ediate desires for the purpose of obtaining larger pay­
offs, and this was true in spite of the hand-to-mouth nature of their 
existence. 
However, in a similar study by Bochner and David (1968) among iso­
lated Australian aborigines, the opposite trend was apparent. In this 
sample, children who were the first generation of their tribe to attend 
school and who aside from their time in the schoolroom spent their 
whole lives ,in the traditional aboriginal manner, were administered the 
Porteus Maze test of intelligence and offered a choice between one candy 
now and two candies later. Those who chose ~lediate gratification 
were significantly brighter than those who chose delayed gratification. 
What is the meaning of these results? The aboriginal culture is 
one of the very few cultures in the world where there is absolutely no 
storing, planting, or growing of food for the future, and no delay of . 
any gratification beyond minutes--or hours, at most--except that imposed 
by environmental hardships. Even in a refugee camp, it may be wise to 
save food coupons for a later day, or to wait for eating or buying. But 
for the aborigines, such delays would be extremely maladaptive. Most. 
likf;11y, delay behaviors would be punished in children from infancy; at 
ver.y least, they would receive no reinforcement for them. In all other 
cultures, some s}:'l..aping and rei,nforcement of delay behaviors would be 
certain to occur. 
We can make a generalization with these facts in mind. In almost 
all cultures, where delay of gratificatio,ns is of definite value, more 
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intelligent children learn better to delay their own gratifications and 
to iILhibit their own responses than less intelligent children. They 
are simply more capable of inhibiting responses. However" in a culture 
where delay of gratification is useless, or even harmful, it is'the 
intelligent children, again, who best learn those responses which are 
adaptive to the environment. This,does not prove that inhibitory pro­
cesses are not highly differentiated in intelligent members of a cul­
ture oriented toward immediacy. On the contrary, lIintelligence tt is 
directly dependent upon ability for abstraction, discrimination, and 
so on--and these abilities cannot exist without inhibitory activity 
at some cognitive level, if our arguments have been cOl~ect. Ylhat we 
see in the aborigine study is that cognitive inhibition does not al~ays 
mean generalized behavioral inhibition--it merely provides the basic 
potential for behavioral control. 
We have seen that although a wide range of cognitive and behav­
ioral controls are dependent upon the inhibitory processes identified 
with intelligence, they are independent of each other and must be spe­
cifically selected or shaped by the environment (Levine, et al., 1959) ,,' 
In the aborigine, basic inhibitory processes still result in "intelli­
gence," but they mayor may not result L"1 bep,avioral controls, depend­
ing upon the adaptiveness of those controls. Motionlessness during 
hunting, a'motor inhibition, is adaptive and is performed. Delay of 
gratification, another beha"vioral control, is not adaptive for the abor­
igine--and the more intelligent an individual is, the better he is able 
tq understand and respond to his environment's contingencies. 
Again we have seen evidence that the highly intelligent subject 
is more responsive, and more discr:in1irJ.a tingly responsiva" to his envi..P ' 
(' 
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ronment--whatever that environment contains. SuCh responsiveness alwa~~ 
requires discrimination and, of necessity, cognitive inhibition. In by 
far the majority of cases, it also requires generalized inhibitions of 
responses at a behavioral level. 
III. MORALITY AND INTELLIGENCE 
Vlhen an individual inhibits a response which would obtain for 
him something reinforcing, and does so for the internalized reinforce­
ment inherent in performing acts labeled by his culture as "good, It he 
might be said to be engaged in moral behavior. MOral behavior, then, 
involves both attention t 0 cultura~ly recognized behavioral guidelines, 
and the inhibition of an otherwise reinforcing response. We might ex ..· 
pect, from this analysis of the composition of moral behavior, that 
intelligent individuals would be more easily capable of it than less 
intelligent ones. 
This proves to be the general case. In her analysis of one hun­
dred mentally gifted children (Cox, 1926) found her subjects signifi­
cantly more trustworthy and conscientious than average children. Ter­
man (192,) observed the same phenomena in his Gifted Group (see also 
Tallent, 1956). In a plea for attention to the definite relationship 
which exists between intelligence a nd moral behavior, Unger (1964) 
suggested that the over three hundred studies showing positive correla­
tions between the two variables cannot-be disregarded. Because of the 
nature of the results obtaL~ed (correlations were low, but the most 
moral children were almost always among the brightest), Unger supports 
the hypothesis that "intelligence operates as a requisite precondition 
for these tendencies as measured (p. -300). If Inte~ligence is once again 
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posited to be necesBary~ but not enough. 
In fact, some evidence indicates that when intelligent children 
do not behave in "goodtt ways, they may be some of the most difficult 
children a teacher might face. Jaggers (1934) finds a strong relation­
ship between good behavior and intelligence, but discovers several 
very bright children, near the top of their group in IQ scores, who 
'Were Ita constant source of disturbance" in the classroom (p. 258). 
It appears that when they are good they are very very good, and when 
they are bad they are horrid. 
Assuming that intelligence is the precondition--the potential-­
for moral behavior, what are the possible reasons this is the case? 
First, the intelligent person may s imply be better at distinguishing 
"good" from "bad" behavior. One of the long-standing difficulties of 
the MBnifest Anxiety Scale (~~S) by Taylor has been the suspicion that 
more intelligent subjects are able to select responses on the test which 
are more socially acceptable (that is, indicate low a~xiety) (Taylor, 
1955; Grice, 1955). In an attempt to discover the truth of this sus­
picion, Voas (1956) administered the 1~S with the instructions to 
"choose the 'best' (most socially acceptable) answers (p. 87)." He 
found that there was a significant and negative correlation between 
~he P~erican Council on Education (ACE) intelligence test scores and 
MAS scores under these conditions. Although all subjects revealed less 
anxiety when instructed to respond in a socially acceptable way, more 
intelligent subjects were better at judging which responses were most 
acceptable (that is, least uanxious '1 ). 
Some of the highly j.ntelligent person rs moral capacity is thus 
his ability to distinguish moral from immoral, acceptable from unaccept­
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, able behavior. This greater ability to distinguish good from bad is 
easily seen as a case of making fine discriminations" of course, and 
as such is, very much dependent upon cognitive inhibitor,y mechanisms 
hypothetically plentiful in the hig~ intelligent. 
The second possible explanation for moral behavior in the highly 
intelligent is that they are better able to concentrate on a difficult 
moral task, and are less likely to be distracted by other possibla res·­
ponees. Binet was aware of this possibility when he suggested that 
among other things intelligence was the "tendency to take and .maintain 
a definite direction (as cited in Cronbach, 1970, pe 200).11 Grim and 
Kohlberg (1968) imperfectly confirmed Binet's intuitive conviction. 
They found a positive relationship between conscientious behaviors and 
ability to concentrate. Attention is an obvious derivative of inhib­
itory and arousal processes, and this explanation for moral berwvior 
among the intelligent does not require any new or unique explanator.y 
mechanisms. 
The third possible explana tion is merely the simplified combina­
tion of the others: moral behavior, in the sense we have been discus­
sing it, is an elaborate inhibitive process at a behavioral level. It 
requires, primarily, complex inhibitory mechanisms at the cognitive 
level and, secondarily, shaping by tho environment. Because of their 
greater capacity for complex inhibition at the cognitive level, highly 
intelligent persons have a greater potential for moral behavior, and 
will emit it significantly more often, g tha:i.r environment rewards 
t~em for it. Inldb1tive processes (and so, intelligence) provide the 
potential, not the direction for moral behavior. 
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IV. INHIBITION AND CREATIVITY 
What is the relation of the intelligent person l s greater inlubi­
tory capacity to his potential for creative thot~ht and behavior? If 
generalized, behavioral-lavel inhibition, in the form of low spontan­
eity, "inhibitedness," and constriction, is the necessary product of 
cognitive inhibitory processes, than the highly intelligent person has 
absolutely no chance of being higr~y creative--because spontaneity and 
fluency of beha:v:ior are intrinsic to creativity (see Chapt.er III). 
We have seen demonstrated, in a variety of ways, that intelligence 
and/or cognitive inhibitory processes are prerequisite to behavj.oral 
controls of many kinds. But we have also argued that when the environ­
ment reir~orces not UL~bition, but spontaneity, the intelligent per­
sons are those who respond best, -to environmental contingencies and 
show l-eest "control. II 
In fact, there is nothing antithetical to creativity in inhibitory 
processes, at least L~ certain of the directions they may be utilized. 
It, was Diamond, et ale (1963) 'toyho emphasized t,hat a capacity for inhibi­
tion of old responses is necessary for flexibility and change to be pos­
sible-and that the greater and more complex the inhibitory capacity, 
the greater the potential for flexibility and change. In other~ords, 
intelligence and complex cognitive inhibitory- systems are necessary 
for the change and flexibility in the schemata group we know as creativ­
ity. 
The critical variable--a va.nabla not decided by level of intel­
ligence or inhibitory complexity--is §..~re9t.i~. The direction ttpraferredtr 
by the environment will be most accurately discriminated or perceived, 
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and most intensively responded to, by a cognitive system with a com­
plex interaction of heightened sensitivity and heightened capacity for 
inhibitive controls. In essence, the highly int~lligent person has a 
greater potential for almost any style of beha~or his environ~ent 
might choose for him. He can control his behavior extensively toward 
moral, culturally conforming, socially reinforcing ends. Or, he can 
establish a complex system of cognitive inhibitions and discrimina­
tl.ons which "protect" him against the effects of external social rein.... 
forcement, and orient him toward spontaneity, originality, and crea­
tivity. Or, he can be shaped by his environment to follow a path any­
where in between. 
V. SUGGESTIONS 
Vie have argued that the highly intelligent person is more 
ttarousedtf--more able to take in large amounts of stinn.Llation. In 
order to function at this lavel of arousal, he must be able to order 
incoming stimulation through discrimination and categorization, or 
through discrimination and inhibition of irrelevant stimulus aspects. 
But this limiting through inhibitory processes introduces a sig~ifi­
oant danger. The individual will have heightened responsivity to ~ 
~ aspects of his stimulus environment. He "Will have chosen, in a 
more finely discriminative way than his peers, to respond in a partic­
ular direction. 
Diamond, et a1. (1963), suggest that there is a developnwntal 
process of childhood, during which inhibitions are acquired. This 
process begins in infancy with the inhibition of fear responses, and 
continues through childhood, where the individual learns to make 
, .. 
· abstractions by inhibition of stimuli which are generically irrelevant. 
We suggest that the child also learns to which environmental stimuli he 
must be responsive, and to which he must inhibit responses. Presum­
ably, this is accomplished through the shaping effect of his social 
environment. If the child is reinforced more for behaving in creative 
ways, he will develop j.nhibitions ~gainst dependent, compulsi va, non­
creative behavior. But he can as easily acquire other patterns of in­
hibition (or patterns of selective sensitivity~ or schemata--for'sll 
of these are equivalent). 
It is possible that there is a critical period for the develop­
ment of the cognitive structures which determirle an individual's sel­
ective sensitivity to the environment. The arousal correlations with 
IQ are highest during childhood (Terman, 1925; Hinton, 1936), and it 
is perhaps during this time that inhibitive controls and differential 
sensitivities are established. It is not argued here that such cog­
·nitive patterns are absolute, fixed, and irrevocab1e~erely that the 
general style or pattern or schemata of cognition may be fairly 'Well 
stabilized at the end of childhood, and will tend. not to change unless 
drastic environmental changes are encountered (Hebb, 19u9; Piaget; 1969; 
Diamond, et a1., 1963). 
The point we wish to re-emphasize is that there is no reason to 
believe that inhibitor,y potential, any more than arousal, is intrinsi­
cally generativa of compulsivity. The highly intelligent child will 
be more sensitive to selected stimuli, and therefore capable of great 
e~tremes of performance in the direction reinforced by the stimulus 
to which he is sensitive--whatever that direction may be. Thus, inhib­
itory process could easily enhance his creqtivity in a suitable environ­
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ment. 
But if, indeed, brighter people are more sensitive to certain 
aspects of their environment, and if there is a critical period in the 
child's growth whan his schemata of the future are being developed, it 
must be obvious that raising a mentally gifted child is a task to 
which all possible resources must be brought--in order that he not 
respond intensively in an ill-chosen direction. 
CHAPTER VII 
ANXIEI'Y 
Our efforts are directed tow~rd discov9I"J of the crucial varia­
bles which inhibit creativity among the highly intelligent--and inhib­
it it to such an extent that correlations between creativity and in­
telligence are not significant at high IQ levels. Because this is our 
purpose, we must not neglect a full examination of arousal and its 
related phenomena. If increases in intelligence are accompanied by 
increases in average arousal level, then the arousal phenomenon it­
\ 
self may be in some way responsible for specific effects interfering 
with creativity. 
There are two areas of concern in our examination of the litera­
.	ture on anxiety and its relation to intelligence and creativity. 
First, anxiety has often been considered a form of arousal--a state of 
high motivation. Duffy (1957) has suggested that heightened arousal 
may take the form of anxiety. It is thus appropriate to investigate 
any possible relationships between anxiety and intelligenoe; or anxiety 
and creativity. Second, if highly aroused, highly intelligent persons 
do shmv leas curiosity or other creative behaviors than less intelli­
gent (but highly·oreative)·persons, and the possibility exists that 
they are receiving stimulation from their environment which "uses uplt 
their stimulation needs or tolerances, we ~ust investigate the possi­
bility. that anxiety-evoking environmental pressures fill the role of 
that extraneous stimulation. 
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I. ANXIETY, CREATIV!TY, AND INTELLIGENCE 
It is well established that states of high anxiety impair problem­
solving ability (for a review, see Cofer and Apley, 1964). But anxiety 
is not an indiscriminately general agent of impairment. It impairs, 
to some extent, selectively. On the whole it has been found that flex­
ibility, divergence and abstraction in thinking are the processes most 
adversely affected by anxiety. Behaviors emitted under conditions of 
chronic or acute anxiety tend to be rigid, extreme, and concrete (for 
example, Le~is and Taylor, 1955; Berg and Collier, 1953). 
A study of the effects of anxiety on creative behavior was car­
ried out by Krop, Alegre, and Williams (1969). The control group 
watched a film demonstrating the use of the· chalkboard in teaching. 
The experimental group (the "stress" group) watched a film showing a 
puberty rite Hin which crude surgery is performed with stone knives 
on the penises of adolescent boys (p. 895) & It Resll1ts of the study in­
dicated that creativity was impaired on two creativity tests (Guilford 
Consequences Test, and the P~T) by the induction of stress, although 
to a significant degree only on the more open-ended Consequences Test. 3 
One difficulty with the study is that the stress induced was not in 
any visible way relevant to the responses required on the creativity 
tests--but this failing could only have decreased the magnitude of the 
results and makes the data obtained appear even more strikineo Another 
study (Bruner, et a1. 1964) with animals demonstrated that abstract, or 
3frhis reinforces our belief th~t the RAT measures creativity at a 
more basic, less environmentally responsive level. 
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"creative" response were most interfered with when responses mvolved 
were instrumental in reducing drive level, and this indicates that 
when a stress is relftlvant to the task at hand creative responses on 
the task are even more adversely affected. 
Gelfand (1962), in yet a third study, found that when children 
viere manipulated in such a way as to believe that they had failed on 
a series of tasks, they confo~nad or imitated more than those who be­
lieved themselves to have succeeded. Although confornrlty and imita­
tion are not direct opposites of creativity, they are very nearly in­
compatible with it, and were here seen to be the .effects of the stress 
we might assume resulted from recent failt~eso 
Despite the difficulties inherent in dealing with something as 
nebulous as ttanxiety, n there do seem to be a large number of studies 
approaching the problem from a wide range of viewpoints which result 
in one fairly consistent pattern: anxiety--induced, measured, or as-
sumed--decreases the frequency of responses identifiable as, or com­
patible with, creativity. Thus, if the higher arousal levels we be­
lieve to be present among the more intelligent were roughly analogous 
to BPAiety--if arousal took that form--we would have a simple aAjplan&­
tion for the relatively negligible increases in creativity' correspond­
ing to increases in IQ at a high level: high-IQ persons are anxiety 
ridden, and therefore uncreative. 
Fortunately, or unfortunately, this statement does not prove to 
be as complex as the reality. There are other data and considerations 
whi9h must be woven into the problem;s solution. First of all, intel­
ligence shows no clear, positive relationship to anxietyo In fact, the 
evidence more usually than not shows a negative relationship between 
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the two variaoles (for example, Grice, 195,; Kerl~ck, 1956; Feldhusen 
and Klausmeier, 1962; Matarazzo, Ulett, Guze, and Saslm~, 1954; Keller 
and Rowley, 196e)~ 
Various views have been expressed about the reasons bigh-IQ 
subjects shovi less anxiety on measures of general, trait anxiety. The 
most obvious assumption is that more intelligent subjects are simply 
less prone to anxiety, as the evidence indicates on the face of it. 
Suggest Feldhusen and Klausm~ier (1962): 
Superior mental ability may make it possible for a child to 
assess more adequately the real and present danger in any cur­
rent threatening object, situation, or person. Thus~ his 
fears may be specifj.c and ascertainable••• (p. 408). 
A less obvious interpretation of the anxiety-intelligence re­
search was made by Voas (1956),' whom we have already presented. He 
noticed that some of the studies obtaining negative correlations be­
tween intelligence and anxiety had used military personnel as subjects. 
After finding that intelligence made individuals better able to 
choose nonanxiouB responses on the 1ffiS, he hypothesized that in any 
situation where the results of testing are of any relevance to the per­
sonal lives and future of the subjects (or even where the subjects 
might suspect them to be), greater intelligence will act to dampen 
the number of "anxious" responses. Tests administered under what ap~ 
pear to be less threatening circumstances show mix~d results, as op­
posed to the custOmBry negative correlations (see Taylor, 1955, for 
review; Mayzner, Sarsen, and Tresselt, 1955, for counterevidence)~ It 
is not now possible to make an unqualified general st,atement of the 




relationship between anxiety and intelligence--not from existing data. 
II., THE ANXIETY CONCEPI' 
Ona possible reason the anxiety-intelligence data is in such a 
state of disharmony is the questionable validity of the concept 1fanxi­
ety.tI Mischel (1971) concludes, in revi6\"1ing several studies" that 
self-reports of anxiety and other measures--for example, physiological 
readings or counts of avoidance behaviors-are of "low or negligible ll 
correlational strength. Endler and Hunt (1969) devised an inventory in 
which they attempted to sample many different kinds of stress situa­
tions, many different possible reactions to them, and many possible 
evaluations of feeling-states. The variance for a wide sampling of 
students could not be substantially accounted for by stress situation, 
response tendencies (actions or feelings) or individual differences, 
in themselves. Only by treating the results as the product of all 
these variables did the analysis make sense. The individual. responds 
in the way that he has learned (or been innately determined) to res­
pond to a certain stimulus complex. Mischel and Endler and Hunt agree: 
general tests for anxiety are really much less valid than they have 
been assumed to be. 
Sarason (1957) is one investigator who sees the need for redefin­
ing anriety in terms more specific to 8ituation than have been used up 
to now• Although 1;1e is not as anxious as Endler and Hunt or Mischel to 
eliminate measures like the W~S, Sarason does make this observation: 
• • • people are not anxious ever3 minute of the day and. • • 
often we can specify· the conditions which 'Will lead to an in­
crease in anxiety in the individual e Perhaps what we need are 
not general anxiety scales oriented Uwlards the kind of anxiety 
responses (eg., sweating, awareness of an increase in tension, 
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etc.) which an individual will admit to but, rather, tests 
designed to assess the specific conditions under which anx­
i~ty is arousede •• (P. 485). 
He chose as his own particular interest "test anxiety, tt and 
found that his test anxiety measure was negatively correlated with 
IQ" while the general anxiety test he devised was not. 
The emphasis on situational and individual variables in anxiety 
research is consistent with Gaudry and Spielberger's (1970) suggestion 
that the :MAS test measures anxiety occurring ltin situations in which 
Q3ubject~ experience failure or some threat to self-esteem (p. 39l).1t 
Unfortunately" their situational qualification (lIthreat to self-esteemn ) 
is of little help in the task of making anxiety measures as operational 
and specific as possible. 
More specific definition of the particular Itanxietytt being mea­
sured would certainly be helpful in understanding thelelationships 
among anxiety, creativity and intelligence (if anxiety research is to 
be salvaged meaningfully at all). Further" some consideration must be 
given to individually specific as' well as situationally specific fac­
tors. Until these kinds of questions are asked and answered, it will 
not be known for sure whether intelligence covaries positively with 
anxiety. Even if such a relationship were found, it would not be clea~ 
w~ether the anxiety was a function of innate arousal level, or of en­
vironmental factors impinging on the more intelligent. 
We shall have better luck. at reaching a working hypothesis for 
the anxiety-intelligence interaction if we investigate. the differential 
effect of anxiety upon problem-solving performance with v~riation in 
intelligence level. What we shall be concerned \'lith is a particular 
case ?f situation specification, and the situation specified is the 
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setting of a problem-solving task. Immediately, the ~ctura bgcomes 
more complex. 
III. ANXIETY AND INTELLIGENCE IN PERFORMANCE 
Generally speaking, anxiety has been found to have more facili­
tating effects on bigh-IQ subjects. than lmv-IQ subjects in problem­
solving tasks. It has been demonstrated that subjects who score high 
on the llAS make better scores on simple tasks, while subjects low on 
the MAS make better scores on difficult tasks (Spielberger, Goodstein, 
and Dahlstrom, 1958). It is assumed that anxiety facilitates the res­
ponse most dominant in an individual's hierarchy of possible responses 
to a stimulus situation. In difficult tasks, a do~inant response would 
have a lower probability of being the correct one, and high anxiety wou.ld 
decrease efficiency on the ·task. In simple tasks, the dominant responSe 
in one's hierarchy is most probably correct, and the task is facili­
tated (Duncan, 1959; Cronbach, 1970). Spielberger (1958) argued that 
these principles could easily be applied to individual differences in 
intelligence and their ~ffect on problem solving. Among more intelli-' 
gent subjects, problems are relatively easier, and across many tasks 
anxiety would always activate dominant responses with a high probabil­
ityof being more accurate. His research, and others', tend to support 
his argument that highly intelligent subjects are more often facili­
tated by anxiety than ~thers (Gaudr,y and Spielberger, 1970; Denny, 1966; 
Kennedy, Turner, and Lindner, 1962). 
Like all good generalizations, this one has some important quali­
fications e First, there is evidence that anxiety is facilitor,y in prob­
lem solving whenever subjects are in a state of competence relative to 
8 problem-whether by native ability, or by practice (Gaudry a~d Spiel­
berger, 1970). This qualification is merely an elaboration of :the @en­
eralization~ of course, since correct dominant responses could ~0t 
reasonably be assumed to be the result only of ability, and neve~ o~ 
learning. Second, some research simply does not support the Spi~l­
berger argument" for reasons which are not as yet understood (Keller 
and Rowley, 1962; Pervin" 1967). This research is, however, ver.ymuch 
in the minority. 
For the present, at least, we must accept the strong possibility 
that subjects with higher intelligence are more likely to be fac11i­
tated b.1 anxiety in their performance of tasks than are other subjects. 
They are batter able to make constructive responses under al1Xiety be­
cause the dominant responses activated in them by anxiety have a higher 
probability of being accurate and appropriate--evan when anxiety bas 
forced their arousal levels above the optimum. The consequences of 
anxiety in the highly intelligent are thus not necessarily debilitating. 
In fact, a distinction can be and has been made between deb.tli­
tating and facilitating anxiety. Instead of tapping "general" ail.;iety, 
or attempting to define anxiety situations, the Achievement Anxie~y 
Test (AAT) attempts to differentiate between two kinds of responses 
made to anxiety--responses which are detrimental to effective perform-
I 
ancs, and responses which facilitate and invigorate it. In demonstra­
tion of the idea that anxious responses are really a continuum with 
facilitation and debilitation at its poles, several studies have found 
intelligence tied to one particular mode of response in anxiety. 
Pervin (1967) obtained a correlation of -.46 between the two kinds 
of anxious responses (facilitating and debilitating), indicating that 
? t: t ..\ 
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where one mode is used, the other tends not to be. He also found that 
intelligence (as measured by the verbal Scholastic Aptitude Test) 
correlated +.23 with facilitory responses to anxiety, but -.28 with 
debilitating ones (all correlations were significant at the .E.:::: .01 level 
or better). Butterfield (1964) obtained results in the same direction 
for all of these variables, but his correlations were even highe~ 
(intelligence as measured by the WAIS correlated·+ .466 with facilitating 
anxiety and -.429 with debilitating anxiety). The evidence strongly 
suggests that when more in~elligent subjects do have reportable anxi­
ety, it facilitates their solving of problems--that, in fact, they are 
more likely than the average to have facilitory anxiety responses, but 
less likely than the average to have deb iIitating responses to anxiety. 
The ability of those who are more intelligent to :react in facil­
itory ways is probably due in part to their learning histoT'lJ. Anxiety 
has always had a better chance of' activating correct responses in them, 
Even in anxiety, action has proved to have a high success rate; active 
responses are thus emitted rather than responses of salf-criticism, 
emotionality, and so on. Another possibility is that the more highly 
developed inhibitory systems of the more intelligent subject enable him 
to inhibit mora effectively those responses which he has learned are . 
less efficient in handling a problem ~ituation--evenwith the increases 
in arousal due to high anxiety. 
We must qualify what we mean by"response facilitation, however. 
There has been 110 indication in the ;literature r eview€!d by this writar 
that responses faei11tated by anxiety in the highly intelligent subject 
are creative ?responses. On the contrary, there is every reason to be­
lieve that anxiety always decreases the flexibility and variability of 
response, because it activates dominant response tendencies. In the 
highly intelligent person these activated responses happen to be ac­
curate and environmentally adaptive, but they are no less rigid and 
no more "remote" in the cognitive hierarchy because of their accuracy 
Thus" creativity could easily be impaired by anxiety in the highly 
intelligent, in spite of their prowess at, problem solving under ttaruc- . 
ious" conditions. 
IV. SEEKING THE SUPPRESSOR VARIABLE 
Is there any reason that greater a~ety should occur among 
highly intelligent persons? For if there were, t heir anxiety would 
easily act as a variable suppressing increases in creativity with 
increased intelligence. 
As tested by the MAS or any other general measure of anxiety, 
there is no visible, stable relationship between ar~iety and intelli­
gence. Nor is there any reason to assume that the increased arcusal 
levels we have hypothesized to exist in the more intelligent are ex­
actly equivalent to anxiety states. It is highly unlikely that they 
are equivalent--at least not physiologically or necessarily--since 
Duffy (1957) has observed that arousal can be manifest in alertness, 
stability, and adaptive responses. If general arousal level--and thus, 
intelligerice--were intrinsically identifiable with anxiety, we should 
be very surprised not to find clear evidence that anxiety is related 
to intelligence. And even more basically, we should be able to deter­
mine that a generalized trait of anxiety actually does exist. The evi­
dence for either of these suggestions is worse than sketchy--it simply 
does not withstand scrutiny. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that 
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genaral arousal level is not necessarily manifest as ar~iety. 
If this is the case, the environment (not their own cognjtive 
penchants) must be the source of any higher anxiety among those of 
higher intelligence. Their tendency, like that of their peers, is to 
use the most available responses under conditions of stress--and to be 
relatively rigid in those responses, losing flexibility and creativity. 
T~ey do not, however, lose accuraa,y and competence, because of the 
accurate nature of their dominant responses. This is an exact charac­
terization of what could result from anxiety in interaction with high 
intelligence. And it is also exactly compatible with the suppressor 
variable hypothesis. Only one further link is needed for this section 
of the chain: it must be shown that high-IQ persons do have greater 
anxiety-engendering pressures exerted upon them by their environment, 
consistent with or covarying with their intelligence level. 
In establishing groups of high and low anxiety groups, Souei! 
(1958.) used an interesting method. Rather than measuring some response 
tendency which could accurately be labeled "anxiety" only for the spe­
cific situation tested, he made evaluationS of the social st~lcture of 
his countr.y (Egypt) and logical hypotheses about which social groups 
would have such undesirable positions within the culture that they 
would be subject to stressful pressures. These he labeled the "high 
anxiety" groups. In Egypt, high anxiety groups were hypothesized. to 
be Christians (because of their minority), adolescents (as compared to 
adults who were not in a transitional age), and so on. When assessed 
on tests of ambiguity tolerance, groups predicted to be nanxious" showed 
more rigidity and greater intolerance for ambiguity in their behavior. 
Therefore, Soueif's assumption that people under stress can be ident~fied 
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by examination of their cultural and social situation fOtL~d significant 
support. 
It is our intention to make that kind of socio-cultural search in 
regard to individuals of high intelligence, and to arrive at a logical 
assessment of the stress they may incur because of their intelligence 
level~ Of course, direct measures will be used as much as possible. 
In keeping with Soueif's method of looking for anxiety by logi­
cally deducing who might have. cause to be anxious, we might assume that 
high-IQ children were under stress commensurate with their intelli­
gence level because intelligence caused them to be alienated and unpop­
ular in the classroom--especially if evidence could be found for such 
an assumption. But, on the contrar.y, a strong trend tcwlard what is 
Culturally-defined as psychological "health" and "adjustment" is readily 
seen in intellectually gifted subjects of many different samplings 
(Terman, 1925; Wechsler, 1958; Matarazzo, 1972; for comment see Tyler, 
1965; and Burt, 1961). Not only are the mentally gifted well-adjusted, 
as rated by adults, but they have also been found to have more popular­
ity among their peers (Terman, 1925; Gallagher, 1958). 
There are, however, data qualifying our visions of the highly in­
telligent child as the supersocializer of the classroom. The social . 
~cceptability of a child depends not only upon how intelligent he or she 
is, but also upon creativity. Jacops and Cunningham (1969) found that 
children in a questionnaire chose h~ghly intelligent, highly creative 
peers to work with them on school-related tasks more often than anyone 
else. But these sama children were not preferred for social purposes 
--their peers rated them preferable only to children low in both intel­
ligence and creativity. Any other combination (high in one or the other 
.. ' 
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variable, but not high in both) was more acceptable). It seems that 
if a child who is mentally gifted is to find himself a social niche 
among his peers, he may very well have to forego creativity. And only 
'when the child was noticeably brighter than others would this kind of 
pressure be exerted. Thus, it fits the prQfile of our hypothetical 
'suppressor variable. 
But it is not only for his peers that the gifted child may n~ed 
-to tailor his behaviors. Getzels and Jackson (1962) and Torrance 
(1962) found evidence that teachers prefer high-IQ students to high­
creativity ones, even when both have equal leyals of achievement. 
Wallach and Kogan (1964b) suggested that children high in both intelli­
'gence and creativity may be disruptive in a regularly stru,ctured class­
room because of their expressiveness, wit, and spontaneity. Such chil­
dren are often known by their peers as "naughty." It is easy to under­
stand how teachers and parents who do not high1y value spontaneity and 
. autonomy might prefer children who did not show 'these qualities. Crea­
tivity may well be udisruptiva lt in many situations. 
It is logical to asswne that when both are available for s el~c... 
tion conforming, :restricted achievement 1\'ill. be preferred by the culture 
-to creativity. Since more intelligent children have shown greater sen­
sitivity to social stimuli (Rothenberg, 1970), these cultural prefer­
ences may well be sensed by them more intensely, so that they are bette r 
able to avoid creativity and the .disapproval accompanying it. 
These views are compatible with the position taken by Fellows 
(1956), who approaches the problem in a slightly different way. He 
maintains that although gifted people may be Uadjusted1t-m.ay even be 
very popular-they are not necessarily "happy." Recognizing the 
l 1i".f t Y­
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enormous difficulties inherent in a scientific investigation of happi­
nes-s, Fellows, nevertheless calls attention to his data--which show 
that self-ratings of happiness in college students are negativelyre­
lated to scores on an intelligence measure (ACE). Although tthappiness tt 
is little more useful than tranxiety" as an explanation or prediction, 
these results do serve to point out the fact that ttadjustmentft is not 
necessarily a satisfactory state--that gifted people may achieve adjust­
ment by paying a high price. 
- . Some investigators suggest that if constricting p~essures are 
exerted upon the highly intelligent because of their intelligence, it 
is only at very high levels of intelligence that this begins to occur. 
Gallagher (1958), for example, found what he believed to be a downward 
trend in popularity and social acceptability at the 165 IQ level (this 
IQ number is probably inflated, because of the high scholastic level of 
the school population he sampled). Apparently, in spite of ability -to 
reach social acceptance bys.acrifices in creativity, children may reach 
a maxinrum intelligence level, beyond which they are much less acceptable 
to their peers. Gallagher also found what he believed to be a tendency 
to sacriftce achievement for greater popularity, among children above 
150 IQ who had been placed in a school with rather low norms. These 
subjects were still ver,y popular, in spite of their high intelligence, 
and among those much less intelligent, but their achievement quotients 
were quite a bit lower than would have been expected. Burt's (1961) 
finding that at higher and higher levels of intelligence, achievement 
is in continuous deceleration (confirmed by Wilson, 1926), may have 
significance beyond his own awareness. 
Gallagher's (1958) finding that children at a very high intelli­
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gence level are those who shm' an inability to compensate for their 
diffe~ences by social conformity is not without predecessor. Equiv­
alent suggestions were made by Leta Hollin~lorth more than thirty years 
ago (Hollingworth, 1940; Hollingworth, Terman, and Oden, 1940). She 
made children of extremely high intelligence levels her special inter­
est, believing them to have unique problems in findL~g a place among 
their peers. Her observation is that children of high but not extra­
ordinarily high intelligence (130-150 IQ) adapt socially and get along 
better personally than any other group. 
Within this range, the person comprehends more clearly, but 
not too much more clearly, than the majority of his fellow 
men, and can thus get himself accepted as a supervisor and 
leader of human affairs generally, with accompanying emolu­
ments and privileges. His vocabulary, his interests, and his 
hopes have, at this point, still enough in common w~th his 
contemporaries to enable and warrant cooperation (Holling\'Jorth, 
1940, p. 274). 
1Yhen one's IQ level is higher than 150, problems begin to appear. 
His abilities begin to separate him from,.. rather than endear him to, 
his peers. Says Hollingworth: "Mutual :rejection begins to appear be­
tween the deviate and nearly all his contemporaries (Hollingworth, 
1940, p. 274)." She suggests that this highly gifted person will have 
difficulty being tolerant of others. He may seek the company of elders 
and of his own imagination so much of his life that unidentified prob:' 
1.ems can arise in hi~ relationships 'With peers. Most of all, he may 
appear to be completely separated from the normal world in terms of his 
thoughts and values--he may lose his n cozmnon sensen and thus his common­
ality. Several investigators have found evidence of these hypotheses, 
although systematic research is difficult, given the small size and the 
large geographical spread of the population (Sheldon, 1959; Gallagher, 
sf 
1998; witty, 1940). 
V. SUMMARY: RESTRUCTURING OUR APPROACH ID THE PROBLEM 
It appears to be possible that difficulties in socialization and 
interpersonal relations might cause pressures to be put upon child~en 
and adults with intelligence levels which are very high (150+ IQ). 
Although we might call this group lIarodous ll because of the pressures 
we·have hypothesized, and point to their failure to live up to their 
potential in creativity as evidence ,of their anxiety, the label ttanxiousU 
is not the most efficient label we mdght use for them. By hypothesiz­
ing that they are under stress or "aw.iety,1t we have been able to make 
use of the anxiety literature in un~erstanding creativity among the 
highly intelligent. But this label does not help us predict or modify 
the phenomenon we observe. And uamdetyn as a theoretical COT'..struct 
cannot be (or at least h~s not been) specified adequately to be of real 
.usefulness. What we really need to know about are the specific pres­
sures and manipulations exer~ed upon the intelligent person by his 
environment in shaping processes. 
We have seen that preferences are expressed and shaped in its 
members by the culture, and that these are e~pecially forceful in their 
effect upon the pighly intelligent. We do not need to say, or have the 
basis for saying, that the emotiona~ responses intelligent persons feel 
in those conditions are ttanxiety." 'What we can say is thAt the pressure 
of their environment evidently caus~s a certain intensity and a certain 
p~ttern of responses in them. They respond with facilitated vigor and 
little-diminished accuracy. 
In 'What directions will they re.spond~ They will seek social .rein-
X M 
forcements from the best ava:tlable source. The best source of rein­
forcement is obviously not among peers. They are too likely to be to 
, 
some extent alienated by differences. It is most efficient to adhere 
rigidly to patterns of behavior known to be accepted and reinforced 
by parents and teachers and others in command: to become a model stu­
dent, a model child. Of course, this pattern is not al~aj~ followed 
"\iO its limit, in spite of the kinds of social difficulty which every 
particularly gifted child must feel. Some of them do manage to behave 
creatively (in accordance with their cognitive tendencies), to culti­
vate their autonomy, and to remain spontaneous and flexible. Others 
become rebellious under-achievers. 
All of these, presumably, experience the same externally-imposed 
Itanxiety• It But it must be clear that that fa ct provides us wi th n~) 
help in predicting which of the available response modes a child ~":1y 
choose~ We must look to the specific sources of punis~Jnent and rein­
forcement which enable one child to be creative and force the next to 
be compulsive. We must begin to understand specifically how creative 
schemata ara formed in the developing child. 
One ~ther thing should be borne in mind: the highly intelligent 
child is particularly adept at responding to stress, an.~ety, and de­
mands of negative sorts effectively and efficiently (Kennedy, at al., 
1962). He is particularly adept at reducing his arousal by selective 
sensitivity and attention to certain stimuli. He has such a high rela­
tive rate of success that he may get more information by attending to 
negative cues and ignoring positive ones--the loss of per.forrr~nce ef­
ficiency that others would sh~j if they concentrated on criticisms and 
punishments prevents their being able to attend to theil" environment 
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in just this way (Hurlock, 1925, presents a hypothesis of marginal rele­
vance to this suggestion). If the highly gifted person grows up in 
such 8 pattern, wit.h heavy emphasis upon negative cues, it is inevit­
able that his unusually high potential for creativity wilJ. be absorbed 
by the necessity for rigid, efficient responses to the environment. In 
order to allow him to realize his .full potential, he must be saved from 
his own tendency toward efficient environmental sensitivj.ty, and from a 
cultural environment which places little value upon creativity. 
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CRAPI'ER VIII 
PERCEPrUAL AND COGNITIVE STYLES 
We have hypothesized that certain patterns. of physiologically 
Q~sed cognitive capacity and tendencies in cognitive structure (for 
example, fine-grained differentiation) are daterodned by or equiva­
lent to intelligence. We have also investigated cel~ain environmental 
sensitivities which are argued to exist in the highly intelligent" as 
well as some environmental effects which could have influenced than 
thl'ough their heightened sensitivity. We now wish to examine the in­
teraction of cognitive tendencies with certain environmental phenomer~ 
(for example, the causal nature of environmental events) in the devel-" 
opment of cognitive sche~~ta. 
Although there may be no physiological necessity for noncreativ6 
behavior among the very intelligent, we cannot yet elim:inate the possi­
bility that their interaction with the environment results in structures 
of behavioral control and selection which prevent or inhibit creativi.ty. 
That is our concern in this chapter. 
I. PERCEIVED weus OF CONTROL 
One of the major intellectual achievements of the growing child 
is its development of an understanding of the laws of causality. At 
a rudimentary level, the child understands causality as a process with 
himself at the center, the Cause of ALl Things (Piaget, 1969). Later, 




things to oocur. Real understanding is achieved when the child is able 
to discriminate actual causal agents among those agent.s which are in 
any other way associated to a phenomenon. 
An analogous process of learning, one not so complex or abstract, 
is the development of a system of hierarchies of expectation--based on 
previous success or failure at achieving reinforcement through some 
instrumental response. The individual, because of his past history, 
nas a certain expectation of reinforcement in almost any situation or 
stimulus complex. This expectation does not only apply to one specific 
situation. It generalizes to all situations which have similarity to 
the specific one. ~n studies dealing with expectations of success in 
more or less s~ademic situations, Crandall and McGhee (1968) noticed 
that. a ch:ildt s past h:istory of academic reinforcement (good grades) 
was significantly correlated with the expectations he expressed about 
future success on a wide range of tasks. Even in a perceptual task, 
like matching sample angle sizes to a series of model angles, the chi1­
<iren showed expectancy levels which were correlat.ed +.32 wl:ch school 
grades. But the more "academic" a task became, the closer YlaS the cor­
relation bet.ween grades and the expectancy of success on that task 
(correlations ranged to a high of +.62). 
It is the conclusion of Crandall and McGhee that i.l~dj.viduals dev­
elop generalized patterns of expectancy, based upon past reinforcement 
-and that theRe expectancies, if they are in any way contingent upon 
the subject's own behavior, are estimates of the adequacy and competence 
of his own respop.se. They further argue trlat rJ.gh expectancies provide 
greater motivation for a task, and a facilitating influence on task-
relevant responses. 
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Children of high intelligence would of course be expected to de­
velop high expectancy levels in intellectual tasks at quite an early age 
;-~barring some strong environmental influence like unavoidable failures, 
or the inability of the child to have any signif:ic:snt effect in obtain­
..ing reinforcers by his own actions. But, in most cases, the intelli­
gent child should be more effective than the average child in ewitting 
·behaviors instrumental to reinforcements. He is probably more discrtm­
'inating in reading the reinforcement probabilities of his environment-­
Imows better what are the sources of reinforcement, and upon what re­
sponses the,y are contingent--and s~ou1d generally have much higher suc­
cess at obtaining them through his own actions. Consequently, he would 
have higher success expectancies. 
Thus, it might be predicted that the highly intelligent child 
would soon, with the help of his understanding of causality and of 
his system of reinforcement a~pectancies, develop an internalized repre­
sentation of the controls of relevant reinforcers in his environment. 
:·It is further' expected that in such an internalized r.epresentation he 
would see his own behavior as instrumental to many more significant 
-reinforcers than would the average child. For the bright child, the 
perceived locus of control is internal. 
It should be emphasized that w~at we mean her~ by perceived trcon­
trol" does not necessarily mean onets perceived position in a cultural 
-or political power structur~--although these kinds of control would cer­
tainly enhance the "perceived" control which is our concern. Rather, 
we are discussing the individual's perception of his ability to choose 
and emit behaviors which will reap good consequences and avoid most 
bad ones in his milieu. 
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In the literature devoted to individual differences in perception 
of control, the majority of investigators designate a continuum with 
the axis tt:l-nternal-external, It any point along which an individual can 
select as the "locus" he percej.ves for control in his en\iironrnent. He 
~ocates, in effect, the seat of power. Those who see themselves as 
very much in control of and responsible for the contingencies of their 
environment are labeled "internal, If and those who sea themsal ves at the 
mercy .of a random, whimsical environment are "external. tI 
Once an individual has experienced enough reinforcements and pun­
ishments, he can establish and internalize some expectations of rein­
forcement and a perception of the general locus of control in his own 
surroundings. His internal representation of the locus of control is 
quite stable, and tends to guide his continuing perceptions of the an­
vironment--it acts, in other words as a schema for organizing incoming 
information and executing appropriate responses. 
In example of the ways in which locus of control schemata affect 
perception in behavior, we cite the research of Lefcourt (1966). He 
reported that subjects categorized as highly ftexternal" in perceived 
locus of control were much more likely than "internals" to raise their 
reported expectancies of success after a task failure and to la~er 
them after a success. If one has already established a world-visw'in 
which random events are conceived to be dominant--events with no re­
lation to one's own behavior--it is as sensible to raise expectations 
after a failure as it is to Imler them. To this "external" person, a 
s~ring of successes may mean a high probability of fai1ure--an end to 
a run of luck. To the "internal" subject, of course, all estiIn3tes 
about the future are strongly dependent upo~ the results of his behaviors 
- " eta 15 e·'ok nd" 
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in the recent past--he has constructed a schema, a system of informa­
tion....processing which makes predictions in that way, and he continues 
to make them even when environmental events are really random. 
Many studies have established that the more intelligent individ­
,wls are, the more likely they are to percaive their locus of control 
as internal (Gold, 1968; Bialer, 1961; Crandall, Katovsky and Preston, 
1962; Butterfield, 1964). Trus is true over a wide range of subjects, 
from college students to retardates, and should not be surprising. An 
intelligent person should be better at perceiving causal relationships 
in his environment, at choosing and accomplishing appropriate instru­
mental responses, and at realization of the effectiveness of his own 
responses. 
What is perhaps really surprising is that the correlations between 
intelligence and internalized locus of control are not nearer unity. 
The relationship is so logical and predictable, and the evidences so 
consistent, that as Lefcourt (1966) pOints out, nit might be argu~ that 
locus of control merely represents the phenomenological response to 
one's own intelligence (p. 217)0" In actuality, one's degree of intel­
ligence is directly related only to one
' 
s ability to perceive the locus 
of control accurately. Usually, i~telligence is also strongly (but 
indirectly) related to one's ability to affect the environment. But 
if, for any reason, an individual with high intelligence is prevented 
from exerting control upon the environment which is as effectiva as 
that of which he is capable, he will then be able to perceive even his 
own lack of control accurately; 
Let us examine a few 6ituations in which cultural structures are 
sel~ctive in meting out individual control. Battle and Rotter (1963) 
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found that among both blacks and whites, 10'l"/er-class subjects showed a 
more external perception of control than middle-class subjects. Com­
paring races, they found that blacks were generally more external than 
whites. In fact, lower-class Negroes, even those with high IQ's were 
more external than low-IQ, middle-class whites. Further, there seemed 
to be a tendency among the lower-class blacks for the brightest among 
them to develop the most external perception of control. They were 
perhaps better at accurately estimating their own ineffectuality in a 
white culture than were their less-bright peers.' 
Thus, . the structure of the individual f s environment determines to 
a significant extent his perception of how much control he has over en­
vironmental contingencies. It is relatiyely simple to choose a group 
one expects have little control over their own lives and thereby extract 
an environmental factor in the individual psychology of controls. It 
is considerably more difficult to predict and verify what specific en­
vironmental influences affect indivtduals
' 
perception of control within 
a cultural group. It is possible that an autocratic parent might"pro­
duee an external-control child. But such a child might perceive subtle 
ways of obtaining predictable reinforcements from the parent--through 
achievement, flattery, and so_on--and be classifiable as "internal. 1I . 
In a study not strictly part of the locus of control literat'ure, 
effects like these were found to be important. Heilbrun and Waters 
(1968) discovered that college students who came from homes with strict 
5Graves (1961) supports the contention that repressed groups per­
ceive themselves as little able to be in control of their environment, 
as has Seeman (1959) from a more sociological point of view. 
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"controls" were much more capable than others of the independent behav­
iors required for achievement during their first year away at college 
--but such capability was present only if their parents were seen as 
highly nurturant or rewarding, as well as strict. It can be guessed 
that the availability of rewards encouraged the students, as children, 
to seek ways of responding to parental "control" which would bring the 
rewards. Behaviors instrumental to rewards were emitted by the stu­
dents, rewards ware received, and for all practical purposes the stu­
dents were in "control" of reinforcement contingencies. We must attend 
to Skinner's (1972a) warning that the pigeon controls the experimenter 
just as surely as the experimenter controls the pigeon. 
It is probably because more intelligent persons are more capable 
of making out indirect as well as direct ways of controlling the~r re­
inforcements that they are, as a group, so high in perceived inte~el 
control in spite of environmental variations. It is also partly be­
cause of this capacity that they are probably more susceptible than 
others to any systematic patterns of environmental contingency and 
may be easily shaped by those patterns. Unfortunately, behaviors lead· .. · 
ing to social reinforcement may not always be creative behaviors. In 
fact, another defi.'1ition of creativity might be that it is not o~ly 
representative of an internal locus of control, but also an indepen­
dence from .those who administer social reinforcements··...an independence 
that goes well beyond being able to obtain these reinforcements. 
What are the results of a certain internalized perception of con­
trol? First of all, internalized control is expected to enhance one's 
desire and ability to achieve. We have already observed that Crandall 
and McGhee (1968) believe internal perception of control facilitates 
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achievement (see also Butterfield, 1964; Lefcourt, 1966). Gold (1968) 
reports several small and insignificant or barely significant correla­
tions between internal locus of control and need for achievement. This 
is surprisingly little support for such a logical proposition. But 
heed for achievement measures of the McClelland type tend to depend 
partly on independence from parents and authority figures--a variable 
which may not take into consideration the desire and ability to achieve 
independently because of dependence on parental ~inforcement, as we 
have just discussed. It would be enlightening to see the results of 
a nead for achievement measure which was not tappi.11g independence from 
authority figures, as compared with locus of control. Significantly 
enough, measures of actual achievement (grades), with intelligence 
held constant, results in a high partial correlation betvveen internality 
of control and achievement (! = .891, in Butterfield, 1964). Therefoxe, 
?-Ie conclude that whether or not they are truly "independent, It individ­
uals high in internal control are generally high achievers. 
Another predictable effect of the perceived locus of control var­
iable is anxiety. Butterfield (1964) demonstrated relationships among 
measures of the Internal-External Control Scale (I-E), the Frustration­
Reaction Inventory, and the Alpert-Haber Facilitating-Debilitating Test 
Anxiety Questionnaire. He found that both intelligence and internal 
locus of control were significantly correlated with constructiveness of 
responses to frustration (positive correlations), debil:Ltating test anx­
iety reactions (negative correlations),6 and facilitating anxiety reac­
tions (positive correlations). 
6Just under significance for the- I-E , 
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With this data we can sketch in the details of a portrait of the 
highly intelligent person. If he is anxiolls, he also is capable of 
analyzing ~nd manipulating the contingencies of his environment so that 
his responses are most often facilitory and goal oriented. Also with 
this bent to successful dealing with the environment, an internally 
controlled and highly intelligent person may be more alert to its stim­
ulus configuration. And that is pur next topic of discussion. 
II. PERCEPTUAL LEVELING AND SH.ARPEND~G 
With the conviction that his responses can be instrumental in 
causing change within his environment, an individual will probably pay 
more attention to his environment, so as to learn what are its eontin­
gencies. Comments Lefcourt (1966): 
Vfhen the subject perceives thBt he is able through some modi­
cum of personal activity to predict the events occurring in a 
given situation, he becomes more accurate in his perception of 
changes in that situation (p. 209). 
Although it is necessary, simple predictability of events is not 
a guarantee that a subject will attend to and be more accurate in ob­
serving en\~ronmental changes. Reece (1954) argues that the availa­
bility of instrumental responses relevant to a stimulus is critical to 
the sharpening of an individual's perceptual processing of that stim­
ulus. He showed that when subjects could avoid shock by quickly rec­
ognizing critical stimulus words: (a) they recognized all stimulus 
words more quickly, (b) they did not recognize more quickly words immed­
iately preceding stimulus words in presentation~ and (c) they later 
remembered more pairs of words (preceding word plus stimulus word) than 
other subjects. Reece took these last results to mean that people 
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generalize their perceptual ·tvigilancett to all task-relevant stimuli, 
, and only to task-relevant stimuli. They may attend to (and remember) 
stimuli associated to the critical class of stimuli by contiguity or 
causal relationship, but they will not necessarily nexpend1l their per­
ceptual vigilance on these more or less irrelevant stimuli (see Guthrie, 
1966, for supporting evidence). This research points to possible dif­
ficulties in finding stable traits among individuals for responses 
which evidently have such stimulus-specific characteristics. 
Phares (1962) did a kind of photonegative of Reecels study~ He 
established escape-from-shock conditions for his subjects on both 
-"chance" and "response-contingent" bases. Since escape conditions are 
'by definition response-contingent stimulation, Phares is rea~ly measur­
ing somethj~g like subjects' response to manipulated success-rate for 
their instrumental behaviors. At any rate, his results supported 
ReecG. ~~en response-contingent escape is possible, subjects have 
shorter recognition thresholds than when escape is based upon chance. 
Vigilance is the most adaptive response mode for subjects who 
have internal control within a test situation-that, is, for those whose 
res~onses are instrumental in avoiding punishment or obtaining reward. 
But for subjects who have external control in the temporal context of 
the experiment, another kind of modification of perceptual processes 
is possible. It is known by the various names of leveling, repression, 
and defense. Both Reece (1954) and Phares (1962) found evidence that 
subjects who were shocked, but had no way (that is, no precti.ctable way) 
of influencing the onset of the shock, recognized stimulus words more 
slowly than control subj acts who were not shocked at all. 
Clear evidence of the nature of a subject's "choice" of percep­
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tual mode--whether vigilant or defensive--is found in a study by Guthrie 
.(1966). He found that parachutists, prior to a critical jump, displayed 
significant vigilance to visual cues as cOI!lpared to control subjects; 
while hospital patients, prior to abdominal surgery, tended to level 
their perceptions of visual stimuli. Obviously, parachutists have a 
great deal more control over their environmental contingencies than do 
surgical patients, and for this very reason are more alert to their s~-
roundings. 
There is no need to regard vigilance as adapt,iva while we see 
leveling as maladaptive. All behavior is produced by adaptation to the 
environment: it is' the dominance of an old (previously adaptive), in­
flexible response in an inappropriate enviromnent which is maladaptive 
--or the use of leveling or defensive respor~es when an instrumental 
response is actually available to the subject. As Dulany (1957) sug­
gests: 
We might guess that one kind of subject had learned to de­
fend against threatening stimuli because with his particular 
experiences and personal economy that reaction has somehow 
been to his advantage. Another has learned perceptual de-. 
fense because that reaction has served,him well (p. 333). 
Although we question whether any individual does not modify his 
mode of perceptton according to the situation (Guthrie, 1966), it is 
u~doubtedly true tha t any leveling or sha rpen1ng, as part of one's., own 
schemata of perception, is adapti~a to environmental events. 
, Dulany (1957) set out tc establish this principle ebjperimentally 
by training his subjects to respond to stimuli in either a leveling or 
sharpeni~g (vigilant) manner. His subjects Vlere asked to report wp..ich 
of the presented stimuli was clearest or most recognizable. Then one 
stimulus was arbitrarily selected as the critical stimulus for each 
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subject•. "Defense" subjects were reinforced (by avoiding shock) for 
recognizing best the non-critical stimuli, and punished (by shock) for 
recognizing the critical stimUlus. "Vigilancett subjects were rein­
forced for recognizing the critical stimulus and punished for recog­
nizing any other stimulus. When their responses were compared to their 
. I 
baseline patterns of response, res~ts showed that the two groups were 
I 
successfully trained in vigilance o~ defense. 
l 
Pustell (1957) was also able ~o obtain experiment effects in the 
direction of both vigilance and defense, using electric shock. Unlike 
Dulany, he was not operantly reinfO~cing one perceptual mode or another 
I 
I 
·in each subject. He was merely clas~ically associating shock to cer­
tain stimuli (subjects were told their responses were irrelevant to 
.the shock, and this was the case). \Vbat he found was that there seemed 
to be striking sex differences in th~ mode of perceptual response 
chosen by the subjects. All of the twelve male subjects were more 
.vigilant after training~ But nine of the twelve females were more 
defensive. 
Pustell suggests that the females were subject to more severe 
I 
anxiety because of the shock than were males. This is a possibility, 
, 
-especially if we consider Pustell's thoroUgh efforts at establishing 
the hypothesis that defense is used ~n 8ituations ,vhere: (a) anxiety 
is intense, (b) escape is difficult <?r impossible, and (c) reality is 
unclear or ambiguous.. But Pustell'$ reference '00 escape can be seen 
as a locus of control variable. And:this variable is much more lik61y 
to.be the determinant of sex differences than Pustell's suggestion that 
females are more frightened of pain. It is intuitively obvious that 
women are cORsistantly trained to perceive their locus of control as 
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external-to remain tthelpless" while others manipulate their environ­
ments. It is only to be expected, then, that in a stress situation, 
,like the exPeriment involving non-contingent shocks, they might choose 
"leveling" responses. Pustell makes note of the fact that when inter­
'viewed, the female subjects reported strong feelings of helplessness 
and resignation. This incidental evidence only supports more strongly 
the idea that locus of control and perceptual defense are intrl.nsically 
related•. 
. Returning to the problem of intelligence, we shall try to relate 
intelligence to the variables we nave just discussed. Intelligence 
,appears to fit quite neatly at the center of the puzzle. Highly intel­
ligent people are better able to tolerate and perform under anxiety. 
This may be simply because they can handle and inhibit the unpleasan~ 
stimulation more effectively, or because they are more internal in per­
'cei ved control and have higher expectancies that a r.esponse can be found 
which will have effect. If highly intelligent people are more vigilant, 
it is thus because they have highly internalized loci of control, ,and 
handle "anxiety" better. 
As neatly as everything may fit together around intelligence as 
'an independent variable, there is little evidence demonstrating directly 
that intelligence covaries with vigilance. Intelligence covaries'with 
·internal control. Internal control covaries with vigilance. Vigilance 
is a determinant of a neurotic pattern, the obsessiva-compulsiva pat­
'·tern.' Obsessive-compulsives have higher average IQ fS (as will later be 
demonstrated) than other neurotics. There is a smooth chain of relati6n~' 
ship beginning and ending with intelligence in which vigilance is a 
central link--and the only link which has not as yet been clearly 
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established as dependent upon intelligence to some degree. 
It is possible, however, that our measures of perceptual vigi­
lance are just not enough like life situations. Dulany (1957) warns: 
The forced-choice procedure simply delimits the range of 
competing perceptual responses to a high priority few. 
Until the evidence for sensitization and desensitization 
is less equivocal, percePtua~vigilance and defense can 
legitimately be identified 0 y with shifts in balance among 
competing perceptual respons s, in the one case toward a 
critical percept, and in the other case against it (p. 337). 
The predicted superiority of the very intelligent at attending 
"vigilantly" to stimuli may only be predictable if the stimuli 'comprise 
a complex input. It is in that very situation that greater information-
processing skills 'Would become invaluable, and would enable an indiv­
idual to avoid negative consequences by attending. For negative conse­
quences can be avoided not only by selecting the proper response, but 
also by selecting the proper stimulus to which to ~espond--and proper 
stimulus selection is possible only with broad scanning and fine-grained 
inhibitory capacities. 
On the other hand, the more intelligent person may prove to be no 
more prone to vigilance than anyone else. Intelligence may determine 
the direction of opposing tendencies to vigilance or defense. This is 
not what we might guess the situation to be, but it is not a point cru­
cial to our h~~otheticaJ. structure. 
All of our discussion has made, to one degree or another, th~ 
assumption that vigilance and defense are more or less unitar,y ways of 
re sponding to one's enviremnent. This as sumption mayor may not be 
accurate. It is impossible to know until we have solved the problem 
of over-simplicity which plagues vigilance-defensa research. The 
studies by Dulany (1957) and Guthrie (1966).ind1cate, however, that 
17, 

perceptual modes are quite situation specif:i.c in their effects. 
Gardner (in Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, and Spence, 1959), 
reviewing results of a factor analysis of the large body of data taken 
by himself and his colleagues, argues that leveling and sharpening des­
cribe a c9ntinuum for a kind of cognitive control which is quite gen­
eralized across tasks and situations. He notes: 
, In levelers, successive perceptual impressions were assim­
ilated to each other, so that distinctions among them were 
blurred. Memories of past impressions were also less avail­
able to them, pres~~ably because of the general laci{ of dif­
ferentiation of their memory schemata (p. 105). 
The opposite trends were found in sharpeners by Gardner. From 
all evidence, it appears that leveling and sharpening (as well as sev­
eral other cognitive controls) are fairly stable tendencj.es in informa­
tion processing. Individuals may have quite differential response ten­
dencies for different stimulus situations, depending upon 'their learning 
history. They may have general, overall tendencies in one direction or 
another, especially in response to a variable with wide-ranging effects 
on perceptual accuracy and information-processing, like intelligence. 
The evidence for this assumption, however, is not at hand. 
Gardner does make note of the fact that cognitive controls hold 
a strong resemblance to intellectual processes in many ways. He sug­
gests that both are essential~y structures of control and delay--struc­
tures, or the capa city to constru~t structures, . which guide and giva 
direction to behavior. What we are really discussing are inhibitory 
processes--the mechanisms of direction selection, and the covariables 
of intelligence, to translate into terms of this paper. But if the 
relationship between cognitive controls (like vigilance and defense) 
and intelligence is so ll1ttmate, why has it been so difficult to 
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demonstrate? 
Gardner suggests that different factors in intelligence have 
~heir directional influence on different cognitive controls. From 
. our point of ViSV/, this is merely another way of proposing that envir­
onmental differentiation of' native ability (crystallization of ability, 
in Cattell's terms) is in turn responsible for differential directional 
tendencies in var:tous cognitive controls & This suggestion may be modi­
fied to a more satisfactory hypothesis with the help of suggestions by 
Dulany. 
Espousing a point of view more or less harmotlious with our hypo­
thetical structure, Dulany (1957) suggests that vigilance is the dom-' 
inant, the preferred way of perceiving threatening stimuli. If instru­
. mental responses are possible in an environment, the superior adaptive 
'value of vigilance is clear. If it is most adaptive, argues Dulany, 
it is most basic. He cites evidence in support of his theory, and con­
cludes by asserting that if vigilance is the "natural, It donrlnant re­
'sponse of h~n beings to t~reatening stimuli, then we can assume ~~at 
any tendency in any individual toward defense is the cumulative result 
of punishments for attending to stimuli and/or lack of reinforcement 
for responses to attended stimuli because of their inefficiency or inr 
·~ccuracy. This pattern of spreading inhibition or defense against 
stimuli would be expected to some extent in everyone, but to a greater 
extent with each decrease in intelligence (if intelligence is the abil­
ity to respond efficiently to a variety of stim~li) •. 
Of course, strong correlations between intelligence and percep­
tual modes would be prevented by individual differences in punishments 
and reinforcers resluting from responses in each of the modes. Final 
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response dispositions might not be highly reflective of intelligence, 
especially considering that the {asks or stimulus situations tapped by 
testing leveling or sharpening may be unrealistically simple or narrow 
in range. 
TIl. SUMMARY 
We have seen that intelligence is equivalent to a capacity for 
cognitive differentiation, but that it does not determine the goaLs 
toward which the schemata made possible by differentiation guide the 
mental processes. By the same token, intelligence may be the critical 
factor in enabling an individual to attend to, and be vigilant to, 
large amounts of sensory information. But it also enables him to in­
hibit response to stimuli (here, a ttresponse ll might be awareness, for 
example). 
As the individual develops, if we accept Dulany's (1957) hypo­
thesis J he is (in a manner of speaking) in a process of leveling. Wha·t 
is leveled depends upon the contingencies attach6~ to each stL~ulus 
class within the individual's environ~ent. Conceivably, the highly 
intelligent person could--in an environment where control was almost 
entirely external, punishment frequent, and possibilities for escape 
vary rare--become an extreme leveler. Of course the chances of that 
are slight. The probability is much' greater that he will become a vig­
ilant perceiver of the environment, since he will very likely be suc­
cessful in behaviors resulting from vigilance. However, that is not 
to say that even the very intelligent have across-the-board tendencies 
at levelirtg or sharpening. The ver,y intelligent person could become 
a leveler of, for example, socially reinfor,cing and/or punishing stimuli 
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while remaining vigilant to most others--he might then be creative. Or, 
he could defend against any spontaneous, Ucreativeu :cesponses, while 
remaining vigilant to cues calling for compulsive, 3chievement-oriented 
responses for which he had received least punishment and most reinforce­
ment in the past. 
Again, direction is apparently environmentally determined to a 
great extent and tendencies in any direction might conceivably be en­
hanced by high intelligence. Although ver.y intelligent people do have 
obvious tendencies toward an internal locus of control and vigilance 
to environmental st~nuli, which are precursors of compulsive behavior 
patterns, these tendencies could also enhance creativity and have no 





THE ~rvIRONMENTAL SPECIFICS 
We have attempted to establish the foundations of the argument 
that highly intelligent people are more susceptible to the promp~ings 
and selections of their environment--that they are capable of re~pond-
. ing intensively in almost any direction to its shaping. we have, con­
centated and shall continue to concentrate on two major directiohs 
! 
available to the very bright growj.ng child: creativity and what we 
sometimes refer to as "noncreativity" or compulsivitjT. We have con­
tinually emphasized that the environment has its effects in ways which 
are situation-specific. Now, we wish to discuss some particular ways 
in which environments are known to affect the directions of a child's 
cognitive-style development. 
I. THE VIGILANCE PATTERN 
For this purpose, there is no research more helpful than tnat of 
Getzels and Jackson (1962). Their studies were carried out in a rather 
~usual private school in a cultured and well-educated populatio~ of 
families near a university. All students in the school were Bccel­
era ted at least one year ahead of pub]~c school students by high school 
graduationo The mean IQ of all subjects involved in ~he study (includt'l' 
ing subjects not in the groups with which we shall be concerned) was 
132. The top students by IQ-score who were not also among the highest 
in creativity were chosen as the high-IQ group, and had a mean IQ of 
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-150. The highest scorers on a combination of creativity tests (devised 
by Getzels and Jackson) who were not also among the highest in intelli­
gence were ,chosen as the high-creativity group, and had a mean IQ. of 
127. 
It cannot be over-emphasized that the tthigh-creativityn group of 
Getzels and Jackson were vary brig~t children. Essentially, the two 
groups were the lower and upper halves of a continuum of jntelligence 
cut out of the superior range. The lower half were bright children 
reaching their potential for creativity; the upper half were brilliant 
children, but the only brilliant children i11 the sample who were low 
in creativity--they were not only balm' their own creative potential, 
but also below the creative performance level of their less bright 
peers. They were the very kind of individuals who are responsible for 
the ceiling effect that we have described in the L~telligence-creativity 
interaction, because they are not behaving as creatively as we wight 
'predict from the intuitive conviction that creativity should covary with 
intelligence. They are then of critical significance to the suppressor­
variable hypothesis. Hopefully, there should appear some critical dii-' 
rarenees in the environments of these subjects and the high-creativity 
subjects, which will enable us to see in specific 'wa:y"'S hovl some of them 
found their creative potential, while others never knew of theirs .. 
First of all, Getzels and Jackson noticed several significant 
differences bev,veen the parents of the two groups. They differed not 
only in quantity, but also in the quality of their education. There 
was a trend in the high-IQ group parents toward a higher number of 
fathers and mothers with college degrees, but it ,'las not highly signif­
icant. lfuwever, the high-IQ group parents ,had significantly more 
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graduate training (especially the mothers) than the other parents. The 
authors posit that this does not so much ~~dicate a higher level of 
cultivation, "but rather a greater degree of "specialization of train­
ing, or, if you will, 'professionalization of education' of the IQ 
group (p. 63). n As for parental occupation, there was a significant 
tendenc.y for fathers of high-IQ subjects to be in academic professions, 
consistent with their specialized and professional training. However, 
in spite of their high-level 'e;raining, high-IQ mothers were more likely
-
than high-creativity mothers to be housewives exclusively. 
For Getzels and Jackson, this unusual restriction of the bighly 
trained mother to her home and children is the first of many indica­
tions that the high-IQ group mothers nare in fact likely to be more 
vigilant about the 'correct l upbringing of their children than are the 
high-creativity mothers (p. 64).1t For example, high-IQ children have 
access in their homes to many more magazines aimed at children than do 
high-creativity children. When asked about their own .satisfaction with 
the way they have raised their children, high-IQ mothers seemed rather 
defensively self-satisfied, while high-creativity mothers did not. On 
the other hand, when asked to comment on the school attended by their 
children and on any unusual qualities in the children themselves, high-
IQ mothers not only made more total observations, but also gave a -higher 
percentage of 9ritical comments. High-IQ mothers expressed much satis­
faction with the enrichment program of the school (none of the bigh­
creativity mothers had any comment about it), and much dissatisfaction 
over the inadequacies they perceived in the school1s control of behavior, 
enforcement of rules, and lesson drill. 17hen asked about their prefer­
ences for their children's friends, bigh-IQ mothers had many ideas 
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about what qualities their children1 s friends should have, and empha­
sized family background, intelligence, manners, and stuqy habits. High­
creativity mothers, on the other hand, tended to emphasize honesty, 
high values, and openness as desirable qualities in their children's 
friends. 
In sunnnary, Getzels and Ja ckson report that on many different 
m~asures, mothers of high IQ-low creativity children show themselves 
to be more vigilant, more likely to intervene, more- critical, more aware, 
more concerned with control~ and more concerned with socially-accepted 
(superficial?) virtues in regard to their children. High-creativity 
mothers, on the other hand, were less child-centered, less critical, 
more tolerant of other adults and of their children, less concerned 
about conventional standards, and less concerned about success for their 
children. 
Domino (1969) presented some evidence corroborative of the 
~-
Getzels and Jackson results. Using groups high and 1~1 in creativity 
on three measures (without regard for intelligence), he found that on 
a personality test (California Psychological Inventory), scores of'the 
mothers of creative subjects formed a significantly different pattern 
from those of the mothers of noncreative subjects. Creative mothers . 
were more self-assured, independent,'and flexible; they showed more 
tolerance for others, but were less concerned about social probity or 
favorable impressions than mothers of non-creative subjects. 
How is it that mothers with these particular cha.ra cteristics have 
the particular children they have? It can only be that behind these 
maternal personality tttraitstt are certain, specific behaviors which 
prov~de discriminative and reinforcing stlinuli for their children's 
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·creativity. It will never be known how to enhance or to 1.Uldo what they 
have aq:eompliehed in shaping their children until '(iO "l:nde~st,al1d the 
exact interaction bet1"leen their behaviors and their childr'6n 1s .. Even 
knowing quite clearly about one particular kind of behavior in. parents 
can be of limited use until we know whether or not there is an inter... 
action effect among kinds of beha~ors9 creating re::i.nforcement schedules 
or deprivation conditions, and varying results in the child's behav-ior. 
SOIne careful studies have been performed which attempt more pre­
cise analysis of the parent-child j;nteraction, but which ala 0 support 
the more global conclusions of Getzels and Jackson. Heilb~un and Nor­
bert (1970) discov61"ed that college students who 'perceived their moth­
ers as exerting low control but high nurturance wera significantly more 
responsive than others to their Qwn self-reinforcement, and signifioantly 
less responsive to the reinforcoment of others. 
We are not suggesting that this is the kind of maternal control 
and reinforcement l:rattern which will automatically result in creativity, 
as such. But there are Inany behaviors which are conducive to creativity 
in anyone, and this mothering pattern produces several of theme Above' 
all, to be creative one must be autonomous, self-confident, and lacking 
in self-deprecation. That is, one must,be c~pable of effective self­
reinforcement. And Heilbrun and Norbert have sh~Nn that self-reinforce­
ment is most frequently seen among those whose mothers are highly rein­
forcing, but low in strict control of their children. This is the pi~­
ture painted of high-creativity mothers by Getzels and Jackson, but veri­
fied from a completely different approacho 
There seem to be three other kinds of control-reinforcement pat­
terns in mothering, as described by Heilbrup and his associates. Low 
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nurturance subjects sherfled h.i.gh susceptibility to 'external reinforce­
ment, whether or not their mothers were very controlling. But ~dar 
conditions of deprivation from maternal reinforcement, only low-control 
subjects showed the capacity for independent work involved in academic 
achievement (Heilbrun and Waters, 1968). The low nurturance-high 
control subjects, having very probably received many punishments, few 
rewards, and little chance to emit autonomous behaviors" were marked 
underachievers. Both of these groups, with their susceptibility to ex­
ternal reinforcers, could be guessed to be conformers, of some kind. 
Conformity is, of course, in complete disharmony with creativity, as is 
dependence upon external, other-initiated rewards. The subjects of 
both groups laCk the necessary behaviors of autonomy and self-reinforce­
ment to be highly creative. 
Of most concern to us is the last group--those high in both con­
trol and nurturance presented by Heilbrun. The mothers of these sub­
jects have been generally described by him as Itoverprotectivett (Heilbrun 
and Waters, 1968). On the test of self-reinforcement effectiveness 
(Heilbrun and Norbert, 1970), these subjects showed themselves to be 
of intermediate degree of efficiency at self-reinforcement--theywers 
neither highly susceptible to external r~inforcement, nor were they 
highly responsive to self-reinforcement. Their idiosyncrasy shows up 
only in the achievement study (Heilbrun and Waters, 1968). The high 
control-high nurturance group was the very high group in terms of col­
lege achievement, even when ability and past achievement were taken into 
account. Without regard to ability, it was this combination of high 
levels of maternal reinforcement with strict and concerned control of 
the child which enabled that child to perform independent behaviors in 
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a new environment, resulting in academic achievement. 
It is our suggestion that tne subjects r~gh in both control and 
nurturance are not merely of "intermediate tl ranking in effectiveness 
of external versus internal reinforcements. We suggest that they are 
selectively susceptible to external reinforcers, and selectively cap­
able of internal reinforcement.. They are perhaps the group of Ifdepen­
dent independents11 we have previously discussed, who perform indepen­
dent behaviors in ord.er to obtain reinforcements from external source 
upon which they are in a significant way very dependent. These sub­
jects are presumably very concerned about approval from their elders, 
and will perform at optimum levels in order to obtain that approval. 
But they cannot be said to be independent as the highly nurtured Iittle­
controlled subject is independent, or as a creative subject is ind~pen-
dent, because their :reinforcements a re still yery much tied to external 
referents--tied with long ropes, perhaps, but tied, just the same. 
They are not simply conforining; they are conforming to an external 
expectation, and they maybe compulsively attempting ~o achieve that 
ideal. Comment Heilbrun and Waters (1968): 
To say that -the boy behave9 independently because he is de­
pendent may reflect exactly what the HC-h~ mother effects in 
~he son by her behavior. She is in a position to use control 
and nurturant reward to shape those forms of instrumental in­
dependence in the son of which she approves, and the son, in 
turn, may learn to perform more on his own in these areas be­
CBuse of his wish for her approval (p. 920). 
We propose that it is this pattern which is most often seen among 
the mothers of Getzels and Jackson's high-IQ group. It is patently ob­
vious that these mothers would be, considered high in control. "Control" 
was one of their major concerns in evaluating their children's school. 
Their attention and intervention were seen in practically ~ery aspect 
~ .._.. "'" 
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'of their children's lives. Their tendencies of high nurturance are 
less obviously demonstrated. But given the possibility that such nur­
turance or reinforcement can be quite selective in nature, the evidence 
-is plentiful enough. Their frequently given permission for the child 
:to stay home from school, their care and a ttention at obtaining the best 
:advantages for their children (mag~zines, books, and so on)--all of 
.these and other behaviors are the outline of a Ifvigilant1t (Getzels and 
Jackson) or "possessive" (Heilbrun) mother. 
And what is the response of the child to "lihese behaviors? Ac­

cording to Heilbrun and his aSSOCiates, it is high-level achievement 

and selective attention to external reinforcers. This is confirmed 

by evidence that bright students who are also high achievers are dis­

tinguishable by the vigilance, the involvement, and the tendency to 

reward academic interest found in their parents (McGillivray, 1964; 

Morrow and Wilson, 1961). The analogous group in the Getzels and 

·Jackson study, high-IQ, show similar concern for the expectations and 
demands of the adult world. Although both highly creative and highly 
'intelligent children shari themselves to be aware of what teachers and 
parents value as ideals for success, the self-reported ideals of the 
high-creativity group are quite different frqm the adult protocol-­
while the high-IQ children report personal ideals which match those 
of their elders almost point by point. These children are making pub­
lic announcement of their acceptance of adult standards and expectations 
and reinforcements as their own. 
It is basic to learning theory that an internalized reinforcement 
system, or the ability to reinforce one's self effectively, must be the 
result of socialization. There must be a ~ime when one is being exter­
187 

p.ally reinforced before one is capable in internalization (Mischel, 
1971). It is highly probable that the difference between high nurtur­
ance and low control and high-nurturance and high control is the degree 
of internalization of a reinforcement system. If a high degree of con­
·~rol is continually maintained over the child3 then he has little oppor­
tunity to learn self-monitoring and -reinforcement. By the time most 
pi his behavior patterns and reinforcement-seeking cognitive schemata 
are fonned, this child still has had little reinforcement for autono­
mous behaviors. In the low-control child, on the other hand, autonomy 
has been reinforced, not punished, and self-reinforcement has been 
~earned. The child is not continually attuned to possible external 
reinforcement sources with the strongest possible resemblance to his 
parents. He is capable of creative, independent behaviors. It is not 
surprising, then, that the Getzels and Jackson high-IQ group, among 
'Whose mothers this compuls:j.vity-engendering pattern of vigilance was 
found, were all the brightest children among a very bright population 
who were not also creative. And that these same children, who did not 
find their way to their creative potential, showed a common tendency in 
•the opposite direction. 
.. Although very little further research has been done on the environ­
mental specifics of creativity among the highly intelligent, there are 
groups of chil~ren finding themselves under approximately ~he same 
.uvigilant" conditions as Getzels and Jackson IS bigh-IQ group_ It should 
be of value to examine the effects of vigilance on other children. 
One of the most obviously vigilant parent groups are parents of 
first-born children. First-child parents are suggested by Lasko (1954) 
to be more anxious and protective about their child, more ready to 
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~nterfere with, criticize, or attempt' to accelerate p~m, and more con­
trolling and demanding of him. The child produced under these circum­
stances of vigilance was found by Schachter (1959) to be, under the 
stress conditions he created, more dependent upon other people as 
'.Sources of approval, support, help, and reference (po 82). tt He also 
concluded that they were more easily influenced by,oth-ers in a social 
situation than were later-borns. Becker, Lerner, and Carroll (1964) 
confirmed this apparent confo~ity to opinions of others for social 
purposes, but qualified the generalization with the finding that in 
tlinformational" situations, first-borns tended to trust more to thej.r 
own opinions than later-borns. This might be explained by the greater 
opportunity of the later-born child to ask for information from his 
peers, or by the first-born child's greater experience and confidence 
in obtaining information independentlyo High-IQ children~ou1d of course 
be expected to have the same confidence in informational tasks (Di Vesta, 
1959; Lucito, 1960; Gelfand, 1962). In spite of their independence in 
information tasks, first-born children (and high-IQ children) still 
exhibit conformity in social situations. 
To summarize, in first-borns we see children who have been brought 
up in a "vigilant, tt protective, demanding home, and who are as a result 
~ore dependent on the approval of others, especially adults, more likely 
to be conformists, and more likely to be high-Achievers. They have the 
elements of a pattern of compulsivity. The very same home pattern is 
found for Getzels' and Jackson r 5 high-IQ group, and es~entj.al1y the 
same compulsive elements: concern for meeting -the approval of adults, 
conformity to adult ideals, and high achievement. 
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II. OTHER FACTORS A~n) THEIR COMPLEXITY 
Why 40 the homes of high-IQ children who are not creativa follow 
this particular pattern? We suggest that since high-IQ children have 
a natural capacity for creativity, precisely these patterns are neces­
sary to produce a non-creative child. A high nurturance level estab­
lishes the parent as a reinforcer-shaper, and prevent.s the child from 
becoming a highly creative rebel or psychopath. A high control level 
keeps the child from internalizing his reinforcers, and developing 
independent behaviors. High expectations-keep him engrossed in achieve­
ment by a method of conformity and acceptability. Without control, he 
might exhibit autonomy, or spontaneity. It could happen, then, that 
most bigh-IQ children who do not have homes engendering creativity, 
have homes which produce compulsivity--because the factors which must 
be present to repress "natural" creativity are also those l"lhich are 
.necessary for campulsivity. 
MBny children mBnsge to survive uncreative home (and school) 
environments with their creative behaviors more or less intact. But 
we suggest that for the child of more or less average intelligence, who 
is not hyper-sensitized to his environment, such a task is not as dif­
ficult a s it may be for the gifted child. 
But this is not the op~yway to look at the problem. A novel 
approach (judged to be novel by the statistical rarity of its examples 
in the experimental literature) would be to examine the effect of the 
in~elligence of a child upon his home environment. L~ a recent survey 
by this writer of the intelligence literature, ~ studies were found 
which took as their concern this particularly fascinating problem. Can 
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this mean that the intelligence of a child, especially an extraordin­
arily high il'lteiligence" has no effect upon the way his parents will 
react to him?--upon the expectations they will have, or their uncer­
.taintyat child-rearing, or their interaction with him? Would it not 
be exceptionally easy to expect a precocious child to be "adult n 
s.ocially as well as mentally, and to demand more than he was capable 
~! performing? 
Experiments show that ambiguous situations, or situations of fail­
ure when a subject is accustomed to success" cause rigidity and con­
formity (Himmelstein, 1958; Gelfand, 1962). Is that, perhaps, the kind 
o£ situation in which both the parents of gifted children and the 
children themselves are found? Parents face situations which are un­
like their expectations abou.t children--a one-year-old c3plble of play­
ing practical jokes, or a two-year-old who teaches himself to reado 
And children may be presented with things they understand just as badly 
--reinf~rcement for mental prowess, but excessive physical or social 
demands which they do not know how to meeto Perhaps rigidit~· is the 
response of both to amgibuity• 
It is well to remember that children of high intelligence appear 
well capable of controlling their own behaviors, of inhibiting them­
selves, and of exhibiting moral behaviors (see Unger, 1964). How does 
a ~rent ,react to a child apparently so ready and able to perform in 
ethical, socially acceptable ways? fues the parent learn early to ap­
peal to the child1s morality in controlling his behavior?--or is it 
perhaps simply too easy to expect nearly perfect behavior of children 
who seem to be capable of fulfilling that expectation, and to demand 
from them the limits of their capability? 
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The question of the effect of offspring intelligence on parent­
child interactions is one tha t is i..11 desperate need of investigation. 
Even attitudinal surveys wou.ld mark an improvement in the available 
data. ~~at are badly needed, however, are observational studies with 
an approach as behaviorally specific as possible. Parental actions 
toward gifted children need to be compared with the behaviors exhibited 
by parents of average children. The difficulties in specifying differ­
ential behaviors which are the effect of a child's individual differ­
ences, and not the causes of them, are very large indeed•. But they 
must be attacked. 
Other difficulties involved in specifying the envir~nmental causes 
of creativity and compulsi vity among highly gifted children can be easily 
gleaned from existing research. Sex differences (in both children and 
parents) are of critical il"11portance in investigating the effectiveness . 
of models for oonformitory or imitative behavior O,fischel, 1971; 
.Rosenblith, 1961), or the effectiveness of parental reinforcement 
(Patterson, 1969; Patterson, Littman and Hinsey, 1964; stevenson, 1961), 
or interactions of anxiety and achievemeJ?t (Feldhusen and Klausmeier, 
1962) or the frequency of creativity among the very intelligent (Barron, 
1969). 
Age differences interact with sex differences in some learning 
situations ·(stevenson, 1961). In fact, age may be a high~y critical 
variable. We have suggested that there is a time when the child's 
schemata for cognitive and gross behavioral tendencies are formed, mora 
or. less to stability_ Thus, it is possible that children undergo a crit­
ical period for learning creative behaviors, or that there are stages 
involved Ll1 the learning of creativity--lik~ the decrement of amounts 
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of external control, or increasing reinforcement rate~ for independent 
behaviors. Hebb (1949) has made the point that the more intelligent 
species take longer to develop to maturity--there may be an analogous 
phenomenon at an intra-species level. It could be suggested that highly 
intelligent people are in part more socially sensitive because the,r re­
quire longer to develop their neurological systems to maturity--to 
develop their sche~ata--and are thus susceptible to environmental/ 
cultural influences for a longer period of timeo It is clear (in spite 
of-the fact that not enough data exists to make more than speculation 
about details) that any theor.y of the interaction between creativity 
and intelligence must make due consideration for age and developmental 
variables. 
A related area of concern is the question of reversibility of 
schemata. Since it has been partially demonstrated that creativity 
schemata are by their very. nature reversible, the .real question is the 
question of whether or not intelligent, noncreative adults can alter 
their schemata in the direction of creativity. It is predicted th~t 
since schemata are not~imple :responses, but complexes of learned re­
sponses and executive cognitive structures J they will be relatively 
stable and not easily reversible. It is very likely that a concerted 
effort at rennovating environmental contingencies, modeling, and shap­
ing creative behaviors would be n~cssary to produce creativity as a 
set of spontaneous behaviors in adults with well-established~ non­
creative schemata. If, however, there is anything hopeful presented 
in this paper, it is the conviction that creativity, within the limits 
of intelligence, is dependent upon environmental contingencies, and 
can be encouraged and shaped. 
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. -Many suggestions have been made as to how to encourage creativity 
in growing children (Getzels and Jackson, 1962; Torrance, 1962, 1965). 
Torrance, most especially has been involved in an admirable dual at­
tempt: to investigate empirically the effectiveness of modeling and 
reinforcing creativity, and to instigate L~ediately the techniqu~s, 
which are found to be effective--in as many situations as possib~e. 
This is part of the work which needs very much to be done, and a read­
ing of Rewarding Creati,:re Behavior (Torrance, 1965) will provide more 
insight into global methods for producing creativity than there is room 
here to eA~lore. But these kin~s of studies are necessarily molar and 
nonspecific. 
Of course, we have seen that approaches which t.oo heavily empha­
size isolated, specific aspects of creativity are not successful. It 
has become clear through our review of the creativi i:(r-training liter­
ature that the training of extremely molecular Itcreativef1 behavj.ors is 
unlikely to result in spontaneous gene~lization or transfer. Many dif­
ferent creative behaviors must be reinforced at once III many different 
ways, so that new discriminative ,stimuli are provided the individual 
for behaving creatively at different times in a different place. Thus, 
it is the interaction of wAny reinforcement patterns which results in ' 
c~eativity--at least during experimental training, and we can'wager 
that the same thing is true in nonexperimental settings. 
We know, then, that th~ evolution of creative behavior is deter­
mined globally, by the interaction of many patterns. And this is the 
nature of the approach taken by Torrance and others. But at present, 
when we wish to make use of suggestions for enhancing creativity, we 
must rely on what our own culturalization allows us to derive and act 
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out behaviorally fTom phrases like, nBe respectful of questions." A 
suggestion of this verY .. general nature tends to result in the appro­
priate, intra-culturally uniform, specific behaviors. But we should 
not forget that "respect" is a specific behavior pattern, if it is 
anything, and should be specifiable; and we must, specify, if we are 
to understand creativity and reach the limits of our ability to enhance 
it. 
The optimal approach is a combination of specific and global ap­
proaches. Behaviors of parents which act as discriminative stimuli or 
reinforcers of creativity among their children must be specified as 
clearly as possible, as well as the elements of the creativity itself. 
But specification of a few creative responses and their contingencies 
is essentially useless--it is the total pattern of such interactions 
which is significant. Therefore, enough behaviors must be tapped, and 
fine enough distinctions made, so that these over-all patterns are not 
lost. 
CHAPl'ER X 
A THEORY OF THE CREATIVITY-INTELLIGENCE INTERACTION: 
AN ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPRESSOR VARIABLE 
It has been our argument that highly intelligent children, be­
cause of the complex interaction of thailt high-level a rousal and :inhi­
bitory systems, have a great capacity for differentiation and complex­
ity in their cognitive systems, and that this capacity has a natural 
tendency to produce creative behaviors. _In fact, these covariables 
with intelligence are necessary, although not sufficient, for creative 
production at any significant level of abstraction. 
We have also argued that because of the veri same meohanisms which 
predispose the gifted child toward creativity, he is extremely suscep­
tibIa to envirorunental influence. He is capable of being more highly 
aroused or motivated in a given direction, and capable by his complex 
inhibitory systems of limiting his attention only to directions shaped 
and reinforced by his environment, perhaps during a Cl~tical period in 
lus life. Not only are his response tendencies at a cognitive level 
(attending, and the like) environmentally selected, but also the overt 
responses made to the stimuli to which he does attend. All of these 
response tendencies might be considered part of creative or noncreativa 
schemata which direct his behavioro 
Presumably, creative schemata differ from noncreative schemata 
in that they allow for rapid and temporary reorganizations of associs­
tional elements into new generalizations or search categories; they 
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must be heavj.ly overlapping, in order to allow for such rapid recombin­
ation. Also incorporated in the schelnata are hierarchies of reinforce­
ment contingencies or expectations for certain behaviors in certain sit­
uations~these, too, will discriminate betWeen the creative and the non­
creative. It is argued that noncreative -schemata will have a higher 
susceptibility to ongoing social reinforcement, while creative schemata 
may have inhibitory processes in effect for incoming social stimuli, 
and depend for direction mostly on already-experienced and -internalized 
reinforcements. 
The highly intelligent child might be guessed to be more adept 
at analysis of the contingencies of his environment and accurate in per­
formance of the behaviors which will meet the criteria for ~~inforce­
ment in that environment--no matter what the nature of the environment, 
or in what, direction it shapes him. Therefore, but for a faw qualifying 
evidences, it could easily be argued that the highly intelligent per­
son is equally sensitive to all directions in which he might be shaped, 
except for his tendenc.y at a cognitive level to perform creatively. 
Any behavioral tendency other than that toward creativity might be 
assumed to be completely open to the random selection of his surroundings. 
As expected from these assumptions, and as we have already seen~ 
there is a high incidence of creativity among the highly intelligent. 
Torrance (1962) estimated that approximately thirty percent of those 
students above the eichtieth percentile intellectually in the public 
schools are also above the eightieth percentile in cre~tivity. This is 
an estimat,e based upon many different studies in different schools, all 
with about the same results. Therefore, we can safely guess that about 
a t~rd of gifted school-age children have reached their potential in 
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c~ativity or have come near to reaching it. This 1'5 an acceptably 
heavy loading, given the assumption that high intelligence leads nat­
urally to high creativity-since we have never argued that environmental 
influences do not have great effect in determining the direction in 
which a child will invest his potential. 
If, however, all the other possible.behavioral .tendencies have a· 
random probability of occurrence, they should have a more or less evan 
distribution. We shall not have to identify all the other possible 
tendencies. A simple evaluation of the few we can identify should be 
sufficient to find if there is an even or uneven distribution of occur­
rence among them. 
For example, let us examine the general pattern of rebelliousness, 
intractability, and low aChievement, which often occurs in children of 
average or below average intelligence. Of course this pattern is not 
unknown among children of high intelligence; and when it does appear, 
it may be manifest to an axtreme degree, true to our expectation that 
any tendency will be more intensely followed by the gifted. But the 
overall incidence of any low achievement or antisocial behaviors among 
the gifted is extremely slight (Terman, 1925; Terman and Oden, 1947; 
Jaggers, 1934, and others). The distribution of frequenc.y does not ap­
pear to be an even one at all. 
Wbat constructs can we invoke to provide explanation for the ap­
parent avoidance of underachievement among the highly intelligent as an 
overall strategy? It is wise to think almost in terms of econoll'.ics if 
we. wish to understand what we see. It is the natural dispoSition of 
all organisms to get the most reinforcement (primary or secondar,y) pos­
sible from the smallest possible investment· of energies. The growing 
198 
human being, in the process of evolving and developing his own behav­
±oral schemata, is no exception to this rulee The child will do what 
'he must in order to get the most social reinforcers for the least ef­
fort invested. This means that he must use his particular abilities 
,e~ficiently. Underac~evemen~, disobedience, and rowdiness may be the 
most effective v~ay of gaining attention for the average or below-average 
child--an investment in school work and obedience is most likely to 
,bring only partial failure and punishment. 
For the gifted child, the situation is quite different. An in­
vestment of energies in ~chool work, obedience, and responsibility has 
a high probability of paying off well in social r einforcernent from the 
teacher--and therefore, from the peers. In point of fact, there is no 
other means of response which has as high a probability of success and 
;rewerd for him as does responsibility and scholarship--not even cre­
ativity. Any child is capable of making an original response, and eval­
uations and judgments of creative products are more subjective and un­
.predictable than those of factual products. All in all, the child has 
a much lower hope of success in competing with his peers creatively than 
. he has in ftacademic lt competition. He will very naturally play to his 
comparative strengths. 
Of course, if the school system were structured in such a way as 
to demand creativity above encyclopaedic knowledge of facts, the highly 
~telligent child would' be forced to adapt hi-mself to the new set of 
contingencies. He would invest his complex cognitive abilities in 
, .. ,.. 
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creative responding, and very like1ywould be" better at it~than his 
peers.? In such Itcreative tt schools, flexibility could be as much a 
part of the curriculum as reading-every subject could be taught from 
n~ny different points of view, instead of one. Skinner (1972a) has 
pointed out: 
• • • we do not need to abandon subject matter in order to 
teach discovery. It is not true that if we fill the stu­
dent t s haa d with fa cts he will be unable to think for him­
self. He is not damaged by fa cts but only by the ways in 
. which facts have been taught (p. 338). 
As things stand in our society, however, creativity is not the 
preferred mode of response, and stu~ents are being harmed by the way 
facts are taught. The school system seems excessively guilty in this 
regard, with its strong emphasis on conformity and control. 8 Although 
it is easy to make intuitive and experiential judgment that creativity 
is not reinforced in the school system, we have also seen more objective 
data supporting our suspicions (Getzels and Jackson, 1962; Torrance, 
1962). Evidently, the extra "disruptiveness" and playfulness of cre­
ative children is more bothersome to the teacher than their creativity 
is valuable. With such risks attached to creative behavior, it is no 
wonder that only the student who "has a lesser certainty of strictly 
academic Sllccess can afford to invest his efforts in creativity and < 
.rely upon the sparse schedule of reinforcement it represents. 
?There is evidence that in very "creative fl school systems," corre­
lations between IQ and creativity are higher than elsewhere. Refer to 
data of schools nA" and flD" in Torrance. (1962) although he does not 
draw these assumptions from the data. 
BIt is perhaps no accident that the high IQ-low creativity sub­
jects of Getzels and Jackson (1962) were in many cases the children of 
teachers or professors. 
200 
If the intelligent child does not have the necessary envi~l1- I 
mental contingencies outside the typical classroom, from early ~ his 
I 
li£e--eontingeneies specifically counteractive of school reinfor~a~ent 
patterns-he will almost assuredly choose to behave in a patter.n:lof 
responsible, compulsive attention to scholarly alld factual achievement. 
He will choose a pattern of uconve~gence, It in a very real sense, be­
cause he will constantly be looking for the "right, ft and acceptable 
behavior with a high probability of being reinforced. This may well 
generalize into moral and social areas--he may extend the pattern, and 
seek in these domains as well the "rightlt' and accept.able behavior, as 
reinforced by those in authority. The compulsive child of high intel­
ligenoe will attend constantly to those social, verbal and nonverbal 
cues that tell him which behaviors to emit. His inhibitory capaci­
ties will enable him to limit his attention to these cues, and to con­
trol his other behaviorso He will become the vigilant, responSible, 
.moral, socially-sensitive, high-achieving, gifted child we have so 
often bean shown in research results. The more he is reinforced for 
social reactivity, the more this pattern will affect him. 9 
Unfortunately, susceptibility to this pattern may be heightened 
by higher and higher levels of intelligence•. Although the gifted per­
son's potential for creativity is undoubtedly greater with extremely 
9It is very significant that girls, who are known to be much more 
socially responsive in nonverbal ways (Exline, 1963) than boys, are 
also more responsible and more achievement-oriented than boys, until 
late adolescence. In a study of creative women, Barron (1969) found 
th~t they were very much unhappier than their noncreative peers, lead­
ing to speculation that creativity is not an acceptable pattern for 
female behavior in our society. 
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high intelligence, so, too, is his potential for compulsive attention 
to detail and success in meeting the expectations of others. If. this 
is true, we should expect to find not only that the extreme case of 
flexibility (high creativity) has a high concentration of the 'highly 
~telligent, but also that extreme compulsivitywould have a higher­
tha~-expected frequency of occurrence among the highly intelligent. 
Before we evaluate the data on this point, let us make note of 
the fact that extreme coropulsivity is not very likely to be thought 
unusual in our culture. In its inflexibility, it might be expected to 
be an undesirable thing, its disadvantages socially recognized. But 
-it is this end of the continuum which is preferred; given the alterna­
tivas of creativity or coropulsivity, our culture will choose and rein­
force comvulsivity. Therefore, individuals with even a marked degree 
of compulsivity--well.beyond any margin of adaptability--will not be 
.readily recognized as "devianto" Rather, they will more likely be 
.labeled tlmodel, tt or "ideal. It It Deviant" subj ects will represent only 
.~he very most extreme cases, and their namber will appear smaller than 
. might be accurately estimated, were the facts known. 
In comparing compulsivity and IQ, there is an additional problem. 
Highly intelligent subjects have been shown to be capable of more fac­
ilitative response patterns under conditions or states of stress. We 
can very easily assume that they might also be better at handling. a 
compulsive behavior pattern or strategy, without overt emotional 
"problems, It and would still less often than others be diagnosed as 
deviant or neurotic. 
With this in mind, let us attempt to define what psychological 
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The Diagno~tic and Statistical 1~nual of Mental Disorders of the Ameri­
can Psychiatric Association defines the obsessive-compulsive personal­
ity disorder in this manner: 
This behavior pattern is characterized by excessive concern 
with conformity and adherence to standards of conscience. 
Consequently, individua~s in this group may be rigid, over­
inhibited, over-conscientious, over-dutiful, and unable to 
relax easily. This disorder may lead to an obsessive com­
pulsive neurosis••• (1968, p. 43). 
With this quite ext.reme degree of compulsiveness asour cnter­
ion, and with the stipulations we have stated in mind, it can be shawn 
that intelligence is related to the obsessive-compulsive :p3rsona11ty 
disorder. Says Slater (1945): 
It is also generally agreed that neuroses of different types 
tend to occur among persons of different orders of intelli­
gence: in particular, obsessional neuroses among highiy in­
telligent persons (p. 40). 
Although he found no evidence that other neuroses could be dif­
ferentiated by any intellectual measure, the ngenerally a greed" upon 
hypothesis that obsessive~compu1sives are on the average more intel­
ligent than other neurotics was supported. Ingram (1961) obtained 
corroborative results. 
What we apparently find here is that their environment tends to 
shape lughly intelligent people in one particular direction: compul-. 
~ivity. Although they have natural itendencies toward creativity, at 
a cognitive level, only a third of them approach their creative poten­
tial. The rest, with very few exceptions, choose achievement and com­
pulsive, responsible, ongoing attention to social re~forcements (from 
authorities) as their life pattern. A few of these are higbly:respon­
siva to an extremely demanding or restrictive environment, and they 
will tend in disproportionate numbers to be clinically diagnosable as 
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. obsessive-compulsives. But most of them ara somewhere in between, 
hav:i.ng been reinforced for some flexib!i.lity and 80:ne creativa behav­
iors and falling at neither extreme of the croativity-compulsivity 
continuum. 
Although most of the gifted will fall batween the extremes, the 
higher the individual's intelligence level the more pressure toward 
compulsivity is exerted upon him by his surroundincs. He may la ck the 
common viewpoint or experience of those less intelligent, he may find 
himself only marginally accepted because of his uniqueness, and he may 
find that success at concrete learning is simply too reliable to give 
up. Therefore, as his potential for creativity grows, so do the en­
vircnmental influences against creativity. This environmental influ­
anee, stronger on him the more intelligent he is, and far stronger on 
him than on his peers of average intelligence, is responded to more 
and more int{~nsively, with increasingly high intelligence. The higher
,'-: 
·the intelligence level, the stronger is this pressur~ compared to
'.. 
the increases in creative potential. And this combination of factors 
is our suppressor variable. It is this matrix of variables which 
causes correlational studies to indicate a ceiling to creativity in­
creases with IQ elevations. It is this group of variables which causes 
zero correlations between IQ and creativity to appear in high IQ ranges. 
It is this·variable complex which prevents extremely high IQ individ­
uala from reaping, as a group, the benefits of their great creative 
potential. 
The suppressor variable does not appear to be biological in ori­
gin (although it could not acc~~plish what it does wi tilout certain bio­
logical factors, like j . .IlJ.l.ibitory processes). 'It is therefore environ­
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mentally-based, and avoidable. There is no reason to assume, as Torrance 
(1962) does, that intelligence in itself is inimical to creativitYe 
Nor that highly intelligent children are hopelessly plodding and 
encyclopaedic. 
But special attention rrmst be given to highly intelligent chil­
dren, so that they may be "vaccinated" against our culture, before :tt 
destroys or maims their creative IX'tential. We nmst find out how par­
ents may be particularly susceptible to expecting hyperresponsibility 
and conformity from them. And, eventually, we must change the behav­
ioral contingencies in our school systems and in the culture, ~enerally. 
If these steps are taken, we shall be able to realize far greater crea­
tive potential than we have yet gleaned from the brightest among our 
children. 
If the steps are not taken, we must make do with the creativity 
we do get from the fe'fl highly intelligent children who are raised in 
an effectively creative enviro~~ent, and from the less intelligent 
children--who, having less to lose, are able to take the risks involved, 
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APPENDIX 
A theoretical system is beneficial because it introduces order 
where once there was chaos. That is its most obvious benefite But 
the pro.cess of, theory construction has other signifi cant by-products. 
Ey assuming a theoretical position, one is led to approach the tasks 
of experimentation and observation in a more systematic way. In order 
to carry out the process of theory testing-no matter what validity 
the theory may have--one is led to choose certain areas of study over 
others, to follow a pattern, to persist until a thing is either known 
to be true, or known not to be true. 
It is our purpose here to indicate the direction (or directions) 
of research suggested by the present theory of the creativity-intelli­
gence interaction. Some of the areas suggested will be tests of the 
theory: others will not. Some suggestions will indicate new or pres­
ently underdeveloped research areast others will indicate areas which 
have been overdeveloped or in which new methods seem to be necessary. 
Although the ~ginative experimentalist will be able to ~erive 
many more useful applications from the present theory than we might be 
able 'to enumerate, some of the more obvious ones can be presented here. 
They will be presented in terms of the specific area of investigation 
they suggest. 
The correlation of creativity with personality .tI.:traits.tt Since, 
as we have suggested, little foundation can be found for the Utrait lt ­
concept itself, the finding of relationships be~veen t~aits and other 
variables is of extremely limited value. Furthermore, a great deal of 
141M" mt tr 7S'· i 11 
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this kind of research has already been done--it is probably the most 
thoroughly explored aspect of creativity--and what value it has had 
in the past can now easily be superseded by other areas, of critical 
significance, which remain untouched. 
The anxiety research. Although it suffers from the same difficul­
"ties as the st?dy of personality traits, the a~~ety research has a few 
particular problems of its own. Anxiety must be specified in terms of 
situation, individual, and response tendencY if research results are 
to be readily usable. Although much has been irrvested in investigating 
the -interaction of anxiety and intelligence, little more will be gained 
through further investigation unless the kinds of responses made to 
anxiety are clearly specified, anxiety is clearly defined, and intel­
ligenca is consistently accounted for in research design. 
The achievement rasearch~ It is not proposed here that we elL~-
inata achievement as an area of significant concern--only that we limit 
our observations to behaviors which can be defined as achievement, and 
~xclude concern with need for achievement until this concept has a 
stronger and clearer theoretical and methodological foundation. 1~ny 
problems (such as the confusion of independence from parents with the 
, 
"independence lt corresponding to need for achievement) make the" design~ 
~f present achievement research almost inapplicable to investigations 
of intelligence. If we are ac~ura te in our prediction that intelligent 
children have a kind of social sensitivity but also achieve in extra­
ordinary measure, the field of achievement .!1"esearch n~eds" drastic re­
vision before it will be able to prese!lt an adequa.te test of the theory. 
91:eativity and generalization. It is the suggestion of this paper 
that creativity is represent~tive in part of an ability at the cognitive 
{ s ,tC', t, t r 1 t , .. 
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level to generate and regenerate useful generalizations containing 
different populations of elements. This is closely related to Bruner's 
(1964) suggestion that creativity actually is a kind of generalization 
or abstraction. It would thus be helpful to determine whether or not 
creatiye subjects are better at forming generalizations rapidly. For 
example, do cr~ative subjects more, efficiently provide a common title 
for' a group of miscellaneous objects? And are they then better able to 
invent another title, when some, but not all, of the objects are sub­
st~tuted? Or, do creative subjects construct a larger number of cat­
egories into which a group of objects can be classified, and do these 
show a greater overlap in category construction? 
Computer simulations. Although Schroder (Karlins, 1967; Karlins
• 
at a1., 1967; Schroder, et al., 1967) has initiated a great daal of 
research comparing c~eativity to certain kinds of structures and opera­
tions in computers, little has been done to extend this research to 
. include intelligence. This may be the most promising (and perhaps the 
only) means for discovering the differences between creativity and 
intelligence at a cognitive level. An attempt should be made to de­
sign executive prograrr~ wruch can simulate creative or intelligent but 
noncreative behavior, or to tap these phenomena by observing what 
computer resources are used and how they are used differentially by 
subjects who are intelligent or creative. 
Flexibility of creativity. ~~though the strong implication of 
several research results (McDonald and Martin, 1967; Walla ch and Kogan" 
1965a, 1965b; Duncan, 1959) is that creative subjects are able to re-
spend well in ways that are both typical and atypical for them, while 
noncreative subjects cannot respond in atypical ways without great. 
t.t Ot 
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difficulty, there is little direct evidence of the idea that creativity 
schemata are mostly instructions of flexibility at a high "executive" 
level of cognition. An experimental study needs to be designed spec­
ifically to test the idea, so that we need not depend upon the by­
products of research designed for completely different purposes. The 
McDonald and Martin (1967) method could be used-an approach in which 
creative subjects were taught a pattern which would not characteristic­
ally be chosen by them, and noncreative subjects taught a ttcreative" 
pattern, and both were compared for rate and efficiency of learning. 
Intelligence and stimulus complexit~. Although there are many, 
many studies in which creative subjects have been fOund to prefer vi­
sual stimuli which are asymmetrical and complex, (Barron, 1957, 1958), 
this format has not been applied to the question of intelligence. 
Beck (1968) has found tentative evidence of this kind, working with the 
Rorschach. And it might be predicted from our theory that intelligence 
would covary with a preference for complex, asymmetrical stimuli-­
although the suppressor variable which limits creativity might also 
have its effects on stimulus preferences. Nevertheless, research in 
this area would indicate how much of Barron Ss results is due to the 
effects of intelligence, and it might help to clarify hmv exte~~ive 
are the effects of the suppressor variable. 
Delay of gratification and creativity. Although correlations 
have been discovered be~leen ability to delay gratification and 
intelligence, it has not been related in anyway to creativity. It 
might be predicted that creativity would be enhanced by ability to 
delay gratification, and, although not crucial to the theory, such a 
result would tend t~ remove further any suspicion that intelligence 
f .. Z t M4> t 
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(or covarying ability to delay gratification) is intrinsically opposed 
to creativity_ 
Vigilance and IQ. It will be impossible to investigate the true 
relationship (if any) between intelligence and the vigilance phenomenon, 
until methods are devised to present stimuli to experimental subjects 
which are complex enough so that information-processing ability can 
actually be used to advantage in a "vigilant" response mode. The use 
of dramatic or narrative films rather than stimulus cards as the source 
of stimulus input might be a beginning of the process of complication 
which must be carried out in the vigilance research, if intelligence 
is ever to be fully investigated. 
Success, rigidity, and intelligence. In order to determine if 
a high probability of academic success can stunt creativity and result 
in compulsive adherence to academic pursuits among the highly intelli­
gent, some experiments of a slightly less global nature might be of 
potential relevance and use. For example, do subjects who have a high 
probability of success at a task (that is, history of successes for 
the task during the experimental treatment) show a rigid adherence to 
that task when given the choice of other tasks? Do they manifest a 
tendency to remain steadfastly in one particular mode of response on < 
~ single task, when that mode has proven successful, as compared with 
those who have experienced a few failures? The smaller questions, if 
anmvered, would provide a good basis, for conjecture about larger ones. 
Self-reinforcement and creativity. Although fr~m the Heilbrun 
and Norbert (1970) description of e~fectively self-reinforcing subjects 
and their mothers, we might well assume that self-reinforcers are more 
creative than other subjects, this has not been specifically tested. 
,#tm w 
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Therefore, a design must be constructed in which creative subjects 
(who are known to be more independent and more self-valuing) can be 
determined to be more or less efficient at self-reinforcement than 
others. Vlhen given a task and told to reinforce themselves, will they 
do so more often? Will they respond more to their ~Nn reinforcement 
·than other subjects do? Will they respond more to their own reinforce~ 
ment than they respond to reinforcement from others? The answers to 
these questions will help us establish the kind of learning history 
human beings must have in order to behave creatively. 
Explicit specification of creativity variables. Research must be 
done on the specific behaviors, and the total patterns of specific be­
haviors, which result in creativity. This can be done only with a com­
bination of observational research and creativity-training experiments. 
Training experiments could well be elaborated to a broader scale than 
they have been as yet. Groups could be chosen whose parents would 

. undergo extensive training in how to train their children to behave 

creatively, and observations made over a long period of time. With 

intensive creativity training, over long periods of time, high-IQ 
children would be expected (according to the "present theory) to make 
greater gains in creativity than children with l~ler IQts. 
The effects of intelligence 'in children upon their parents. 
Although it is not now clear to this writer how the problems involved 
can be solved, research must be carried out on the effects of intelli­
gence upon the parent-child interaction. That this kind of research 
could best be served by observational methods is clear--how the effects 
of the child's intelligence could be distinguished from other variables 
is not at all clear. The results of such ~esearch, hrnY6Ver, would pro-
r 
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vide many of the fine-grained elaborations needed ,by the theoretical 
system as lie have presented it. 
